Thursday, 17 April 2014

Istoria badak no Estatuta Tasi Timor

Guteriano Neves
 
Introdusaun
 
Iha fulan hirak nia laran, asuntu Tasi Timor mosu no domina fali ona notisias sira iha rai laran no iha Australia. Notisia sira iha rai laran, partikularmente, foka ba Tratadu ikus liu nian mak Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea (CMATS). Dala barak, tuir hau nia observasaun, iha komprensaun ne’ebé dala ruma la los, no la kompletu kona ba prosesu ida ne’e no hamosu konfuzaun barak iha públiku. Iha tempu hanesan, mosu mos pergunta barak iha públiku kona prosesu ida ne’e. La’o Hamutuk rasik, ONG ida ne’ebé fo analiza komprensivu kona ba asuntu ida ne’e update informasaun kona ba prosesu tomak ne’ebé akontese iha tinan ida nia laran liu hosi sira nia pajina Website http://laohamutuk.org/Oil/Boundary/CMATSindex.htm. Iha loron 10 fulan Marsu 2014, Tom Clarke husi ONG Timor Sea Justice Campaign iha Australia hakerek artigu ho titulu “Timor’s Oil” ne’ebé publika iha http://rightnow.org.au/writing-cat/article/timors-oil/ lori fo deskrisaun istóriku ida kona ba prosesu ne’e. Iha media internasional, iha ona artigu lubuk ida ne’ebé hakerek fo deskrisaun kona ba oinsa prosesu lao too agora, maibé barak liu hare hosi perspetiva Australia nian. Infelizmente, iha Timor-Leste rasik, diskusaun no komentariu sira ne’ebé iha tendensia atu hare hosi perspetiva ida deit, falta de deskrisaun klaru kona ba oinsa prosesu too agora, no tratadu hira ne’ebé asina ona nem mensiona. Iha âmbito diskusaun ida ne’e, hau hakerek artigu ida ne’e lori bolu fila fali ita nia memoria kona ba saiad mak akontese ona durante tinan 40 nia laran.
 
Hosi Tratadu Timor Gap to’o Tratadu CMATS: Deskrisaun Istoria ida
 
Koalia kona ba asuntu Tasi Timor, nu’udar essensia ida atu ita hotu tau ba konsiderasaun katak prosesu ida ne’e komplexu tanba riku soi mina no razaun geo-strategis seluk. Segundu, iha prosesu atu hetan solusaun ba Tasi Timor, iha ona tratadu lubuk ida ne’ebé mosu, komesa hosi kona ba fronteira tasi okos – Seabad Boundary – entre Australia no Indonezia to’o CMATS, entre Australia no Timor-Leste. Tanba ne’e, ita sei labele komprende CMATS ho komprensivu, se ita la komprende tratadu sira ne’ebé antes ne’e asina ona, hanesan Tratadu Timor Gap, Tratadu Tasi Timor, Akordo Unitizasaun Internasional, no CMATS no oinsa tratadu sira ne’e impaktu ba fronteira maritima entre país rua. Terseiru, atu komprende CMATS, ita presiza komprende kontextu ida ne’ebé mak CMATS asina, no nia impaktu ba kestaun Fronteira Maritima. Parte ida ne’e fornese deskrisaun badak kona ba prosesu ida ne’e, foka partikularmente ba Tratadu sira asina ona.
 
Dezde 1970 e tal too agora, iha ona akordu lubuk ida ne’ebé mak Indonezia, Australia no Timor-Leste asina lori regulariza no rezolve problema Tasi Timor. Em jeral, akordu sira ne’e la fo solusaun permanente ba Fronteira Maritima entre Timor-Leste no Australia. Primeiru mak iha tinan 1972, Governu Indonezia no Australia hetan Akordu kona ba Fronteira Tasi Okos – Seabed Boundary Agreement. Akordu ida ne’e bazeia ba prinsípiu Continental Shelf, ne’ebé em vigor iha tempu ne’eba. Australia rasik to’o agora, sei prefere prinsipiu ida ne’e tanba favorese liu Australia nia pozisaun. Portugal ne’ebé sai nu’udar administrador kolonial iha tempu ne’eba la hola parte iha negosiasaun ida ne’e tanba prosesu ba UNCLOS la’o hela iha tempu ne’eba. Ho nune’e, ba Portugal, diak liu hein liu internasional mak defini duke liu hosi prosesu negosiasaun. Tanba Portugal la partisipa, espasu ida iha Tasi Timor la rezolvidu. Espasu ida ne’e mak ikus mai hanaran “Timor Gap.”
 
Depois Indonezia invade Timor-Leste iha 1975, no iha 1979, komesa negosia kona ba Timor Gap. Depois tinan sanulu negosiasaun, iha 1989, Australia ho Indonezia asina Tratadu Timor Gap. Ba Timor, importante katak Tratadu Timor Gap estabelese Zona Kooperasaun – Zone of Cooperation (ZOCA) entre país rua; zona ida ne’e ikus mai haran JPDA. Bazeia ba Tratadu Timor Gap, Australia ho Indonezia fahe rendimentu hosi ZOCA hanesan; 50-50. Iha razaun polítika relasiona ho okupasaun Indonesia nian iha Timor mak sai hanesan fundasaun ba iha akordu ida ne’e. Hanesan autor barak hakerek ona, ho akordu ida ne’e, Australia hetan benefisiu komersial, no Indonezia hetan rekoñesementu ba ninia okupasaun illegal iha Timor-Leste.
 
Depois administrasaun Indonezia nian remata iha 1999, iha loron 10 de Fevereiru 2000, UNTAET ne’ebé administra Timor-Leste durante periodu tranzisaun asina Nota Intendimentu – Memorandum of Understanding – ida ho Australia lori kontinua fali akordu Timor Gap. Em prinsipiu, laiha mudansa iha Nota Intendimentu ne’e. Buat ne’ebé muda mak naran Indonezia troka de’it ho Timor-Leste. Iha 5 de Jullu, 2001, Untaet hamutuk ho Dr. Mari Alkatiri asina Aranjamentu Tasi Timor – Timor Sea Arrangement ­­– ho Australia hodi troka Nota Intendimentu antes ne’e. Laiha mudansa ba buat seluk; Arranjamentu ida ne’e aumeta Timor-Leste nia rendimentu hosi 50 ba 90 hosi rendimentu upstream nian, no husik. Katak invez de 50-50. Ho aranjamentu ida ne’e, Timor-Leste sei hetan 90% no Australia hetan 10% husi JPDA. Akordu rua ne’e nonok kona-ba area ne’ebé la tama iha JPDA, hanesan Laminaria-Corallina, ne’ebé to’o agora Australia hetan tokon $200 kada tinan. Iha
Antes Timor-Leste restora fali ninia independensia, iha 21 de Marsu, 2002, Australia dada an sai hosi prosesu internasinál atu rezolve fronteira Maritima nian, UNCLOS. Ida ne’e taka dalan ba parte rua atu uza mekanizmu internasional lori rezolve Fronteira Maritima.
 
Iha 20 de Maiu 2002, wainhira Timor-Leste restora tia ninia independensia, Timor-Leste no Australia asina Tratadu Tasi Timor. Provizaun importante balu ne’ebé presiza deskreve iha ne’e. Primeiru, artigu (4) hosi Tratadu Tasi Timor kontinua ho fahe rendimentu 90 – 10. Segundu, Tratadu ne’e mos estabelse Timor Sea Designated Authority (TSDA) ne’ebé ikus mai transforma ba ANP. No Terseiru, artigu (22) defini kona ba durasaun Tratadu ida ne’e, ne’ebé atu too tinan 30. Artigu ida ne’e mos garantia kompañia sira katak sira nia atividade sei la hetan impaktu, maski Tratadu Tasi Timor la vigor ona.
 
Tratadu Tasi Timor define no regula kona ba prosesu dezenvolvimentu iha Area Dezenvolvimentu Petroleum Konjunta – Joint Petroleum Development Area. Area seluk ne’ebé la defini mak Greater Sunrise, Buffalo no Laminaria Corallina, ne’ebé besik liu Timor-Leste, no hanesan legalista barak argumeta ona, tuir prinsipiu liña media nian, sira ne’e 100% Timor nian. Espesifiku ba Greater Sunrise, kadoras ida ne’e komplikadu tanba ninia pozisaun rasik mos komplikadu. 20.1% hosi Greater Sunrise tama tia iha JPDA no 79.9% iha JPDA nia liur. Maibé atu dezenvolve Greater Sunrise, presiza halo ida de’it. Ho realidade ida ne’e, Australia ho Timor-Leste presiza akordu ketak ida atu lori defini Greater Sunrise.
 
Artigu (9.a) hosi Tratadu Tasi Timor hateten katak “Any reservoir of petroleum that extends across the boundary of the JPDA shall be treated as a single entity for management and development purposes.” Interpretasaun simples hosi ne’e katak rezerva Petroleum nian balu ne’ebé mak tama parte balu tama iha JPDA tenki trata hanesan entidade ida atu fasilita jestaun no dezenvolvimentu. No artigu (9.b) hateten katak “(b) Australia and East Timor shall work expeditiously and in good faith to reach agreement on the manner in which the deposit will be most effectively exploited and on the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from such exploitation.” Katak Australia no Timor-Leste tenki servisu ho lalais no iha “Good Faith” atu hetan akordu iha ne’ebé kadoras ne’e sei exploita no fahe benefisiu ne’ebé hanesan hosi atividade exploitasaun ida ne’e.
 
