Thursday, 27 November 2014

Extraordinary Meeting of the Council of Ministers from November 21st, 2014

Presidency of the Council of Ministers

V Constitutional Government
.............................................................................................................................
Dili, November 21st, 2014
Press Release
 
The Council of Ministers met extraordinarily this Friday, November 21st, 2014, in the Council of Ministers Meeting Room, at the Government Palace, in Dili, and approved two diplomas:
 
1. Government Resolution approving the Investment Agreement with Heineken Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd.
 
The Heineken Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd proposed project, for the construction of a beer factory in Timor-Leste, entails an investment exceeding forty million dollars.
Following the proposal evaluation by an Investment Commission comprised by several institutions, and whose results were presented to the Council of Ministers on the meeting of September 17th, the Government has decided to approve an Investment Agreement with Heineken, under which some tax benefits provided for in the Investment Law are conceded to the company.
 
2. Decree Law regulating the Special Development Fund
 
The Fund is aimed at financing, in an efficient, safe and transparent way, the implementation of a set of projects included in the development plan for the Special Administrative Region of Oe-Cusse Ambeno.
 
The Council of Ministers also analyzed four presentations:
 
1. Pelican Paradise Investment Project
 
The State Secretariat for the Support and Promotion of the Private Sector presented to the Council of Ministers the investment project from the international company Pelican Paradise Holdings Timor-Leste located in Singapore, for the construction and exploration of a five star hotel complex located between Díli and Tibar, with an investment of around 310 million dollars.
 
The project includes a hotel with 492 bedrooms, gym, restaurant, spa, convention center for one thousand and five-hundred people, golf course, commercial area and residential area.
 
During the construction stage of the hotel complex, the Investor estimates that one-thousand and five-hundred direct jobs may be created, 70% to 80% of which can be carried out by Timorese. Once the hotel complex is completed and operational, the investor foresees that 830 jobs will be established and maintained, 70% to 80% of which can be carried out by Timorese.
 
2. Arbitration Process and Maritime Boundaries Dispute
 
The Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources presented, to the Council of Ministers, an current assessment of the Arbitration Process and Maritime Boundaries Dispute.
 
3. Timor GAP Activity Report
 
The Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, alongside the President for Timor GAP, E.P. has presented, to the Council of Ministers, the company’s Activity Report, for the years 2012 and 2013. The documents include detailed data on human resources, accomplished projects and projects to be developed, Timor-Leste Onshore prospecting studies, business and partnership opportunities, development of the National Oil industry, joint petroleum development area, amongst others.
 
4. Calendar of Activities during the Presidency of the CPLP
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation presented, to the Council of Ministers, the calendar of the activities scheduled to occur during the Rotating Presidency of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLC), by Timor-Leste (2014-2016), and of which the highlights are the high level ministerial meetings between ministers of several areas, from the nine countries belonging to this organization.

Xanana Expresses Discontent Scorn and Anger towards Australia

Written by Tempo Semanal
 

Governo aprova investimento da cervejeira Heineken em Timor-Leste

http://noticias.sapo.tl/portugues/info/artigo/1422783.html

26 de Novembro de 2014, 10:47

 
O Governo anunciou ontem a aprovação dum projeto da cervejeira Heineken para construir uma fábrica de cerveja no país, num investimento superior a 40 milhões de dólares, segundo comunicado divulgado à imprensa.
 
"Na sequência da avaliação da proposta, por uma Comissão de Investimento composta por várias instituições, cujos resultados foram apresentados ao Conselho de Ministros na reunião de 17 de setembro, o Governo decidiu aprovar um Acordo de Investimento com a Heineken, ao abrigo da qual lhe são concedidos alguns benefícios fiscais previstos na Lei de Investimento", refere em comunicado.
 
A Heineken Ásia, baseada em Singapura, tinha já anunciado intenção de investir 40 milhões de dólares (cerca de 31 milhões de euros) no país para construir uma fábrica e produzir cervejas e bebidas alcoólicas e não alcoólicas.
 
A empresa, que em Timor-Leste está registada como Heineken Timor, S.A, pretende criar 1000 postos de trabalho no país.
 
No mesmo comunicado, referente à reunião de Conselho de Ministros do passado dia 21, o Governo informa que analisou um projeto de investimento de uma empresa com sede em Singapura para a construção e exploração de um complexo hoteleiro de cinco estrelas entre Díli e Tíbar, onde deverá ser construído o novo porto do país.
 
Segundo o comunicado, o investimento ronda os 310 milhões de dólares e na fase inicial de construção deverá criar 1500 postos de trabalho diretos.
 
"Quando estiver concluído e em funcionamento, o investidor prevê que sejam criados e mantidos 830 postos de trabalho, sendo que 70% a 80% podem ser preenchidos por timorenses", refere o comunicado.

@Lusa

Wednesday, 26 November 2014

PF Q3 Report - "Incomes did not exceed expenses" is an unfair assessment

*Cosme da Costa Araujo
Lao Hamutuk and the Diplomat rightly pointed out that Petroleum Fund balance decreased in Q3, compared to Q2 balance. The decrease, as they mentioned, was due to foreign exchange losses and also transfer made to the State Budget.

But arguing that "FOR THE FIRST TIME, EAST TIMOR'S INCOME FROM OIL AND GAS OPERATIONS DID NOT EXCEED THE EXPENSES RELATED TO THE OIL FUND" is unfair.

It seems that their conclusion is based on the following calculation - petroleum revenues in Q3 ($522 mil) minus losses and transfers ($340+231), resulted in about negative $50 mil.

However, it is an unfair comparison in terms of the time period and not a true representation of the withdrawal. Ideally, the government should smooth the expenditure (withdrawal) over the year, by taking out $158 mil/quarter (of total ESI amount of $632 that is expected to be withdrawn in 2014).

The $340 mil amount mentioned here is the total amount the Government had withdrawn so far in 2014 from the Petroleum Fund, just half of the budgeted ESI amount. This amount happened to be a "lump sump" withdrawal in Q3 (as no withdrawals were made in Q1 & Q2). Q3 therefore is bearing the burden of the withdrawal.

To be fair, in term of period comparison, it is better to look at the-year-to-date (YTD) numbers. In doing so, we can see that even if the Government manages to withdraw total ESI amount ($632 mil) by the end of 2014, it is still less than the total revenue received for the year to date ($1,606 mil), not to mention revenues from investment return ($365 mil year to date).

The declining trend in revenue is something that the Government acknowledges publicly in its Annual Budget Book 1. According to that report revenues have peaked in 2012 and are expected to decline from 2013 onward until they cease in 2020 - 2022.


KOREKSAUN BA NOTÍSIA TIMOR POST - KONABA “INVESTIMENTU FUNDU PETROLÍFERU”

Iha loron Kuarta, dia 26 Novembru 2014, Jornal Timor Post fo sai notísia ida iha seksaun Ekonomia nian, pájina 11 ho títulu “Osan Mina Hamutuk US$ 2,579 Investe iha Nasaun 14”.
 
Notísia ida ne’e bazeia ba aprezentasaun ne’ebé Sr. Cosme da Costa Araujo, reprezentante husi Unidade Administrasaun Fundu Petrolíferu, Ministériu Finansas, ne’ebeé hetan konvite husi ONG Luta Hamutuk hodi halo aprezentasaun iha loron Tersa, dia 25 Novembru 2014 kona ba “Investimentu Fundu Petrolíferu Timor-Leste” iha sede Luta Hamutuk, Farol, Dili.  
 
Objetivu husi aprezentasaun ne’e maka “atu haforsa kapasidade média hodi halo kobertura ba notísia relasiona ho Fundu Petrolíferu no hasae partisipante sira nia konesimentu konaba Fundu Petrolíferu”.
 
Ami nota katak notísia ne’ebé fo sai balun ladun lós. Tan ne’e, liu husi koreksaun ida ne’e, ami hakarak hadiak fali salan hirak ne’e.
 
Leitores sira presiza tau iha neon katak dadus balun ne’ebeé uza ba aprezentasaun ne’e to’o deit iha fim  Juniu 2014. Nune’e informasaun balun seidauk “update” ho relatóriu ofisial sira ne’ebé fo sai tiha.
 
Aprezentasaun ba mídia sira ne’e hahú hodi hateten katak objetivu estabelese Fundu Petrolíferu maka hodi “maneija ho diak reseitas petrolíferas atu nune’e bele fo benefisiu ba jerasaun agora no mos jerasaun futuru”.
 
Wainhira Fundu Petrolíferu hahú investimentu iha 2005, ita adopta estratéjia investimentu ida simples, hodi investe hotu deit iha obrigasaun sira nivel a’as demoninadu iha dolar EUA. Iha tempu ne’ebá Lei Fundu Petrolíferu No.9/2005 permite mínimu 90% husi Fundu investe iha rendimento fixo  (bonds) demoninadu iha moedas EUA ho nivel a’as no 10% investe iha instrumentu finanseiru sira seluk.
 
Iha tempu ne’ebá estratéjia refere importante tebes hodi tulun Fundu evita espozisaun ba risku no volatilidade, no iha tempu hanesan mos hakbiit no hasae ita nia kapasidade. Maibe estratéjia refere la sustentável, tamba kada tinan ita hasai 3% Rendimentu Sustentável Estimativa (RSE) husi Fundu Petrolíferu, enkuantu investimentu husi Fundu refere fo deit retornu menus husi 2% real.
 
Tamba ne’e, razaun fundamental hodi halo mudansa ba Lei Fundu Petrolíferu maka hodi diversifika investimentu Fundu Petrolíferu liu husi halo investimentu ba iha klase ativu oin-oin, hodi nune’e ita bele hetan aliñamentu entre polítika investimentu ho polítika fiskal. Mudansa ba estratéjia investimentu ne’e haforsa liu tan diversifikasaun hodi ajuda Fundu Petrolíferu mantein prezervasaun kapital, no evita risku konsentrasaun iha klase ativu ida deit.
 
Lei Fundu Petrolíferu foun (Lei No.9/2005, amendada ho Lei No.12/2011) ne’ebé foi lalais ne’e hetan revizaun prevee katak Fundu Petrolíferu investe másimu 50% iha ações públicas, no mínimu 50% investe iha rendimento fixo no la liu husi 5% investe iha instrumentos alternativos. Ita espera katak ho estratéjia investimentu foun, 60% iha obrigasaun no 40% iha asaun, iha probabilidade razoável katak iha longu-prazu Fundu bele atinji retornu real 3%, hanesan ho 3% RSE, ne’ebé sai hanesan sasukat transferênsia anual ba orsamentu estadu.
 
Governu desidi iha tinan 2012 hodi hasae investimentu ba ações públicas, ho montante 0.83% kada fulan durante tinan rua nia laran to’o Juñu 2014 hanesan meius ida prudenti liu hodi atinji objetivu alokasaun 40% ba investimentu iha asaun. Hanesan investor longu-prazu, Fundu Petrolíferu prontu atu asumi risku hodi nune’e bele atinji média retornu longu-prazu ne’ebé a’as. Governu mos desidi iha tinan 2013 hodi diversifika liu tan karteira rendimento fixo hodi redúz konsentrasaun iha Tezouru EUA (Estadus Unidus Ámerika) . Espozisaun inísiu 10% aloka ba obrigasaun nasaun soberanu dezenvolvidu sira ex-EUA, ho limitasaun másimu 30% alokasaun ba Zonaeuro no másimu 10% iha nasaun ida.
 
Agora daundaun, Fundu Petrolíferu investe 60% in Tezouru EUA, 10% iha obrigasaun nasaun soberanu non-EUA no 40% iha asaun merkadu dezenvolvidu. Investimentu Fundu Petrolíferu jere husi BCTL (40%), BIS (10%), Jestor Interinu (5%), AllianceBernstein (5%), SSgA (18%), Blackrock (17%) no Schroders (5%). Fundu Petrolífefru investe iha mais de 2,579 títulus finanséirus, husi ne’ebé 70% investe iha EUA, no restu investe iha nasaun zona Europa, Japaun, Reinu Unidu, Kanadá, Austrália no nasaun dezenvolvidu sira seluk hanesan Dinamarka, Hong Kong, Israel, Nova Zelândia, Noruega, Cingapura, Suécia, no Suísa.
 
Desde Fundu estabelese iha tinan 2005, total reseitas petrolíferas ne’ebé hetan husi esplorasaun kampu rua – Bayu Undan no Kitan, hamutuk $19 billoens. Husi montante ne’e, $5,2 biloens transfere ona ba orsamentu estadu. Total retornu investimentu ita hetan desde inisíu hamutuk 4.4% ou reseitas investimentu akumuladu hamutuk 2.4 biloens. Total Fundu nia balansu iha fim Juniu 2014 hamutuk $16.6 biloens.
 