Anexu E. pontu A hosi Tratadu Tasi Timor defini ona katak Timor-Leste no Australia konkorda atu unitiza Greater Sunrise bazeia ba ninia pozisaun jeografika; katak 20.1% iha JPDA no 79.9% JPDA nia liur (Anexu ne’e hateten katak atribui ba Australia). Ho baze ida ne’e, komesa Jullu 2002, Australia no Timor-Leste komesa ronde negosiasaun kona ba IUA. Prosesu negosiasaun ida ne’e komplexu, no involve saida mak Senador Bob Brown hosi Partidu Verde Australia nian bolu “Blackmail” Governu Australia ba Timor-Leste. Termus ida ne’e Senador uza lori esplika aktu Australia nian ne’ebé mak Australia lakoi ratifika Tratadu Tasi Timor, hodi nune’e halo atrasa dezenvolvimentu Bayu Undan, to’o Timor-Leste asina IUA. Ho realidade katak Timor-Leste presiza osan lalais, atrasa iha dezenvolvimentu Bayu Undan, sei iha impaktu maka’as liu ba Timor.
 
Parte rua asina Akordu Unitizasaun Internasional – International Unitization Agreement (IUA) iha loron 6 de Marsu 2003; maibé maski Parlamentu Australia nian ratifika IUA iha 29 de Marsu 2004, Governu Timor-Leste la submete IUA ba Parlamentu Nasional atu ratifika.
 
Ida ne’e taka tia dalan ba prosesu negosiasaun. Ba kompañia ne’ebé mak hetan kontratu iha Greater Sunrise, ida ne’e, sei afekta sira nia interese. Ba sosiedade sivil sira ne’ebé servisu halo kampaña maka’as iha tempu ne’eba, ba sira, defini uluk Fronteira Maritima mak importante liu duke negosiasaun kona ba faha rendimentu. Ida ne’e relasiona ho integridade teritorial Timor-Leste nian.
 
Iha Oitubru 2002, parte rua komesa fali negosiasaun kona ba Unitizasaun Sunrise. Depois prosesu negosiasaun ne’ebé naruk, to’o ikus mai, Australia ho Timor-Leste asina akordu CMATS iha loron 12 de Janeiru 2006. Provizaun importante balu ne’ebé importante hosi CMATS mak tuir mai ne’e. Primeiru, artigu (5.1) hosi CMATS define katak parte rua tenki fahe rendimentu hanesan hosi exploitasaun upstream Sunrise nian. Segundu, Artigu (12.1). hateten katak Tratadu dia ne’e sei vigor to’o tinan 50; signifika katak artigu ida ne’e troka fali artigu (22) hosi Tratadu Tasi Timor nian. Kuatru, artigu (12.2) fo mos kondisaun kona ba oinsa tratadu ida ne’e bele suspende kondisaun rua: (1) wainhira planu dezenvolvimentu seidauk aprova iha tinan nen nia laran, komesa hosi loron ne’ebé CMATS tama vigor, no (2) wainhira seidauk produz iha tinan sanulu nia laran, komesa hosi loron ne’ebé tratadu ne’e vigor. Bazeia ba artigu (12.2.1), CMATS nia periodu termina ona iha 8 de Marsu 2013. Maibé to’o agora, seidauk iha parte ida mak husu atu halo suspensaun ba CMATS. Signifika katak, CMATS sei vigor hela.
 
Hosi akordu sira ne’e, laiha ida mak rezolve kestaun fronteira maritima. Akordu sira ne’e, por natureaza, iha karakter komersial maka’as liu; katak oinsa atu dezenvolve kadoras mina sira iha Tasi Timor no oinsa atu fahe rendimentu duke atu determina Fronteira Maritima permanente entre país rua. Tanba ne’e, to’o agora, país rua seidauk iha Fronteira Maritima. Pelu kontrariu, Akordu CMATS bandu parte rua, Timor-Leste no Australia atu koalia kona ba fronteira Maritima durante tinan 50 nia laran no bandu parte rua atu halo meius rua atu estabelese fronteira maritima durante periodu ne’e. Hanesan Jefrey J. Smith, legalista ida hosi Canada esplika iha Questions and Answers in the Matter of CMATS, http://laohamutuk.org/Oil/Boundary/CMATS_QA_JJSmith.pdf , “the Treaty is expressly not a maritime boundary treaty. It is a joint or shared area development treaty. The Treaty prohibits both States from making any effort to establish maritime boundaries over either a continental shelf division or an exclusive economic zone at any time during its term.”
Dezde inísiu, hanesan negosiasaun iha ne’ebé de’it, país boot, riku, no forte, iha kilat musan barak liu atu uza. Asaun Australia nian lori sai hosi prosesu legal internasional nian taka tia dalan ba parte rua atu uza mekanizmu internasional. Iha tempu hanesan, ho faktus katak Timor-Leste la iha osan, ida ne’e favorese ba Australia. Timor-Leste laiha opsaun viavel seluk, so deit bele hein no depende ba rendimentu hosi Tasi Timor. Australia uza ida ne’e ho diak wainhira haka’as Timor atu asina Akordu Unitizasaun Internasional, se lae Parlamentu Australia la ratifika Tratadu Tasi Timor. Katak wainhira Tratadu Tasi Timor la tama vigor, Timor sei la hetan osan lori finansia ninia atividade dezenvolvimentu. Prosesu ida ne’e mak to’o ikus mai hanaran Blackmail.
 
Iha prosesu negosiasaun, involve mos grupu solidaridade barak mak hola papel impotante lori muda opiniaun públiku iha Australia. Grupu sira hanesan Timor Sea Justice Campaign, East Timor Action Network iha Estadus Unidus da Amerika, intellectual no akademiku sira, kaer papel lori muda ema barak nia hanoin, liliu iha Australia. Ba Timor, no mos ba grupu solidaridade sira, negosiasaun ida ne’e hanesan husu Governu Australia atu rekoñese direitu sira ne’ebé mak Timor iha bazeia ba prinsipiu internasional. Tanba ne’e, iha prosesu negosiasaun hosi 2002 to’o 2006, kampaña barak halo somente husu Australia atu iha “Good Faith” iha prosesu negosiasaun. Maibé ida ne’e la akontese. Tanba ne’e, wainhira Timor no Australia asina CMATS, organizasaun Timor Sea Justice Campaign konsidera ne’e hanesan “Another Chapter of Australian Foreign Policy Betrayal.” Tuir estimasaun La’o Hamutuk nian iha tempu ne’eba, ho CMATS, signifika katak Timor-Leste hetan deit 60% hosi 100% ninia direitu tuir prinsipiu internasional.
 
Maibé hosi perspetiva Governu Australia, ho akordu sira ne’e, manifesta Australia nia jenerosidade ba povu Timor-Leste. Iha ninia submisaun ba Parlamentu Australia nian, Governu Australia hakerek katak “It is in Australia’s interest to create a long-term stable legal environment for the exploration and exploitation of petroleum resources in the Timor Sea between Australia and East Timor, without prejudicing either country’s maritime claims in the Timor Sea.”
 
Maibé ba parte ne’ebé suporta definisaun fronteira maritima, liliu grupu sosiedade sivil sira, asegura stabilidade longu-termu nian entre Australia no Timor-Leste diak liu mak determina fronteira maritima permanente. Grupu ne’e mak kontra argumentu Australia nian katak saida mak Australia halo nu’udar atu karidade ida ba viziñu Timor-Leste. Ba sira saida mak Timor husu mak ninia direitu ne’ebé rekoñese liu hosi mekanizmu internasional sira.
 
Hare ba estratejia Australia nian, hanesan prova ona hosi arkivu istoriku sira katak Australia dezde inisiu suporta Indonesia ninia okupasun, tanba hosi perspetiva Australia, negosiasaun ho Indonezia facil liu ba Australia kompara ho negosiasaun Timor-Leste ida ne’ebé independenti.
 
To’o agora, CMATS sei vigor. Problema ne’ebé foun mosu katak Timor-Leste “hanesan” foin diskobre iha fim 2012 katak Australia halo atu espionajem ba Timor-Leste durante iha prosesu negosiasaun. Timor-Leste uza provizaun Tratadu Tasi Timor nian, ne’ebé hateten kona ba parte rua tenki negosia ho “good faith” atu invalida CMATS, atu nune’e bele negosia fali parte CMATS ida ne’ebé bandu parte rua atu labele koalia kona ba Fronteira Maritima. Iha inísiu, Timor-Leste hakerek karta ba Australia atu diskuti kona ba asuntu ida ne’e, maibé Australia rejeita. Iha Abril 2013, Timor-Leste komesa prosesu arbitrajem, husu atu invalida tia CMATS tanba laiha “good faith” iha negosiasaun. Maski ida ne’e la’os buat foun, maibé atu hare hosi parte estratejia, hanesan Edward Rees, iha intervista ho Journal the Guardian hateten http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/23/timor-leste-v-australia-analysis, Timor koko foti vantajem hosi eventu global rua; kazu Wikileaks no kazu Snowden.
 