Tinan 2013 sai hanesan tinan ida diak tebes ba merkadu asaun iha ekonomia nasaun dezenvolvidu sira, enkuantu merkadu obrigasaun la fo retornu ne’ebé diak iha tinan ne’ebá. Iha tinan 2013 deit retornu investimentu husi asaun a’as tebes ho 27%. Maibe retornu asaun tinan ida ne’ebá ita konsidera hanesan eksepsaun ida, tamba sei susar tebes ba merkadau asaun hodi fo rezultadu hanesan iha tinan 2014.
 
Diferensia iha dezenpeñu entre asaun no obrigasaun hatudu mai ita importansia husi diversifikasaun. Wainhira ita investe iha klase ativu oin-oin, ne’ebé dala barak iha mudansa la hanesan, maka Fundu sei hetan protesaun husi impaktu temporáriu retornu negativu entre klase ativu sira ne’e ida.
 
Governu agora daundaun hanoin hela atu hadiak liu tan karteria investimentu obrigasaun no asaun hodi investe iha sub-klase ativu sira seluk atu bele hadiak karaterístika risku no retornu Fundu Petrolíferu.
 

Tuesday, 25 November 2014

Timor-Leste most tax competitive country in Portuguese-speaking world

November 24th, 2014  
 
 
Timor-Leste (East Timor) is the highest rated among the Portuguese-speaking countries in the list of most competitive nations in the world in terms of tax burden, according to the “Paying Taxes 2015″ study by PricewaterhouseCoopers, published recently.

The study puts Timor-Leste in 55th place, ahead of Portugal in 64th and at a great distance from the other Portuguese-speaking countries – Angola (144th), Brazil (177th), Cabo Verde (91st), Guinea-Bissau ( 150th) Mozambique (123rd) and Sao Tome and Principe.

This list is drawn up based on a set of indicators such as the tax burden for businesses, the number of hours spent dealing with tax issues and the number of annual payments.

In the case of Timor-Leste, the tax applied to companies is at a rate of 11 percent, the number of hours needed to deal with tax matters is 276 and the number of annual payments is 18.

In the case of Portugal the corporate tax burden is 42.4 percent, the number of hours is 275 and the number of payments is only eight.

This study by PricewaterhouseCoopers comparing the tax burden of 189 world economies and drawn up in cooperation with the World Bank, shows that on average companies make eight annual tax payments (a number that has remained constant) and spend 275 hours dealing with tax matters. (macauhub/AO/BR/CV/GW/MZ/PT/ST/TL)

“Juíz Timor oan hetan ameasa” – sé lós mak bosok iha ne’e?

*Cosme da Costa Araujo

 Foin lalais ne’e, mídia internasional, liu-liu sira ne’ebé iha Portugal, no “copy paste” tutan husi mídia lokal balun no naklekar makás lós iha mídia sosial hanesan Facebook, hateten “juiz Timor oan sira hetan ameasa”. 
 
Notísia surpresa ida ne’e mosu, hafoin prokuradora portuguêsa, Sra Glória Alves, ne’ebé hetan espulsaun iha semana hirak liuba, hateten ba Lusa katak nia hetan email ida husi nia kolega juíz Timor oan ida ne’ebé hateten ba nia katak “sira nia moris iha perigu” nia laran. Prokuradora ne’e akresenta katak iha email ne’e juíz timor oan sira husu atu nia kolegas juíz portuguêsa sira husu tulun ba komunidade internasional hodi tulun sira nia siguransa no moris. 
 
Iha loron 12 Novembru, koinsidente ho komemorasaun loron Masakre Santa Krus, Micael Pereira no Rui Gustavo relata ba jornal Expresso no nia versaun Inglês distribuidu mos iha ETAN, hateten katak “juiz Guilermino da Silva, Presidente Tribunal Rekursu no SCM, telefone ba Antonio Piçarra, vice presidente CSM Portugal nian hodi husu ajuda ba situsaun ne’ebé juíz timor oan sira hasoru”. Jornalista nain-rua ne’e mos hatutan tan katak “juiz Guilermino da Silva xave-an iha kuartu ida ho nia kolega nain rua tamba tauk lakon sira nia moris”. 
 
Iha loron tuir mai dia 13 Novembru, mídia barak inklui mos SAPO TL hatoo fali notísia kontradiktória ida mezmu husi fontes de informação hanesan. Ba Lusa juíz Guilhermino rasik desmente notísia ida ne’e. Nia rasik dehan “desconhese” ameasas ba juíz sira. Nia hatutan tan “hau la hatene konaba ida ne’e. To’o agora hau seidauk direitamente haré ameasa ne’e”. 
 
Hafoin mídia lokal sira mos buka tuir no konfirma rasik ho Presidente Tribunal Dili, Sr. Duarte Tilman, iha ne’ebé nia desmente notísia ne’e no konsidera hanesan “rumoris”.
 
Pergunta maka ne’e, sé lós maka la koalia lia-lós iha ne’e, alias bosok.
 
Iha senáriu rua, primeiru - fontes de informação, juíz sira maka bosok ou sigundu – ida ne’ebé fo sai informasaun ou rumoris ne’e uluk maka bosok. 
 
Integridade no kredibilidade husi juíz Guilermino no nia kolegas sira “é uma questão inquestionável”. Katak imposível ba juíz sira ne’e atu ohin koalia buat ida no aban koalia buat seluk. Ba ema sira ne’e, ne’ebé okupa fatin importante iha nasaun ida ne’e hodi tesi lia-lós, laiha dúvida katak ema hirak ne’e koalia deit maka lia-lós. 
 
Se nune’e lia-lós maka ne’e, ida ne’ebé fo sai notísia ne’e maka la koalia lia-lós alias bosok. Notísia kona ba “juíz Timor oan hetan ameasa” ne’e laiha faktus no meramente “rumoris” ida, ne’ebé mídia sira ejajera. Ita lamenta tebes ho hahalok Sra. Prokuradora nian ne’ebé la koalia lia-lós no mos hahalok mídia sira nian ne’ebé tolan tomak Sra. Prokuradora nia sokar-lia, seim halo konfirmasaun direita ho fontes de informação orijinal.
 
Ita kompriende katak ema idak-idak iha reasaun oin-oin ba insidente espulsaun juíz internasional sira foin lalais ne’e. Buat ita husu maka ne’e “para reduzir um bacandinho de emoção quando se expressam”.

 

“Timorese judges’ life under threat” – who is not telling the truth here

*Cosme da Costa Araujo

 It was widely reported by international media, especially by those in Portugal and “copied pasted” by few local media and went viral on social media that “Timorese judges’ life was under threat”.
 
The shocking news came out after the then sacked Portuguese magistrate Glória Alves told Lusa that she got an email from her colleague in Dili saying “their lives are in grave danger”. She further added that “they asked their Portuguese counterparts to appeal to the International Community for help”.
 
Coincided with the commemoration of Santa Cruz massacre, Micael Pereira and Rui Gustavo reported for Expresso and its English version was posted in ETAN saying that “Guilhermino da Silva, the President of the Court of Appeal, and Timorese CSM, made a call to Antonio Piçarra, vice president of Portuguese SCM, ask for help against dramatic situation in the past hour confronting Timorese judges”. Both added that “Guilhermino da Silva locked himself in a house with the two other judges because they fear for their lives”.
 
Next day, various news media including SAPO Timor-Leste, quoted Lusa, reported a contradictory version from the very same source. In Portuguese version, the news reads that “Presidente do Conselho Superior de Magistratura de Timor-Leste DESCONHECE ameaças a juízes”.
 
Thanks to Google Translation, the statement can be roughly translated into English as “the President of CSM does not know any threat against the judges”. He further elaborated that “I am not aware of it. So far, not directly seen this threat”.
 
Local media followed up on this issue with Sr. Duarte Tilman, President of Dili Court and he denied that such thing happened and he called it a mere “rumor”.
 
The question now is who is not telling the truth here. It is either “the source of information” or “the one who report it” in the first place.
 
The integrity and credibility of the source of the information is unquestionable and therefore it is highly unlikely that Judge Guilhermino da Silva and his colleagues would one day say one thing and another day say something else. These people who hold such important positions in the country speak only the truth.
 
We are then left with one and the only truth, which is the one who reported it in the first place did not tell the truth. Therefore, the news about “Timorese judges’ life under threat” is unfounded and it is a mere rumor that is overly exaggerated by the media.  It is gravely regretted that such a reputable magistrate could tell such a deplorable lie and regurgitated by media without confirming with the sources.
 
A good friend of mine once told me that apart from coffee, the next big commodity Timorese can export is gossiping. Sadly, this incident tells me that the Timorese no longer have that competitive advantage, as people in other countries are also good at it.
 
It is understandable that everyone has different reaction to the recent sacking of international judges, but what we ask is “to reduce a bit of emotion when expressing them”.

Thursday, 20 November 2014

Xanana Gusmão: “Não é nada contra Portugal”

5/11/2014, 17:52
 
 
Hugo Tavares da Silva
 
Na origem da decisão de expulsar 50 funcionários internacionais estão as derrotas judicias contra petrolíferas. "Não aceito [perder] por irregularidades, negligência e talvez diga má-fé", acusou.
 
Xanana Gusmão disse esta quarta-feira em entrevista à Agência Lusa que a negligência e até a má-fé de atores judiciais em casos contra companhias petrolíferas levaram à decisão da expulsão dos funcionários internacionais. “Eu não tenho o direito de dizer que isto é incompetência, que nos faz perder dinheiro do Estado?”, questionou. Apesar do tom, o primeiro-ministro timorense vincou ainda que este processo “não é nada contra Portugal”.
 
O governo de Timor-Leste ordenou na segunda-feira a expulsão, no prazo de 48 horas, de oito funcionários judiciais, sete portugueses e um cabo-verdiano, depois dos responsáveis pelo setor judicial timorense rejeitarem acatar a resolução que determinava a suspensão dos contratos e a realização de uma auditoria ao setor. Os alarmes diplomáticos disparam pouco depois em território português. Xanana Gusmão, que negou a intenção de “esfriar as relações com Portugal”, apelou à redução da “emoção com que se expressam” aqueles que comentam ou reagem ao caso da expulsão dos magistrados do país.
 
“Não permitiremos que a nossa soberania seja violada. Entendam que não é nada contra Portugal, não é nada contra os portugueses que estão aqui”, disse o primeiro-ministro timorense. Xanana Gusmão apelou aos portugueses que entendam que este é um caso de soberania e interesse nacional. “O nosso desejo foi só o de interromper o ambiente viciado em que nós perdemos dinheiro quando exigimos às companhias [petrolíferas] para nos pagarem o que deduziram por fraude”, explicou.
 
“Eu não tenho o direito de dizer que isto é incompetência?”
 
Toda esta polémica surgiu devido à derrota em 16 dos 51 processos em tribunal, nos quais estão em jogo cerca de 300 milhões de euros em impostos e deduções ilícitas que as empresas petrolíferas devem ao país, explicou.
 
“Em 16 casos já julgados, o Estado perdeu todos”, informou Xanana Gusmão, explicando que foram perdidos 28 milhões de euros. E continuou: “Verificámos erros inadmissíveis. E aqui coloca-se o problema das competências. Se tivéssemos tido uma cooperação, dizem sempre que os tribunais são independentes, estão acima da lua, as coisas não se tinham levantado tanto assim.”
 
O primeiro-ministro informou ainda que a resolução do parlamento não abrangia todos os internacionais no setor, mas sim aqueles envolvidos em casos judiciais com as petrolíferas. O tom de Xanana não baixou: “Os erros foram tantos, foram tão inadmissíveis que paramos para não influenciar o processo, porque estamos em recurso para recuperarmos o dinheiro que é nosso. (…) Eu aceitaria se perdêssemos porque não apresentámos bem os factos ou não temos visão. Não aceito por irregularidades, negligência e talvez diga má-fé por parte de alguns atores, que nos fazem perder os processos”, afirmou.
 
“Eu não tenho o direito de dizer que isto é incompetência, que nos faz perder dinheiro do Estado?”, questionou. “Tudo junto são 28 milhões que perdemos só por causa disso”, disse, insistindo que vai reestruturar o setor da justiça no país.
 
Xanana Gusmão explicou ainda na entrevista à Lusa que fez um pedido ao parlamento para não levantar a imunidade aos membros do governo até ao final do mandato. “O não levantamento da imunidade é apenas para dizer para nos darem tempo para trazermos mentores de Portugal para ajudar. Não levantar a imunidade não é pedir ao tribunal para arquivar o processo”, explicou.
 
Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros português deplorou a decisão
 
O governo reagiu pouco depois da polémica estalar, na segunda-feira, dizendo estar a acompanhar a situação “com profunda preocupação e desconforto”. Na altura, o Executivo português queixava-se da falta de esclarecimentos, que chegariam 48 horas depois, pela voz de Xanana Gusmão.
 
“O Governo Português deplora, por claramente desproporcionadas, as súbitas revogações de vistos e de autorizações de estada (…)”, pode ler-se na nota enviad às redações pelo ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros (MNE). Lisboa tem realizado “sucessivas diligências e contactos político-diplomáticos de alto nível” junto de Díli nos últimos dias.

How to Get Timor Leste Into Asean by 2020

The Establishment Post
 
Posted by:Edmund SimNovember 19, 2014inFeatured,Headlines,Regional

On October 27th, Mr Christian Whiton, whose work I respect, wrote in WSJ.com on the reasons why Timor Leste should join the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean). Now I would agree with the political, economic and other reasons put forth in the article. Unfortunately, I do not see how this will become reality any time soon, perhaps not in this decade.
 
Have things changed since 2011, when Indonesia was actively pushing for Timor Leste in its role as Asean Chair?

On the ground, Timor Leste has improved its governance and infrastructure, as Mr Whiton notes in his article. However, sources in the Asean Secretariat and in Dili have indicated to me that Timor Leste is still far behind in understanding and incorporating the aquisof commitments associated with full Asean membership. Much of this is related to the relative lack of skills and human resources in Timor Leste’s government; however, similar issues did not hold back Cambodia from joining Asean, issues which were resolved through the passage of time and the influx of resources.
In Timor Leste, Australia is funding training for young people in skills such as electronics and carpentry to improve their employment prospects.

Just as importantly, Asean itself is not ready for Timor Leste to join its ranks., for reasons big and small. In 2015, Asean is conducting a stocktaking of the Asean Community, which will include a review of the authority and functioning of the Asean institutions. Implementation both of the post-2015 Asean Community agenda and the institutional reform will take time. Asean needs to get this right with its existing members before it takes on a new member.

On the smaller reasons, Dili will need time to develop the physical infrastructure to host the two Asean summits that will come with becoming Asean Chair at some point; one of these Asean summits will also incorporate the East Asia Summit which the leaders of the United States, China and other countries will attend.

Furthermore, if Timor Leste joined now, the rotational Asean Chair position would be filled by Timor Leste in 2020 (currently scheduled to be Vietnam’s term as Asean Chair, as the rotation is supposed to be Malaysia, Laos, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam beginning in 2015; Timor Leste would fit in after Thailand). This means that Timor Leste probably cannot join Asean until Vietnam’s term as Asean Chair in 2020, or more likely, Timor Leste will agree to a delayed term as Asean Chair upon joining. Although these considerations may appear to be minor, they are given weight by the Asean leadership.

Weaving all of these considerations leads to a worst-case scenario of Timor Leste joining Asean by 2023, when its former occupier Indonesia becomes Asean Chair once again. By that year, sufficient time will have passed for Dili to have addressed the large and small concerns regarding its membership application, which should allow Indonesia to make a full court press for Timor Leste once again and succeed where it could not in 2011.

The problem is that 2023 is eight long years away and much could happen in the interim. Furthermore, Asean membership can, in and of itself, be used as a carrot and a stick to encourage Timor Leste to continue with its economic and political reforms. Better then, to give Timor Leste a fixed date of membership, say by 2020 (which was the original date for the Asean Community), but take effort to ensure that Timor Leste can be a fully functioning member by then. That means letting Timor Leste participate as an observer to Asean meetings (something promised by then-Asean Chair Indonesia in 2011 but not really implemented) and increasing support for its accession efforts (both to Asean and the World Trade Organisation (WTO); full accession to the WTO will greatly help Timor Leste deal with its AEC commitments). That also means making accession conditional on achieving set goals during the process, so that Asean does not lock itself into taking on an unprepared Timor Leste.

By doing this, Asean can avoid the mistakes of the European Union. The EU has arguably taken on new members who were unprepared and required years to catch up. The EU also started accession talks with Turkey which became interminable due to domestic European politics and ultimately alienated that country.

Timor Leste, by comparison, carries no such political risks for the Asean leaders but comes with regional risks which can be alleviated by the proper use of time and resources. The bigger risk would be to put off Timor Leste indefinitely and create a underperforming, or worse, failed state at the southeastern edge of Southeast Asia.

This article was written by Edmund Sim, originally published on theAsean Economic Community Blog and reproduced here with their kind permission.

Wednesday, 19 November 2014

The Gap is Getting Bigger: It’s Time to Draw the Line




Agio Pereira
 
In recent weeks we witnessed leaders of various countries, including Australia, iterating or promoting the need to resort to international law to ensure countries act sensibly and with moral authority when approaching disagreements with neighbors. In doing so, reference has expressly been made to the United Nations Convention for the Law on the Sea (UNCLOS), in the context of international maritime issues. To give one example, the Australian Defence Minister David Johnston stated in his speech “Managing Strategic Tensions” at the Shangri-La Dialogue that all parties must exercise restraint, “refrain from actions that could increase tensions, to clarify and pursue claims in accordance with international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.” Prime Minister Tony Abbot repeated the same call in an ABC radio interview on June 3rd, when he affirmed the need for disputes to be settled within the confines of international law. In addition, the U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, in the same Shangri-La Dialogue meeting, also expressed concern that fundamental principles on the international order are being challenged. These calls to abide by international law, including UNCLOS, for the settlement of maritime boundary disputes, should bode well for Timor-Leste and its desire to close the Timor Gap in accordance with UNCLOS.
 
The Timor Gap was created by the 1972 Australia-Indonesia boundary agreement and still exists today. At the time the 1972 Australia-Indonesia maritime boundary was being negotiated, Timor was occupied by Portugal, and hence Australia and Indonesia could not establish a maritime boundary to the south of Timor as Timor's territory did not belong to Australia or Indonesia. However, Indonesia did (and still does), have territory to the east and west of Timor so a 'gap' in the boundary was left and marked by points in the Timor Sea known as A16 (in the east) and A17 (in the west). Despite global opinion denouncing Indonesia's subsequent occupation of Timor (1975 - 1999), Australia recognized Indonesian sovereignty over Timor so it could 'close' the Timor Gap. Australia hoped to simply link up A16 and A17 with a more-or-less straight line and (wrongly) believed it was 'legal' to do so as Timor was now Indonesian territory. By the mid-1970s though, Indonesia had 'wised-up' to being "taken to the cleaners" in the 1972 boundary agreement with Australia (as the boundary was closer to Indonesia than Australia), so Australia had to settle for a petroleum sharing zone under the 1989 Timor Gap Treaty. This petroleum sharing zone has now been inherited by Timor-Leste, following a treaty entered into on Timor-Leste's first day of independence (20th May 2002). As a result, the Timor Gap has not been 'closed' as there is no permanent maritime boundary in the area, only a petroleum sharing arrangement.
 