Australia halo asalta lori foti dokumentus sira no kaer tia eis intelijensia no Australia nian ne’ebé sai testamuña ho razaun seguransa nasional Australia nian. Depois de hatama keixa, iha loron 17 de Dezembru 2013, iha loron 3 de Marsu 2014, Tribunal hasai desizaun prelimnaria husu Australia atu taka metin dokumentus ne’e.. Kazu ida ne’e kona deit ba dokumentus ne’ebé mak Australia foti. Hanesan karta hosi Timor-Leste nian ba ICJ, hakerek, “The facts underlying this request case set forth in the Application and, in summary, are as follows. On 3 December 2013 officers of the Austra1ia.n Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), acting under warrants issued by the Attorney-General of Australia attended an office/residence in Canberra at 5 Brockman Street, Nasrabundah, in the Australian Capital Territory, Australia and seized documents, data and other property which belong to Timor- Leste and /or which Timor-Leste has the right to protect under international law (‘the documents and data’) from those premises. The owner of the above-mentioned official residence is Legal Adviser to and a Legal Representative of the Government of East Timor.” Importante atu nota katak desizaun ICJ ida ne’e laos kona estatuta CMATS, la’os kona ba pipeline, e laos kona ba Fronteira Maritima.
Konkluzaun
 
Artigu ida ne’e hanesan informasaun kona ba antesente, prosesu, no tratadu sira ne’ebé asina ona. To’o agora, CMATS sei vigor, maibé seidauk klaru kona ba oinsa atu dezenvolve Sunrise. Desizaun tribunal ne’ebé iha, husu Australia atu taka metin dokumentus ne’ebé mak Australia foti. Kona ba estatuta CMATS rasik, ho evolusaun ida agora nian, maski legalmente, CMATS sei vigor, kestaun mak oinsa atu dezenvolve Greater Sunrise. To’o ikus, parte rua mak tenki tur hamutuk atu negosia fila fali. Kestaun mak Australia sei hakarak ka lae atu tur hamutuk fali lori negosia, e se atu negosia karik, atu negosia kona ba saida.

Dependénsia ba Importasaun

Author – Guteriano Neves

http://aitaraklaranlive.wordpress.com/

Introdusaun

Dependénsia ba Importasaun sai nu’udar problema ida ne’ebé agora Timor-Leste enfrenta. Ida ne’e prova hosi dadus estatistika ne’ebé iha, no konfirma hosi realidade ne’ebé ita hare iha moris lor-loron. Artigu badak ida ne’e haree kona ba kestaun ida ne’e, no hare ho espesifiku kona ba saida mak ita importa.
 
Problema ekonomia ida ne’ebé Timor durante ne’e enfrenta mak dependénsia ba importasaun. Organizasaun barak mak levanta ona kestaun ne’e. Kada tinan, ita importa tokon atus barak somente atu hatan deit ba ezizênsia ba sasan no servisu iha merkadu doméstika. Importánsia hosi importasaun iha Timor-Leste la susar atu nota. Ita vizita fatin ne’ebé de’it, to’o iha area rural sira, ita nota kedan katak iha kios barak neébé fa’an sasan nesesidade baziku ne’ebé maioria mai hosi Indonezia. Ita ba Supermerkadu sira iha Dili laran, ita hetan mak sasan importasaun hosi Indonesia, Singapore, Australia, Portugal no seluk tan. Sasan ne’ebé produz iha rai laran kiik tebes, susar atu nota, hanesan kafe, xa, ne’ebé grupu koperativa kiikoan mak halo. E hanesan relata hosi Diresaun Statistika Nasionál relata, kada tinan, importasaun ida neé aumenta.
 
Grafika tuir mai ilustra kona ba kresimentu importasaun, exportasaun no re-exportasaun iha tinan tolu ikus ne’e.
comparision imp-exp
 
Grafika ida ne’e la inklui importasaun ba servisu ne’ebé mak Timor importa. Importasaun servisu ida ne’e inklui importasaun ba konsultor ba administrasaun públiku, ONG sira, doutor sira ne’ebé servisu iha klinika privadu. Importasaun servisu mos inklui pasienti ne’ebé ita haruka atu halo tratamentu iha rai liur, estudu komparativu sira ne’ebé Governu no ONG sira halo iha país seluk, no mos Timor oan sira ne’ebé sai turizmu iha fatin seluk.
 
Bazeia ba ida ne’e, ita hare katak ita nia importasaun sempre boot liu ita nia exportasaun. Signifika katak ita nia balansu komersiu sempre negative. Iha tinan 2009, Bazeia ba Relatório Annual Komersiu 2009 nian, ne’ebé publika hosi Diresaun Estatistika Nasionál, ita nia total importasaun maka tokon $295 no exportasaun tokon $34.5; ida ne’e inklui ona re-exportasaun. Iha 2013, bazeia ba kompilasaun ba relatório komersio mensal ne’ebé publika hosi Diresaun Nasionál Estatístika, ita nia total importasaun hamutuk tokon $843.7, no total exportasaun hamutuk tokon $79.3; tokon $63 mak re-export. Haree espesifiku ba importasaun deit, iha tinan hat nia laran, ita nia importasaun aumenta 286% hosi nivel 2009 nian. Kompara ho ita nia ekonomia doméstika, reprezenta hosi non-oil GDP, ita nia importasaun iha 2013, akumula 54.9% hosi projeksaun ba ita nia non-oil GDP.
 
Grafika tuir mai ilustra kona ba ita nai exportasaun (la inklui re-exportasaun), importasaun no Balansu Komersiu.
 
balance TL
 
Hanesan ilustra iha grafiku ida ne’e, tanba ita nia importasaun as liu ita nia exportasaun, balansu komersiu ita nian mak nevativu hela deit.
 
Sasan saida mak Timor Importa?
 
Hare espesifiku ba kada sasan ne’ebé ita importa, importante atu nota katak, durante tinan hirak nia laran, laos nesesidade baziku mak domina ita nia importasaun. Bazeia ba dadus estatistika, sasan luxu sira mak domina ita nia importasaun, hanesan kareta, gazolina, gazoel, ekipamentu eletriku sira. Pur ezemplu, iha tinan 2011 importasaun ba sasan eletriku hamutuk tokon $99, ou reprezenta 29% hosi total importasaun hamutuk tokon $339. No iha 2012, importasaun ba sasan eletriku sira hamutuk $244, ou reprezenta 36.4% hosi total importasaun tokon $670 no tun fali ba ba tokon $43 iha 2013, reprezenta 5% hosi total importasaun tokon $843.
 
Sasan seluk ne’ebé Timor importa maka’as mak sasan mineral, hanesan gazolina, gazoel. Iha 2011, Timor importa tokon $47, reprezenta 14% hosi total importasaun. Maibé iha tinan 2012, importasaun ba mina sae too tokon $104, reprezenta 15.5% hosi total importasaun iha tempu ne’eba no iha 2013, total importasaun ba mineral hamutuk tokon $150, reprezenta 17% hosi total importasaun.
 
Kona ba kareta, total importasaun ba kareta kada tinan mak iha nivel tokon $50 to’o tokon $60 e tal no so tun deit iha 2011. Iha tempu ida ne’e, Timor importa deit tokon 433. Iha 2012, total importasaun ba kareta hamutuk tokon $53, depois sae ba tokon 63$ iha tinan 2013. Ho importasaun kareta, signifika katak númeru kareta ne’ebé existe iha rai laran aumenta, ho ida ne’e, dudu ezizensia ba mina no sasan manutensaun kareta nian mos aumenta.
 
Iha asumsaun katak importasaun kareta maka’as dudu hosi seitor públiku, ne’ebé mak iha kareta barak. Tanba kareta barak, dudu mos ezizênsia ba gazolina no gazoel aumenta maka’as. Importasaun ba sasan eletriku ne’ebé as tanba mos dudu hosi elektrifikasaun nasionál signifika katak ezizensia ba sasan hanesan televizaun, antenna parabola, DVD, Rice cooker, Zelera, aumenta. Ida ne’e mos bele hare ho mos iha realidade wainhira ita vizita ba iha distritu sira seluk no mos sub-distritu sira ne’ebé foin hetan asesu ba eletrisidade.
 
Sasan seluk ne’ebé interesante no importante atu hare mak importasaun ba sasan alcohol sira no tabaku, inklui sigaru, no sasan hirak ne’ebé iha nikotin. Maski importasaun ba sasan sira ne’e relativamente ki’ik, maibé kontinua aumenta. Kona ba tobacco, iha tinan 2009, importasaun ba Tobako hamutuk tokon $2.5. Maibé iha tinan 2013, númeru ne’e aumenta dala tolu, lori atinzi tokon $7.3. Sasan sira hanesan Beverages,spirits no vinegar, iha 2013, Timor importa hamutuk tokon 21.4, aumenta maka’as iha tinan rua nia laran, tanba iha 2011, total importasaun ba sasan sira ne’e hamutuk tokon $9.2.
 
Grafika tuir mai hatudu kona ba tipu sasan saida deit mak ita importa durante ne’e.
Import Timor
 
Hare espesifiku ba kada item sira iha leten, ita bele halo asumsaun balu. Importante atu tau konsiderasaun katak dadus sira ne’e bazeia ba dadus DNE, ne’ebé bazeia fali ba informasaun hosi Alfandega, tanba sira mak simu sasan no halo inspeksaun ba sasan tama no sai hosi Timor. Tanba ida ne’e, ida ne’e la inklui sasan sira ne’ebé tama illegal hosi area fronteira Maliana, Suai no mos Oecusse no mos sasan sira ne’ebé tama no la selu taxa.
 
Hare hosi parte makroekonomia, ho importasaun ne’ebé as, signifika katak ita laiha baze produsaun atu hatan ba konsumu domestiku. Entaun, ekonomikamente, importasaun fasilita kapital barak atu sai hosi ekonomia doméstika. Wainhira laiha polítika ekonomia ida ne’ebé klaru, hanesan ita hare agora, importasaun hamate inisiativa autor ekonomia lokal, tanba susar atu kompete ho sasan importasaun, iha nivel kualidade, kuantidade, no presu iha merkadu. Ida ne’e sai fenomena ida ne’ebé mak ema barak agora koalia iha fatin hotu, tanba ema hotu depende deitt ba sasan importasaun.
 
Hodi komprende kona ba saida mak Timor importa, fasilita ita atu komprende kona ba situasaun no kondisaun sosio-ekonomia iha rai laran no bele halo asumsaun preliminaria balu kona ba impaktu hosi polítika Governu nian. Iha nivel makro, hare katak tendensia jeral mak kresimentu ekonomia sa’e, maibé mos dependénsia ba sasan importasaun aumenta. Ida neé signifika katak penetrasaun importasaun maka’as no lalais tebes. Ita hare spesifiku ba items sira hanesan kareta no mina, importasaun ba sasan siran ne’e aumenta tanba dudu hosi seitor publiku ne’ebé mak hola kareta barak. Maski laiha dadus klaru kona ba kareta, maibé fasil atu hateten katak laiha kompania ida iha Timor mak iha kareta barak liu duke estadu. La nega mos katak polítika governu nian durante ne’e mos kria ona kondisaun ba parte balu, liliu kompañia lokal sira atu iha kapasidade atu hola kareta, no ida ne’e, obviamente, hare iha Timor laran tomak.
 
Ho númeru kareta ne’ebé aumenta, signifika mos katak ezizensia ba mina no ekipamentu lori halo manutensaun kareta mos aumenta. Ida ne’e dudu aumenta iha importasaun ba mina sira ne’ebé tama ho dalan legal no illegal. Buat seluk ne’ebé dudu importasaun ba mina aumenta mos eletrifikasaun. Númeru importasaun ba sasan mineral sira ne’e aumenta hosi tinan ba tinan. Ho importasaun ba sasan sira hanesan kareta no motor aumenta, ezizi mos Governu atu fornese kualidade Estrada ne’ebé diak liu. Wainhira númeru kareta aumenta, maibé laiha melloramentu ba infraestrutura, prinsipalmente Estrada, implika katak kapasidade Estrada nian menus ba bebeik, konsumidor aumenta, entaun fo presaun maka’as liu ba Estrada agora nian atu at lalais.
 
Sasan seluk ne’ebé importante atu hare mos mak importasaun ba sasan sira hanesan tobako, no alcohol tanba nia impaktu ba saude públiku. Hanesan ita hatene, iha Timor, laiha lei ruma ne’ebé limita ema ho idade minoria atu konsumu tobaku no alcohol. Hosi dadus estatistika ne’e, ita nota katak Timor nia nivel konsumu ba sasan sira ne’e aumenta, entaun risku ba moras mos aumenta. Wainhira moras aumenta, signifika katak gastus ba saude mos aumenta. Entaun hanesan hateten bebeik, ita nia sistema saude la koko atu prevene ema atu moras, maibe barak liu moras tia mak kura. Atu prevene ema moras, presiza mos kontrola ema nia costume konsumu, inklui konsumu alcohol no tobako. Konsumu alcohol ne’ebé la kontrola mos impaktu ba asidenti trafiku ne’ebé durante ne’e akontese barak iha Dili laran. Ema barak mak lori kareta no motor wainhira lanu hela, no ida ne’e tau risku ba vida ema sira ne’ebé uza fasilidade publiku hanesan Estrada. No wainhira hetan asidenti trafiku barak, signifika katak orsamentu ba aimoruk mos aumenta.
 
Konkluzaun
 
Iha kontextu Timor, komprende saida mak ita importa fasilita ita atu komprende saida mak ita nia sosiedade konsumu, impaktu saida ba polítika publiku. Hare hosi dadus estatisika ne’ebé iha, ita nia nivel konsumu aumenta hosi tempu ba tempu, no maioria hosi konsumu domestiku importa hosi pais seluk.

Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in Latin America: re-assessing military’s salvation narrative

Author – Fidelis M.L Magalhães
 
 
BACKGROUND
Authoritarianism is not new to Latin America. After all, almost every country in the region had been under the rule of a number of authoritarian regimes since their independence. Previous authoritarian regimes included liberal and conservative from the mid 1800s and populist from 1930s. Yet, the strand of a new authoritarianism or otherwise referred to as Bureaucratic Authoritarianism (henceforth BA) seemed to capture the interest of many observers of Latin American politics.
 
Various military generals that came to power under BA claimed that their intervention was needed in order to save the nation from civilian corruption and irresponsible economic policies that plagued the region. They argue that thanks to BA regimes that the region was spared from a total economic and social collapse. For instance, the current success of the Chilean economy is claimed to be a result of General Augusto Pinochet’s good economic policies. This is despite the sentencing of General Jorge Rafael Videla, the ex-Argentinean dictator, to life imprisonment on 22 December, 2010 for his role in waging the “the dirty war” (BBC, 2010). The debate about the legacy of military regimes in Latin America is still ongoing.
 
It is against this light that this paper seeks to analyze the military’s claims that they fought against endemic civilian corruption and their acts were driven mainly by ethical and moral demands. This paper would like to put to test their claims by assessing corruption within military itself and its impacts on the larger society in the periods preceding and during BA. In so doing, it touches upon the impacts of military cooperation and subsequent professionalization. Hence this paper covers three key issues; a general characterization and political economy of BA regimes, internal corruption within the military in Latin America and lastly the impact of military cooperation in contributing to the establishment of BA.
 
This paper is organized as follows; first, it defines BA and outlines its general features and point at their differences from the previous populist regimes. Second, it revisits the military’s claim of moral and ethical superiority over civilian politicians. It seeks to analyze corruption within the military itself. Third, it analyzes the contribution of military cooperation in laying the foundations for the creation of BA; and finally, it concludes.
 
WHAT IS BA AND ITS MAIN FEATURES
The term bureaucratic authoritarianism was first coined by Guillermo O’Donnel, an Argentinean political scientist, in mid 1970s in explaining the nature of the authoritarian regimes that ruled the region from 1960s to the 1980s.[1] Unlike other forms of authoritarianisms, in his view, BA is a type of authoritarianism generally ruled by a military junta rather than a caudillo and marked by the increasing capacity of the state institutionalization of suppression of political dissidents and civil society groups by the military with the aim to transform the country into a modern capitalist society.
 
Whereas its predecessors were practically incapable of controlling various political forces, BA seemed to achieve greatest success not only in containing the dissident elements in the society but also in de-politicizing and excluding them from political participation in the state as a whole. De-politicization here referred to the deactivation through killing, suppression and kidnapping of any suspected members of political movements within the society. This was made possible only by the institutionalization of coercion. As Farcau (1996:16) put it: the killings no longer involved just open combat with violent demonstrators in the streets but included an apparent effort toward the systematic elimination or at least the exclusion through terror of an entire political class and extending even to those simply suspected of harboring resentment of the regime, including members of the middle class and upper classes and even the military itself.
 
This, the military hoped, would lead to a new engineered society in which the state was to be apolitical and to be based on technocratic capacity to achieve development.
 
BA states also relied heavily on three core social classes; the military for order and domination of other social classes, the business elites for the achieving a modern-transnational open economy and the technocrats for the formulation of pro-market economic policy and managerial capabilities for achieving better structural transformation (O’Donnel, 1979). In this sense what differentiated BA from the previous populist authoritarianism was the fact that while the former garnered popular sectors as its support base, BA on the contrary, depended primarily on the coalition of the above mentioned groups, normally with the military at the helm.
 
In terms of its main features, BA, despite its solidly authoritarian appearance, had to continuously deal with its inherent fragility. The first source of this fragility was in its very nature. The fact that it was founded upon suppression and economic domination of a small minority over the popular sector exposed the regimes to challenges and contestations from the majority. This was worsened by the military’s common practice of granting preferential treatment to small business elite. The intertwining of business with the military/state interests turned the state into anything but Evans’ embedded autonomy. The state succumbed to business interests, and vice-versa. This contributed to crafting of a state which did not stand beyond any interest group but rather perceived to be the representative of the business elite (Cardoso, 1979; Schneider, 2004).
 