On 20th March 2002, the Australian Government opportunistically and in what could be characterised as an act of bad-faith, withdrew from the maritime boundary dispute settling jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). This brazen withdrawal came just months before Timor-Leste became a sovereign state on the day of its Restoration of Independence (20th May 2002). Australia’s carve-out of jurisdiction came amidst months of tense negotiations on the Timor Sea Treaty, regarding the maritime area between the northwest region of Australia and the south coast of Timor-Leste. It was a cowardly act of retreat because the then Australian Government was certainly concerned that, if Australia was to conform to the current calls of its leaders to act in accordance with international law, it would ‘lose–out’ in a maritime boundary delimitation with the newly sovereign and independent Nation-State of Timor-Leste. Despite the positive influence of the Australian military in helping restore peace in Timor-Leste, such a gesture of bad faith marked the beginning of difficult relations regarding maritime boundaries. It also heavily influenced the subsequent negotiations pertaining to the Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea or (CMATS) and the International Unitisation Agreement (IUA). These arrangements/agreements concern the Sunrise and Troubadour gas fields, which collectively are known as Greater Sunrise.
 
The difficulties of such a process led to the current complex legal situation faced by Australia in the ongoing International Arbitration on the matter of spying on Timor-Leste during the negotiations, being conducted in the legal precinct of The Hague and in accordance with the rules of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. In the same city of law and justice, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is hearing the matter of the seizure of legal documents belonging to Timor-Leste, which were seized in a raid on a lawyer’s office in Canberra.
 
Both legal processes continue to attract international attention, not least in Australia, where experts on international law convene public forums to analyze and discuss the impact of these legal processes upon Australia, Timor-Leste and on international law itself. The Australian National University (ANU) held a symposium dedicated to these topics. In a summary attested to by participants with legal backgrounds, a number of salient points emerged.
 
Dr. Christopher Ward, speaking on the background to the dispute, acknowledged that Australia has “consistently shifted ground away” from the natural prolongation/continental shelf argument, while “still playing lip service to natural prolongation”. In addition, he noted that if the determination of the maritime boundary was brought before an international court, “something very different to natural prolongation would come forward”. Commenting on the lateral boundaries, he noted that if A16, the eastern point of the Timor Gap area is moved “laterally”, all the Greater Sunrise will lie within Timorese territory.
 
Dr. Sarah Heathcote spoke on “The Claim of Treaty Invalidity and CMATS”, which is currently being argued by Timor-Leste’s legal team, Sir Elihu Lauterpacht and Professor Vaughan Lowe QC in thespying case being arbitrated. Dr Heathcote presented her view that Timor-Leste has to prove that the legal principles within the framework of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLOT) are customary law or that grounds beyond the VCLOT exist to declare CMATS to be void. Timor-Leste cannot rely on the VCLOT itself invalidating CMATS because Timor-Leste was not a party to VCLOT at the time of the alleged espionage activity. However, if a provision within VCLOT can be proved to be customary international law, it is theoretically binding on all States. While there are limited grounds available, one possible ground is fraud. Dr. Heathcote went on to note that “it is difficult to say” if fraud is a customary principle of international law as many jurisdictions have different definitions of fraud and there is a lack of relevant international law precedents. On other likely grounds, Dr. Heathcote also made reference to the history of Unequal Treaties, saying that the Soviet-style interpretation of the doctrine, which focuses on a developed State taking advantage of a developing State, “fits nicely” with the Australia/Timor-Leste dispute. However, she also pointed out that Unequal Treaties is not customary international law and it is also not covered by the VCLOT. Further, she outlined a “fantasy” ground for invalidity, such that the treaty is invalid for violating rules of jus cogens(the peremptory norms on which international law is based).
 
Professor Donald Anton, speaking on “The Closest Nature of Arbitration in the Context of the Dispute”, echoed the view that CMATS could be declared void if espionage is shown to have occurred, as it breaches Australia’s obligation to act in good faith under CMATS, despite the fact that there are no treaties on spying, nor customary international laws prohibiting espionage. Citing the Nuclear Test Case and the North Sea Continental Shelf cases he described the notion of good faith as a “broad rule of international law” and added that “good faith underpins the essence of negotiations related to seabed boundaries”. On spying, Dr. Anton stressed that it “looks more like bad faith when for commercial gain” and that “sending in agents to a foreign country without consent offends the principles of non-intervention” set out in previous cases. He added that Timor-Leste stills needs to prove that the espionage activities occurred. 
 
However, regardless of the legal theoretical dilemmas, the conclusion to be made from the academic debate is that Timor-Leste, as a Nation-State, has the right to avail itself of these legal avenues and to seek remedies under international law to protect its rights, including its sovereign status. As long as Timor-Leste continues to act with due propriety and reasonableness, as it has, the case can be considered a strong one in favor of Timor-Leste. It is true that there is the need to prove that the espionage activity did occur and within the realms of the international arbitration to a ‘balance of probabilities’ standard of proof.
 
In the same symposium, Dr. Donald Roth well made the point that if Timor-Leste was seeking see a “litigation advantage” from the public nature of the ICJ hearings, they were right to do so.
 
On the need for Timor-Leste to successfully argue that spying constitutes fraud under the VCLOT, it has been argued that such a need is due to the fact that ‘everyone is spying on everyone anyway’. However, this can be a very misleading perspective. The argument put by Peter Galbraith in the latest documentary from ABC’s Four Corners on the topic, made a distinction between different types of espionage. One type is the recording of someone’s conversation or hacking into their emails or telephones. A second type, and the more offensive type, is to enter a foreign government’s office illegally, install a bugging device, listen to the Prime Minister and his minister’s confidential discussions; and enter again the same venue to extract the bug. This type of espionage, not average by any standard, could only be characterised as a desperate move to gain commercial advantage during a serious negotiation on natural resources. In such negotiations the parties are expected to act in good faith, particularly because Timor-Leste was and is not an enemy of Australia. The reference to "commercial" advantage" and not to "national security" is most important in this context. 
 