In order to maintain control the military resorted to the use of coercion. The action, however, not only resulted in their subsequent collapse but also in the fracturing of the state as a whole. The combination between a minority rule and an excessive coercion undermined the very legitimacy of the state. To better understand the impact of BA regimes, we should revisit the definition of the state. The state is:
“Fundamentally a social relationship of domination, or more precisely, one aspect—as such, comprehensible only analytically—of the social relations of domination. The state supports and organizes these relations of domination through institutions that usually enjoys a monopoly of the means of coercion within a defined territory and that are generally viewed as having alegitimate right to guarantee the system of social domination. As such the state should be understood from and within civil society, though in its objective, institutional form it appears to be, and proclaims itself to stand, above society” (O’Donnell, 1979:286-87)
 
This is now obvious that BA were by nature predestined to collapse in the long run due to emphasis on coercion and not legitimacy, and by suppressing all popular sectors. Ideally while the state uses coercion in order to ensure the monopoly of violence, it nevertheless, should advocate consensus, which can be gained through either hot or banal nationalism, allowing mechanisms for participations and access to substantive justice via the judiciary. These would strengthen state legitimacy from the citizens, since only via such means that the state may stand within, and at the same time beyond, the civil society. The state should also maintain (perceived) autonomy from any interest group and encompass all sectors of society. In the case of BA, the state, in contrast, was seen to be the advocate of an elite group which privileged and contributed to the strengthening of economic domination by a small upper bourgeois class. Cardoso (1979) claims that BA states focused primarily on strengthening of the executive and its technical capabilities, privileging the business elite, increasing centralization, elimination of the roles of the legislatures, control of judiciary by the executive. Resultant from this, despite the military’s invocation of nationalist symbols, the BA regime lacked unifying factor. It was thus opposed by the majority of the national civil society.
 
Furthermore, in order to understand the key policy divergence between BA and the previous populist regimes one should return to the period in the preceding to BA regimes. BA came into being partially due to the dissatisfaction of the military and the bourgeois elites with the way their countries were run under populism. They perceived its rule responsible for the destruction of the economy and politics. Chiefly among what they saw as economically destructive outcomes were the notably high inflation rates, corruption and political intensification driven primarily by pressure groups, such as unionized labor workers “activated” under the populist regimes. Precisely, the military’s key discontentment concerned ‘the preferential treatment” through initiatives such as wage increase and the general populist attempt to distribute income responsible for the high rate of inflation and the retardation of the economy (Cardoso 1979 and O’Donnel, 1979). Its primary motivation was to put an end to the populist period and impose neo-liberal economic policies.
 
The military and the business elites were not in favor of the ISI (Import Substitution Industrialization) strategy adopted by previous regimes arguing that state subsidies afforded massive wage increase and manufacturing subsidies burdened government’s spending, and thus led to debilitation of domestic savings, budget deficit and a high inflation. The ISI also created unattractive value for country’s exports in the international market since the strategy required appreciation of the exchange rate in order to facilitate cheaper imports of technologies which inversely reduced the country’s savings, depleted foreign exchange reserves and unbalanced Terms of Trade (Hartlyn and Morley, 1986).
 
Beyond disagreements over the economic and social policies, the military also saw clear financial advantages by being in power. Hence, in the next section this paper attempts to point out that the reasons for military intervention had roots in populist era. Also the reasons were far from altruistic and moralistic. Contrary to what is claimed, corruption did not exist in the civilian sphere alone and rampant corruptions were often home-grown inside the military institution itself. In fact rather than civilian corruption, military corruption had more profound impacts on national politics and development.
 
THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY AND BA
 
Military often used instability and civilian corruption during the populist period as the pretext for intervention to establish BA. It claimed that it had the moral duty to intervene as the savior of the nation and guardian of sovereignty. The military also claimed that it was the only institution capable of ending the cycle of rampant civilian corruption. For example in the case of Brazil, the view that civilian corruption resulted in the collapse of the nation could be traced to the “war of triple alliance (1865-1870), in which Brazil defeated its smaller neighbor Paraguay only after years of bloody fighting” (Smallman 1997:41). The army used the event to claim that the prolongation of what should have been an easy war was due to the corruption by the civilian politicians who stole state fund rather than investing in the armed forces. This led some military leaders to believe that, as Floriano Vieira Peixoto (a former vice-president) put it, “it is he (the soldier) who knows how to purify the blood of the social body that is corrupted like ours” (ibid: 42).
 
However, in contrary to the claim the reality pointed otherwise. Military institution was far from clean. In fact corruption and mismanagement was also chronic inside the military institution. There were cases such as the misuse of funds by army generals for personal gains since the time of the Old Republic in the early 1900. Army generals used “public fund to pay for numerous concubines…And stealing coal intended for navy ships and embezzled public fund to pay gambling debts” (ibid: 43). Corruption in the army even led to various internal fights. A group of lieutenants in the Brazilian army rebelled in 1922 but were crashed by senior officers under the command of the Minister of War General Setembrino, perceived to be the most corrupt. The rebellion would resurface two years later and would also be crashed by the same general (ibid). It was only a few years later that the military managed to quell internal rebellion against its leadership. Despite this the rebelling younger officers, interestingly, also blamed civilian politicians for “corrupting the leaders for their political ends”. The generals were seen to be victims of civilian political gains. The argument was, nevertheless, simply to safeguard the reputation of the military institution. As a matter of fact, military generals were not simply passive agents who were victims. Their increased participation in corruption was partially driven by the ascension of military leaders, such as Vargas and later Peron in Argentina, to power and their direction participation in development. The newly risen military leaders were obliged to allow corruption in the military to flourish as a way to buy off loyalty (ibid). This was the case with the Estado Novo in Brazil where Vargas himself was only a colonel and hence relied heavily on more senior generals, many of whom were corrupt, to maintain control over the military.
 
Furthermore, the change of military tactic from classical military training to anti-communist insurgency in the 1950s with emphasis on the “popular defense” allowed the military to have control not only of its own affairs but also of national development. Throughout the military gained more skills in development programs and began to perceive it-self as a development agency. This coincided with the increase role of the US as a key military partner to Latin America out spacing European countries. The US also shifted its military aid to the region from hemispheric security from external threats to a more inward looking security in which domestic communism was the key threat (Baines, 1972:474). Latin American armies were advised by their American advisers to swift from focusing on heavy armaments to light arms and training of small mobile units specialized in counter insurgency (Francis, 1964). From the 1950s to the 1960s Latin American militaries began to focus on “civic action”. It was “basically the use of military forces on projects useful to the local population in such areas as education, public works, public health and agriculture” (ibid). By being in charge of key development programs, the military also became they key institution which held 52 percent of the internal security aid from the US of which 15 percent was spent on civic action programs (Op.cit: 475). This heightened corruption inside the military. The military established close links with the business communities, and often engaged in bribery and open corruptions. The corruption led to another round of internal war within the armed forces.
 
The issuance of the “Colonel Manifesto” in 1954, similar to the one of the 1920s by the lieutenants, openly criticized the corruption within the country and in the army itself. The colonels and junior officers called for renewal inside their institution which led to Vargas’ suicide and the overthrow of his successor regime (Smallman, 1997). The problem, nevertheless, was obviously driven by an intertwining of military and business interests. Military commanders developed closed ties with the business elites and they began to challenge the authority of the government. This shows that the argument used by the military that the BA intervention was needed in order to save the country from civilian corruption was partial and unfounded. The military itself was part of the overall problem and was not by means insulated from it.
 
Rather than saving the nation from all ills, it is more plausible that the military[2] intervened to guarantee its own survival. The military saw the populist regimes as being too sympathetic towards the leftist groups. This intensified their suspicion of, and enhanced their animosity towards, the civilian government. These fears were intensified by two pivotal events, even though they took place eleven years apart–the Cuban revolution in 1959 and the 1970 election of Salvador Allende, a Marxist candidate, into Chile’s presidency. The Cuban revolution brought a fear of the communist domino effect in Latin America. A fear that was not only ideological but also pragmatic considering one of the first policies taken by the Castro regime after coming into power was to dismantle the Batista military (Fitch, 1998:17). So in that sense, the military’s position was for institutional survival. The latter, however, confirmed the military’s fear that, if unhindered, electoral democracy would only lead to the rise of anti-military communist regimes. Intervention was needed for the sake of saving the nation from communism even if that meant democracy would have to be suspended. The fear of communism was heightened by the left’s increasing optimism of the possibility of creating Cuban like revolutions throughout the region. An example of such optimism is evident in Allende’s statement of the Cuban revolution:
 
Cuba’s fate resembles that of all Latin American countries. They are all underdeveloped—producers of raw materials and importers of industrial products…..The Cuban revolution is a national revolution, but it is also a revolution of the whole Latin America. It has shown the way for the Liberations of our people (Loveman and Davies Jr, 1997:130).
 
Adding to the effects of the abovementioned events, it is possible to suggest that while the Cuban revolution may have directly driven military actions in Brazil and in Argentina in the 1960s, the latter, on the other hand, may have influenced military’s decision to return to full control in 1976 in Argentina.
 
Conclusion:
To conclude, the first feature of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism is the presence and type of participation of the military. Under BA the military is the key institution in charge of the regime and normally ruled by a junta rather than by a caudillo. In addition, military ruled by favoring the technocratic executives, prioritizing business elites, suppressing all democratic oppositions and curtailed the power of the legislature and judiciary. Despite its omnipotence and the omnipresence of its security apparatus, BA remained fragile and never managed to gain legitimacy due to its reliance on minority control and orthodox economic policies. In general BA regimes implemented orthodox policies such as fiscal discipline, reduction of budget deficit, devaluation of currency to make exports more competitive and form capital. Its policies aimed to reduce wage level and depress the living standards which did not benefit workers, wage earners and people living on fixed incomes (Cardoso 1979).
 
In terms of the military’s claim that their intervention aimed to stop civilian corruptions, the reality was more nuanced. In fact, as much as civilian corruption was an issue for Latin America military corruption was a more decisive factor for political changes in the region. Many of the military coups since the Old Republic sprang out from internal military conflicts due to corruption. Hence it was rather unfounded to assume that BA regime was somewhat different and represented a force against civilian corruption when the military institution itself was heavily corrupt.
 
Changes introduced by, and incentives acquired from, military cooperation with the US. Cooperation with the US, the fact that it emphasized on civic action, allowed the military to be in charge of a significant economic portfolio. It began to directly intervene in the local development and awarding contract to businesses. This increased exponentially corrupt practices within the military. Nevertheless, the cooperation with the US did not serve as the main source of military corruption. Rather Latin American military was already corrupt and the cooperation with the US only intensified the existing corruption and ruthlessness.
 
Hence, BA in Latin America was nothing but another manifestation of the military’s self interest. Civilian politicians might have been corrupt, but it would be erroneous to think that the military was clean.
 
[1] To be exact, it was first established in Brazil in 1964 led by General Castello Branco (1867-1967) in the toppling of the constitutional government of João Goulart (1918-1976), seen as a successor of the Vargas regime after Getulio Vargas committed suicide in 1954. In the Argentinian case, however, BA came to power twice. The first was when the army took control in 1966 until 1973, and then ended with the return of Peron in 1973. The full military rule would only resume in 1976 and lasted until 1983. The Chilean case, in contrast, presented itself to be somewhat more linear. There the BA period can be safely identified as the period when the military, under the leadership of General Augusto Pinochet, seized power from the democratically elected Marxist president Allende in 1973 and lasted in late 1980s.
 
[2] Prior to the 1940s Latin American militaries were mostly trained by the Germans, French and other European countries. For instance, the shift in Brazil only took place with the modernization of the armed forces under President Vargas who took office in 1930 and began to intensify links with the US
 
Bibliography:
Baines, M. John ‘US Military Assistance to Latin America: An Assessment”. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 4, Special Issue:Military and Reform Governments in Latin America (Nov., 1972), pp. 469-487
BBC (2010) ‘Argentina Former Leader Jorge Videla Jailed for Life’. Accessed on March 22, 2014 from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-12064831
B. Loveday “Protected Democracies”: anti-politics and political transitions in Latin America’ in B. Loveman and T. Davies (eds.) The Politics of Antipolitics: the military in Latin America (1997)
B.R. Schneider Business Politics and the State in Twentieth-century Latin America (2004) Chapt. IX.
C. Anglade & C. Fortín ‘Introduction’ in C. Anglade & C. Fortín (eds.), The State and Accumulation in Latin America: vol I (1985).
Dix ‘Populism: authoritarian and democratic’ LARR XX 2 (1985) 29-52.
Francis, Michael.J ‘ Military Aid to Latin America in the U.S. Congress’ Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Jul., 1964), pp. 389-404
Farcau, Bruce. The Transition to Democracy in Latin America-The Role of the Military. Library of Congress (1996)
F.H. Cardoso ‘On the Characterization of Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America’ in D. Collier (ed.),The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (1979).
Fitch, Samuel. The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America. John Hopkins press (1998).
G. O’Donnell ‘Tensions in the Bureaucratic-authoritarian State and the Question of Democracy’ in D. Collier (ed.), The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (1979).
J. Hartlyn & S.A. Morley ‘Political Regimes and Economic Performance in Latin America’ in J. Hartlyn & S.A. Morley (eds.) Latin American Political Economy: financial crises and political change (1986).
K.L. Remmer & G.W. Merkx ‘Bureuacratic-authoritarianism Revisited’ LARR XVII 2 (1982) 3-40.
Loveman and T. Davies (eds.) The Politics of Antipolitics: the military in Latin America (1997)
P. Smith ‘The Rise and Fall of the Developmental State’ in M. Vellinga (ed.) The Changing Role of the State in Latin America (1998)
Smallman, Shawn. ‘Shady Business: Corruption in the Brazilian Army before 1954’ Latin American Research Review, Vol. 32, No. 3 (1997), pp. 39-62

Service Sector in Timor-Leste - Challenges and Impacts

Authors : Guteriano Neves and Bojamma Gandhi

http://aitaraklaranlive.wordpress.com/

Introduction
Timor-Leste has been experiencing what is known as double-digit non-oil economic growth during the last five years. It is broadly agreed that this growth is boosted by expansionary fiscal policy, pursued by the Government. Without deeper exploration, one indicator of this growth can be observed in the expansion of service sector in Dili, specifically. As it is obvious, many new businesses are set up in Dili, such as hotel and accommodation, wellness services, management consultancies, banking and Telecom sectors etc. During the last three months, Department of Documentation, Analysis and Research of the Presidency of Republic conducted qualitative interview of Business owners across the sector operating in Dili, to find out the motivation of the business establishment, their experiences in doing business in Timor-Leste, input purchase, dealing with the Government, as well as their future plans. Based on these interviews, and deeper analysis on the nature and structure of the Timor’s economy we conclude that there is positive trend on the economy of Timor-Leste, and strong confidence on the domestic economy among businessmen who are operating in Dili. However, it is arguable that since most of the inputs are not generated in Timor-Leste, these businesses have not had a wider trickle-down effect on Timor’s economy.
 
Service Sector Dominates Non-oil GDP
Service sector is the biggest contributor for the non-oil GDP. According to the statistics from the Ministry of Finance of Timor-Leste, since 2004, more half of the non-oil GDP is from service sector and it continues to grow. In 2005 Service Sector accounts for 60.7% of non-oil GDP and in 2011, it was 59.4%. Looking deeper to sub-sector, there are three areas that are the biggest: public administration, retail and wholesale and real estate activities that dominate service sector in Timor-Leste in a given year.
 
Compare to agriculture, although it is believed to be the main source of livelihood of most Timorese, in term of its contribution to the GDP, it continues to decline. According to the most recent statistics released by the Ministry of Finance, in 2005, agriculture sector contributes 30% of Timor’s GDP whereas in 2011, it declined to 15.9%. The biggest decline took place in 2011, where agriculture sector decline by 5.7% compare to 2010. In total, between given period, agriculture sector decline 2.0% on the annual basis. Understanding this, one needs to take into consideration also that most of agriculture activities have not been commercialized; hence, it is not counted to the GDP. Manufacturing sector is experiencing the biggest growth rate in a given period by 15.1% growth rate in a given year, or grow by 2.16% every year.
 
The fact that Timor’s non-oil GDP is dominated by service sector is not unique to Timor’s economy therefore is seen as the positive trend to modern economy. At the regional level, according to the most recent report, released by the Asian Development Bank, since 1975, service sector already accounts for more than 43% of the GDP output in developing Asia, and in 2010, it accounts for more than 48% of the GDP output. As such, the growing of service sector in Timor-Leste is seen as the positive sign of modern economy. As stated in the proposed 2014 state’s annual budget, given that primary sector declines, and the growing of the manufacture sector, is seen as the positive trend as it moves from agrarian based economy to modern upper middle-income countries.
 
Although it seen as the positive trend, it is obvious that most of the most of the activities in the service sector takes place in Dili. Almost all hotels, restaurants, real estate activities, salons, banking are in Dili. This is due to the fact that by nature, service sector flourish in a place where middle class exists. Thus in the case of Timor, most of middle class are in Dili, and most of them are benefited from recycle of petrodollars. Secondly, Dili is the administrative centre where since 1999, most of international staff live and spend their money at, and now most of the public servants live. Due to this, service sector does not have wider impact for the national economy. Another concern is in term of labour share. Although it is the biggest contributor of the GDP, it is not the biggest employer. In Timor-Leste, is still considered that agriculture is the biggest employer. This trend is shared regionally, whereas although service sector is the biggest portion of the GDP, but in term of labour share, it is still lower than agriculture. According to the Business Activity Survey, released by the Department of National Statistic, in 2011, total employment in the private sector was 58,000; out of which, 30% are in the Construction, retail and wholesale, as well hotel and accommodation. Given the importance of service sector in Timor-Leste’s economy, it is critical to understand the dynamic that involves in this sector.
 