If concerns about fundamental principles of international law being challenged reflect a fear that the international order may be weaker if Nation-States do as they please to nurture their greed for more territory and resources, Timor-Leste has been right in availing itself of what international law resources can do to resolve potentially destructive tensions. Those tensions, aggravated by acts of espionage and raiding lawyers offices to take advantage of information which otherwise may not be available, serve certain economic interests as opposed to protecting national security. Timor-Leste resolved not to politicise unnecessarily the espionage issue, as well as the raiding of one of its lawyers’ office, which reflects the seriousness of the Timorese Government to protect the extremely good relations between Australia and Timor-Leste at all levels. It was Australia that publicized these activities and it is Timor-Leste that wishes to engage in discussions to overcome the disagreement over the Timor Sea but has had to resort to the neutral forms of international law available to sovereign Nation-States, such as Arbitration and the International Court of Justice, to progress its interests.
 
In regards to Timor-Leste exercising its right to self-determination, Australia’s attitude towards the rights of the people of Timor-Leste has been consistent. Australia supported the illegal occupation of Timor-Leste led by President Suharto. During the 24-year occupation Australia benefitted handsomely from many developments which have exploited the oil and gas resources in the Timor Sea.
 
The Timor Gap Treaty signed while Indonesia was illegally occupying the territory of East Timor was one of the most venal and hurtful acts and demonstrated a kowtowing to President Suharto and turning a blind eye to the murderous policies being implemented by the same regime against the people of East Timor. This was all done for the sake of natural resources, which Australia, being a vast island-continent rich in oil, gas and minerals, was not so desperately in need, unlike East Timor.
 
This de jure recognition was wrongful and done under the cliché of realpolitik, one which was wrongly applied to Timor-Leste because the premise was that East Timor will be never become independent; and the best it can hope for was some sort of autonomy within the Republic of Indonesia. This proved to be a monumental miscalculation caused precisely by underestimating the power of international law applicable to non self-governing territories. Australia tried unsuccessfully to have this matter removed from the Decolonisation Committee of the United Nations, where East Timor was listed. Decolonization can mean the need to hear the voice of the people through a plebiscite, whereby the people vote in a free and peaceful manner to determine their future. The people of East Timor exercised this right on the 30th of August 1999, bringing about the newly sovereign and independent Nation-State of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. Australian politicians had a wake-up call when faced with the reality made by the people of Timor-Leste, supported by international law against all odds. 
 
The question to be pondered by this state of affairs and how Australia continues to act about the Timor Sea is “Have Australian politicians really understood and learnt a lesson?”. It is difficult to appraise this learning curve. One reason is because Australian federal politicians are elected in a cycle of three-year elections and the majority does not get a real opportunity to be involved in international politics, let alone maritime boundary delimitations. These matters are more often than not left to senior Canberra bureaucrats and experts in the foreign affairs, defence and security sectors, to gauge the pros and cons of these issues and to advise internally on the national interest. The politicians further get standard advice on the best ‘lines’ to use, if and when they have to say and/or act on these matters. There are always some politicians though who speak to principle and did so throughout the illegal occupation of Timor-Leste.
 
As is the way with politics, reactive statements are mostly for short-term political consumption, rather than long-term strategic national interest.
 
The prejudicial and long formed attitude in Canberra to the tiny nation state of Timor-Leste is difficult to supplant. If it does not come from within the agencies and led by politicians, then it requires pressure from the international realm, combined with domestic public opinion to turn the attention of the powers-that-be in Canberra to listen to the claims of Timor-Leste. When the Timor Sea Treaty was signed on May 20th, 2002, on the very first day of the restoration of independence of Timor-Leste, promises were made that there would be talks on "permanent boundaries" soon. But the promise has been on hold now for twelve years.
 
In spite of the recent requests by the Timorese Government to start such talks, the appeal from Timor-Leste has fallen on deaf years. It appears that no one in Canberra is really listening to what Timor-Leste states it wants in terms of its maritime boundaries. The retort is, “Well they need to tell us what they want”. There is really only one way to say, “Timor-Leste wants to sit at the table with Australia and have structured talks on maritime boundaries in the Timor Sea.”
 
There have been meetings between leaders, at the highest levels - Prime Ministers Xanana Gusmão with Tony Abbott and also with Foreign Minister Julie Bishop; yet no clear message has come from Canberra as to its willingness to listen and to respect international law in the Timor Sea.
 
This silence is a poor sign of misunderstanding again, shown by Australian political leaders, that things may just get worse before they can get better. Unfortunately for both sides, this will continue to occur if the Timorese leadership and society are not taken seriously. Last year, in an interview to ABC radio program ‘PM’ Dr. Ramos-Horta, former President of Timor-Leste and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, appealed to the Australian Government to take the Timorese leadership seriously. He made the point that the Timorese are serious about their sovereignty and they will prosecute their rights to their resources in the Timor Sea, in accordance with international law. It seems he is also being ignored. 
 
Why now? This is an important question. One of the most respected and internationally a well renowned former U.S. Senator, experienced in mediation on borders and natural resources, simply answered: it must be now because temporary arrangements on borders if left too long, can and do tend to become permanent. This is a simple truth, particularly in the scenario of Timor-Leste and Australia, where there are no agreed maritime boundaries at all; what does exist is a cordoned off zone of development inherited from the illegal Timor Gap Treaty Australian entered into with Indonesia during the time of the illegal occupation of East Timor. Furthermore, Australia has entered into maritime delimitation with all its neighbors, and is party to the Antarctic Treaty, except the country Australian leaders frequently refer to as its closest and friendliest neighbor; Timor-Leste. And comparatively, one is referring to a very tiny area and portion of Australia's vast border.
 
The middle/median line
For the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), Timor-Leste has a right to expect the middle or median line to be drawn in the Timor Sea between Timor-Leste and Australia. Surely this has to be negotiated in accordance with international law. No matter what arrangements are in place in the Timor Sea, Australia has no right to refuse to negotiate with Timor-Leste for the settlement of its maritime boundaries. It is time for Australia to make genuine efforts to resolve the dispute and find a constructive solution through an honest and transparent process. The international law of the sea, reflected largely in UNCLOS no longer supports the natural prolongation theory alone, so the middle line is and will be the departing point, where the borders are less than 400 nautical miles apart, as is the case. As for the lateral borders, Australia has expressed publicly some concerns related to Indonesia, but these cannot be overcome without substantive dialogue and honest and transparent negotiations. In short, sitting with Timor-Leste to talk about maritime boundaries now is advantageous for Australia, as well as for Timor-Leste. Australia cannot just say it is too hard, thus denying Timor-Leste its lawful right to negotiate maritime boundaries with Australia. This right exists under international law and Australia expressly agreed to do so in the 2002 and 2006 treaties.
 