Types of Services in Timor
There are various types of service that operate in Timor, especially in Dili; some in large-scale, and some in smaller scale. The following are some of the booming services that operate in Dili.
  1. Public Administration
  2. Hotel and accommodation
  3. Salon, spa and gymnasium
  4. Banking and Financial Service
  5. Security services
  6. House-keeping services
  7. Renting – commercial space and houses and apartments, vehicles
  8. Travel agencies
  9. Professional services
  10. Financial services
  11. Marketing, advertisement and printing services
  12. Health services
  13. Private schools
  14. Auto repair workshops
  15. Insurance providers
Hotel and Accommodation Industry
In general, the Hotel Industry has improved over the last 10 years. Many new hotels and restaurants have opened up during the United Nations Organisation’s (UNO) time here and after, creating an affordable and quality oriented segment. Although there was a worry that UNO’s departure will have wider impact on this industry, our interview shows that UNO’s departure from the country has not had damaging effects, as their usual clients are Embassies, Non Government Organisation’s (NGO), International Organisations, business persons, the Government and few tourists. According to some hotel owners, the departure of UN is positive for Timor’s economy, as UNO’s presence is always associated with the conflict and war.
 
The restaurants and the housing accommodation have taken a hit in their business with the departure of International employees of UNO. A very few popular restaurants have consistent business.
We learnt in our interviews, that investments made range from 2 millions up to 8 million USD. In term of access to land, most hotels own the land the hotel building is on, but some continue to rent and lease the land. Most businesses have met and in some cases have even exceeded expectations.
The profitability of hotels varied with some popular hotels operating at a consistent profit and some have seen a slump in profits with the opening of new hotels in Dili. The locals own very few of the big hotels that cater to International standards.
 
The inputs that the hotel industry requires in terms of building raw materials, furniture, cutlery, decorative items, and kitchen equipment are sourced from neighbouring countries like Australia, Indonesia and Singapore. Even in some cases, spare parts of kitchen equipment, maintenance and trained technician to fix it in case of a breakdown are not available in the country. Challenges also lie in terms of access to technology for e.g. inconsistent and slow Internet connections hamper the reputation of the hotel especially with the Business people. Sometimes, basic vegetables and fruits, dairy and meat products are not available in the market for months, making it hard for the restaurants to serve a dish in its entirety. If some places do have the inputs that are in shortage, the prices shoot up immediately.
 
Most vegetables and fruits are locally procured. Some hotels have designated families in the districts to grow vegetables and fruits for them. However, this does not guarantee yearlong uninterrupted supply of consumables. Most recently, the prices of products that are being imported have gone up. Many restaurants have increased their prices of food and drinks by 2 to 3 USD.
Most ground level and mid-management employees are Timorese, with Managers being Internationals. There is professional and on job training provided to all the recruits. Every establishment has Human resource policies, which support promotion, leadership and constant training.
 
Banking and Financial Services
Banking and Financial Sector consists of five banks – three private – Caixa Geral de Depositos (CGD)/BNU from Portugal, Mandiri Bank from Indonesia, Australia New Zealand Bank (ANZ) from Australia and New Zealandand two State owned Banks – Banco Nasional Comericio and Banco Central Timor-Leste, and two money transfer companies – Western Union and Moneygram. BNU has been operative in Timor-Leste since the Colonization and suffered discontinuation during the Indonesia occupation, while Bank Mandiri, Central Bank and ANZ Bank were established during the UNO administration period.
 
When the commercial banks were established, initially all of them operated as deposit banks, and not retail banks. In the last 3 to 4 years, Personal and corporate lending were introduced by some banks as the country’s stability improved, and the laws pertaining to investment and commerce were created. Due to the fact that Timor-Leste is endowed with natural resources, mainly – oil and natural gas, the country is attracting various types of investors.
 
Due to the increasing users of banking systems and services, ANZ has started diversifying their products and services to increase their customer base. Services such as personal loans, Internet banking, cheque drop offs, customer service via telephone, cash-in cash-out programs have been introduced. Mandiri Bank is issuing visa cards.
 
Banking Institutions have invested in capacity building in the form of Intellectual property via brining in experts from other countries to train Timorese on all aspects of Banking. The Banking Experts also provide Advisory and guidance to the Government on Finance and sustenance.
 
Although there are many improvements, the future looks optimistic with various projects underway; the financial institutions face quite a few challenges. There is a strong feeling of growth and security, which helps the Banks attract and invest in lending to more Investors.
 
Telecommunication Industry
After a decade of Independence, Timor-Leste’s telecom industry has seen a surge in the year 2013. When Indonesia retreated from the country, it also destroyed about 70% of the physical infrastructure that existed. Even through the 2006 crisis, telecommunication sector continued to show growth with mobile telephone sector growing steadily. There is a steady but slow growth in the Enterprise Consumer market for both Telephone and Internet. So far, the Capital Investment varies from 40 to 50 million USD, with more investments planned for the year 2014.
 
Portugal Telecom created a subsidiary called Timor Telecom (TT) in 2002 and was initially granted an exclusive license in the market until 2017. In March 2012, however, an agreement was reached between the government and TT to end its monopoly earlier than planned. A tender was subsequently launched for two mobile licences. By 2013 the two new operators – Telkomsel from Indonesia and Telemor from Vietnam launched their respective mobile offerings and the market is rapidly changing due to competition mainly on pricing.
 
Although, the telecommunication prices in Timor-Leste is now diversified and competitive, the fact remains that the charges for services are among the highest in Asia, in comparison with the telecommunication and internet prices in India for example.
 
According to the recent report published by marketresearchreports.com,[1]After recording huge annual growth rates over a number of years from 2006 onwards, by the start of 2014 the country’s mobile subscriber base had increased rapidly in a short period of time and penetration was close to the 60% mark. Fixed-line network expansion did not see the same growth, with fixed tele-density down around 0.3%. The Internet market data is hard to find. However, it remains concentrated in Dili. Fixed broadband service subscribers continue to remain extremely low. The advent of mobile broadband Internet access provided a boost to the Internet sector.
 
Report Highlights:
- After surging in the 2008/2009 period, the East Timor mobile market grew by around 30% in both 2010 and 2011
- However, total mobile subscriber growth was ‘flat’ in 2012, ahead of the licensing and launch of two new operators
- The Timor Telecom monopoly had officially ended in April 2012 and the two new operators were licensed in July 2012
- In the newly competitive market, mobile subscriber numbers had reached an estimated 700,000 coming into 2014.
- In sharp contrast with the mobile market, both fixed-line subscriptions and internet usage in its various forms remained especially low, with only modest growth likely in the short term
- The government was also in the process of setting up a new independent regulatory authority for the sector. See more at: http://www.marketresearchreports.com/paul-budde-communication-pty-ltd/east-timor-timor-leste-telecoms-mobile-and-internet#sthash.rdkhAfVQ.dpuf
[1]http://www.marketresearchreports.com/paul-budde-communication-pty-ltd/east-timor-timor-leste-telecoms-mobile-and-internet. Excerpts from the report
table 1
 
For Operational activities, the human resource used are mainly the locals. The companies make use of the International Labour Organisation’s program to provide employment in the villages to the locals on short-term basis to perform manual labour, while the technical and managerial roles are performed by Internationals.
 
Although challenges persist, some companies have exceeded expectations with some of their yearly goals achieved. They get a sense of business security after the Presidential and General elections in 2012. The Companies have plans and goals to introduce more technology to diversify the market further. As Timor-Leste is a new market with an increasing number of young populations and enterprise set ups, the market absorption for various products is good.

Wellness Industry
There are number of salons, spas and gymnasiums run both by the locals and internationals. The businesses are doing well with most costumers being the locals. There was slight dip in the first six months of the year after the departure of UNO, but the market has picked up since.
 
The quality of the newly opened salons, spas and gymnasiums are of International standards. Compared to the rest of Asia, for e.g., Bali and Thailand, these services are very highly priced, and the quality is not up to the mark of the price being charged.
 
A common problems encountered by the businesses were physical security threat of the buildings due to stone throwing and burglary. Some establishments have moved to Timor Plaza for a ‘worry free’ business environment and have seen great results.
 
Travel Agencies
Daily flightsSriwijayaAir NorthSilk Air
DestinationBali and JakarataDarwin
Weekly twice / thriceSingapore
 
The motivation behind establishing travel agencies is that in the period between 2006 and 2007, the agency services were limited, and the consumers were very high given the UNO presence in the country. At present the consumers are mostly private corporates, locals and Government Institutions.
 
Timor- Leste faces its own share of challenges in the travel segment too. Timor-Leste is not a member of IATA. Therefore, there is no International representation of the country. As the nearest Office is in Bali and Singapore the communication between the agencies and IATA is delayed. The costs of telecommunication, electricity, Internet and building rent are high. All these elements increase the price of the tickets considerably and the cost is passed on to the customers.
 
Flights such as Merpati and Sriwijaya are blacklisted in the European market forcing tour groups to fly via Singapore, increasing the costs significantly. Europeans do not want to fly to Indonesia due to the high risk factor, and there are no daily flights to Singapore. Lack of public transport increases the price of the tour, as renting cars becomes the only option.
 
Most travel agencies have stopped working with the Government related institutions as they have faced issues regarding delay and non-payment of dues in the past. Numerous complaints have been registered at the Finance and Treasury and some cases are pending for over three years.
 
Many travel agencies also face issues in terms of discipline. In most cases the agencies need to have an International staff member as backup. Most locals hired do not speak Portuguese or English making language a barrier and hiring more difficult.
 