The boundary is one - but are there other problems? The answer is yes. One central problem is attitude. The world has progressed, but the way Australia’s largely old and tired technocrats view the Pacific constitutes a problem. South Pacific countries’ leadership is hardly taken seriously by Australian officials. Just recall how the Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea was held at the airport in Brisbane and forced to take his shoes off, humiliating him. Protests were made between foreign ministries but to no avail. The same policy still exists. 
 
When Timor-Leste initiated its international arbitration against Australia, a senior bureaucrat in Canberra categorized the move as that of a ‘banana republic’. And when Timorese diplomats and others speak to Canberra bureaucrats about issues related to delimitation of maritime boundaries, the reply is that the politicians cannot do much; it’s the bureaucrats in Canberra that decide, which means Timor-Leste has an even tougher summit to climb.
 
What the bureaucrats do not fully appreciate though is that Timor-Leste has a habit of fighting goliaths and this fight is one that is familiar to its leadership. Hence the appeal of Dr. José Ramos-Horta for Canberra to take Timorese leadership seriously should not fall on deaf years. An opportunity exists for Australian politicians to seize the opportunity before them - to effect change and act on their conscience, not the advice of technocrats. It would also free Australia from constantly worrying about whatever it did with Indonesia and for the first time could have an open relationship with two of its closest and critically important neighbors. It would free itself of the past and unshackle itself from its locked-in paradigm on this matter. A win all round. International law and political will can do this. There exists a window of opportunity, one which presents itself to leaders periodically to look beyond the status quo, beyond the sneers of the opposition and beyond the next election.
 
Another problem is that Canberra seems to believe that all Timor-Leste is seeking is more money. It is evident as it comes up first and foremost in many government level conversations. Former Foreign Minister Alexander Downer recites this often. The Australian political framework seems to have been absorbed by the propaganda of ‘generosity’ of Australia towards Timor-Leste due to the sharing of Timor Sea Treaty revenues and the agreement on Greater Sunrise which includes a 50:50 share of revenues, in spite of the probable 100 per cent ownership at international law.
 
This generosity paradigm has been challenged in many ways, including within legal realms currently ongoing in the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC). When one refuses to draw the line with your neighbors and push beyond limits including threats that “Australia could bring meltdown to East Timor if it so chose”, as Mr. Downer was quoted in ‘A Study of the Offshore Petroleum Negotiations Between Australia, the U.N. and East Timor, by A. Munton (ANU), generosity is a far-fetched award one has the right to claim for oneself; opportunism, bad faith and sheer disrespect for a relatively much smaller and emerging country are likely to be most appropriate. 
Of course every Nation-State in the world nowadays, including Australia, needs more money. However, putting this ‘more money’ concept into perspective, it can be offensive to Timor-Leste, to say the least. To say that Timor-Leste has taken its case to the international arbitration tribunal and the ICJ, simply because it needs more money, is utterly wrong. There is a need to understand clearly the notion of ‘principle’ when one delves deep into these matters pertaining to commercial interests in the Timor Sea whereby the profit orientated strategies of multinational resource companies (MRC) and the national interests of the owners of the same resources can overlap or derail.
This is why Prime Minister Xanana reiterates - time and again – that as far as Timor-Leste is concerned, it is a matter of principle. But what does "principle" mean here?
First, it is about acknowledging that Timor-Leste has rights over the maritime boundaries which, no matter what happens, Canberra cannot write them off as it pleases. Second, it is about sovereignty; which means defining exactly where are the sovereign maritime borders of Timor-Leste, so that our Defence Forces and Allies in the defence field (including Australia) can plan defence capabilities, not necessarily for war purposes, but most importantly, for strategic and peace purposes, for the protection of strategic natural resources such as oil and gas and the most vital natural resource, water. Permanent maritime boundaries are also crucial for effective cooperation with strategic regional allies. Third, it is about consolidation of the process of independence. Having been stripped of resource rights by Australia and Indonesia in the Timor Gap Treaty, it is time for Timor-Leste to register its claims within the realms of international law. Fourth and last, but not least important, it is about long-term national interests, say the next hundred years and where Timor-Leste believes it will be, and securing the interests of our future generations too.
Where Timor-Leste ‘will be’ is planned through the national strategic development plan (SDP);this Plan envisages Timor-Leste gradually becoming a vibrant and self-reliable economy, a model of social justice and equity, and a leading country within the community of Nations that have succeeded in building a flourishing liberal democracy. From a very low base, we are making positive and real steps in that direction. In addition, Timor-Leste wants to become a country with a population that is well educated and also contributes towards the well-being of other Nation-States, particularly those most in need. This is what is meant by Timor-Leste’s "principled approach" in the context of maritime boundaries. It does not and will never mean 'more aid', for the sake of greed; it does not mean more handover money for the sake of covering losses due to pipelines; it certainly does not mean more dependency, more humiliation, more hitchhiking diplomacy and security. Ultimately, it is about principle in the sense of human dignity, as well as State’s (Country) dignity. It is about being in charge of what rightly belongs to Timor-Leste, be it big or small, within its’ maritime boundaries and in accordance with international law. Therefore, this “principle” is about ensuring that “the future of the people of Timor-Leste” can be upheld with dignity.
To conclude, one must stress that Australia and Timor-Leste are neighbours and shall work together at all times to ensure bilateral relations are maintained at its best. Cooperation rather than competition for the sake of selfish gain must be the guiding principle. However, cooperation can only be strengthened through mutual trust which develops from respecting the rights of each Nation-State. On the maritime borders, this means settling them on the basis of international law.
Note : His excellency Agio Pereira is The Minister of State and of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and Official Spokesperson for the Government of Timor-Leste                     

BARRIERS TO LONG-TERM FINANCING AT AFFORDABLE RATES: INTRODUCING A NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANK TO SUPPORT TIMOR-LESTE PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT

BARRIERS TO LONG-TERM FINANCING AT AFFORDABLE RATES: INTRODUCING A NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANK TO SUPPORT TIMOR-LESTE PRIVATE SECTOR DEVEL...