In spite of the overwhelming challenges future prospects are encouraging. Group tours are predicted to pick up next year with Europeans, mainly Germans and Portuguese visiting Timor-Leste for adventure Tourism. This is a result of one the travel agency participating in a Travel Fair in Europe. A cruise ship from Australia will resume tourism activities here next year. Operations to Timor-Leste were halted after the 2006 crisis.
 
The travel agency fraternity is of the opinion that the services in Timor-Leste would be better if the Government invests in obtaining an IATA membership. Many travellers from the country transit via Bali frequently, so a special arrangement could be made to avoid paying visa fees for travellers arriving from Timor-Leste. Slight face-lift for the existing guest houses/Pousada, regulating entry fees into touristic spots, making the beaches crocodile free zones would attract more tourists. Participation in various International travel fairs would help in spreading the country’s tourism aims.
 
Management Consultancies
The motivation behind setting up Management, Law, IT firms are because of the market needs and requirements, common official and working languages and projects and contracts with the Government and existing clients. Costumers are from Timor-Leste, Singapore, Australia, Indonesia, and Malaysia.
 
Since 2005, there have been many Management Consultancies of various functions being set up in Timor-Leste. These setups have seen the sector expand and are attracting more establishments, as there is a sense of business security.
 
There are some fundamental issues that are still present that needs attention from the Government authorities. The Consultancies are of the opinion that the requirement to have a Resident Director who is a local does not seem to work, as the shareholders find it difficult or nearly impossible to trust an outsider to be in a decision making position in a privately held company.
 
For a business set up, the International shareholder has to get the Company registration documents (certificates, by-laws) endorsed by the Timor-Leste Embassy in the home country. Although there is legal provision for Timorese Diplomatic representative in any country to endorse documents of this nature, only the Timor-Leste Embassy in Portugal is equipped to so.
 
Although the laws of the country are adapted from Portugal and are in the Portuguese language, many students continue to study law in Indonesia. Once back in Timor, they struggle to speak the official languages on a professional level and to understand the existing laws of the country.

Challenges
 
The country is slowly showing business maturity and the various improvements that the business set ups have seen in the last 12 years are a proof to that, other than the new development projects that are stemming up. Business opportunities continue to expand. Despite the improvements, there are some common challenges that most business set-ups continue to face, which needs to be addressed.
 
A year back, the timeline for Business registration process was more than 6 months. With the introduction of ‘Serve’ program by the Government, the timeline has been reduced to 4 weeks. The Notary Office is composed of two notaries. They do not have a back Office to provide secretarial assistance. Therefore, the process to obtain signatures from the Notaries is prolonged. There are no standard templates for documents; hence, the format and content of documents are ever-changing.
 
Across most businesses the locals are hired more than Internationals for Administrative and manual jobs. The Internationals continue to perform Managerial roles because there is a shortage of skilled Human Resources at the Managerial level. Many inputs required to run businesses here have to be procured from other countries, as there is no large-scale manufacturing sector in the country. Timor-Leste depends on Indonesia, Australia and Singapore for most of its inputs.
 
Due to the long history of Colonization, and the subsequent Occupation, displacement of people, and the legal uncertainty with regards to the land, people do not feel secure about their investments in the country.
 
The double-digit inflation in the country increases rent, hiring services, living and imports costs while driving up the operational costs. ‘Opportunity costs’ are also high due to frequent travel requirements and non-availability of daily flights.
 
The process to obtain associated Public Services such as Work VISA, driving license and public transport are cumbersome. Corresponding VISA or resident permits are not issued for the period of the license.
 
The Official languages of Timor-Leste are Tetun and Portuguese and the working languages – English and Bahasa Indonesia. Most business people from Asia and Pacific do not speak the Official languages, which has created a huge language barrier. There is a need to build English-speaking skills to enable a thorough business environment.
 
Some businesses also face the threat of physical security as they have suffered property damage because of stone throwing, vehicle theft and drunken youth bothering the customers. Many a businesses are hesitant to conduct business with Government related institutions as they have faced issues with payment delay, and sometimes non-payment.
 
The Telecom Companies continue to face Operational, Legal and Human Resource issues. One of the main issues faced in the land compensation during the infrastructure establishment around the country. On many instances, more than 2 or 3 groups lay claim on the same piece of land. Hence, the companies end up spending 3 times the projected cost to erect antennas and towers. This is due to the non-existence of Land Law. There is always an uncertainty that the next ruling Government might change its policies and revoke current agreements (E.g., Timor Telecom’s monopoly agreement).
 
Due to the fact that Timor-Leste does not have a large-scale manufacturing sector, all the inputs have to be procured from other countries. This creates delay in the implementation of the plan, and increases the cost considerably.
 
There is no legal framework for security collateral for the lending program. Due to the fact that the Land Law is still not been promulgated, many civilians lay claim to land without legal documentation, which makes it impossible to lend without legally endorsed collateral.
Some Companies are of the opinion that some of the local companies lack business maturity as there is no business training by the Chamber of Commerce. Hence, business mentoring is required at least on due diligence, accounting and tendering process.

The high inflation rates, few jobs, trade imbalances, lack of clear State policies and laws and non-existent manufacturing sector threatens the economy and the business success of these companies.

Conclusion
 
Timor-Leste is experiencing a confident, slow and steady trend in the growth of its service sector, as it dominates the Non-oil GDP. With the decline in the primary sector, the manufacturing sector is growing by 2.16% every year. The 2012 General and Presidential elections that were democratically successful and peaceful, has created an impression of political maturity and stability in the country.
 
There are both large and small scales set-ups in this sector with Telecom being the largest. Service sector is centralised to Dili due to the concentration of trade, employment and State Administration.
The UNO’s departure did not have tremendous damaging impacts on the economy. It can also be viewed as economy back to normalcy. A large number of International community still live in Dili and contribute to the service sector considerably.
 
Despite the various challenges, most businesses see positive prospects for this Industry, as many new establishments are being set up. Most hotels are occupied with Business people who are looking to find new opportunities in the emerging economy.
 
When the Land Law is promulgated, there would be an increase in the banking activities, as pledging legally endorsed collateral would become a norm. The market will witness further diversification of services and introduction of new technologies.
 
There is also a huge scope for improvement in the telecom sector. If the existing telecom companies decide to provoke a price war, the consumers will enjoy lower fees for services, more products and better access.
 
The country needs to find creative approach towards Tourism. Tourism Industry has an immense potential. If Tourism activities picks up, it will certainly provide a big boost to the service sector, and overall the economy of the country.
A
n efficient and well-equipped public administration system would go a long way to enable a convenient business registration and other related public services. This seems to be the biggest bottleneck across all sectors.
 
There is a need to bridge the language barrier to facilitate both the Portuguese and the English-speaking investors.
***END***

Tuesday, 15 April 2014

Buat Barak Ba Bro!

Hey bro!! Fitun mutin nee
Hosi ruin Ita hotu nian

Hey bro!! Mean nee
Hosi ran Ita hotu nian
Hey bro!! Nakukun ne’e
Hosi terus ita hotu nian
Hey bro!! Kinur ne’e
Hosi riku ita hotu nian
Hey bro!! Ukun an nee
Hosi povu Jaco to Oecusse
Ohin o hisik kosar ba moris di’ak
Ohin o Husik Seluk Ba Morris kiak
O SOE kiak mai ha’u ulun
O Sosa Prado ba o nia Kidun
Fó hamlaha ba ha’u kabun
Fó pensaun Ba o nia sasán vital
O trata di’ak o nia saúde vital
Saúde ema kiak trata la loos
Ibun hakilar, salva osan povu
Liman hit kartaun, gasta osan povu
Prado mamar, vidru metan, AC malirin
Oin pensaun, lian projetu, kakutak sa’e aviaun

Oin mahar tan bolsu mahar
Ain tuur mamar tan fuan mamar
Isin besi asu ba kilat musan
Isin borus ho dollar musan
Hakarak o ukun nafatin la’o
O hakarak ha’u ain nafatin la’o

Sura mesak istória luta
Sura mesak osan mina iha nia konta
Mate ka moris ukun rasik an
Mate ka moris ukun ba an rasik
A Luta Kontinua, vitória sempre
Kontinua Luta atu sempre hemu bir Victoria

Fatuhada, 23 Marsu 2013
Hosi: Juvinal Dias, Le'e ona durante Palku Arte Popular iha 5 Abril 2014
 
 

Friday, 11 April 2014

Is Timor-Leste really a rich country?


I just want to point out one important thing. 

Everyone in Timor-Leste, including our leaders, think that Timor-Leste is a rich country endowned with abundant natural resources such as oil and gas. 
This is actually not true. 

In fact comparing to other countries, Timor-Leste does not produce much oil and gas, but it is the second most dependent oil country in the world, after South Sudan. 

This is a proven fact. 

The true fact is that Timor-Leste is not rich as everyone thinks. 
It is better to acknowlege and tell the public that we are not that rich, so that we would be careful in our spending, otherwise we spend reclessly knowing falsely that we are so rich.


Monday, 31 March 2014

Temos o dever patriótico de aprender o português

Ceremónia de Entrega de Certificado - Curso Língua Portuguesa

Bom dia a todos.

Excelências

Senhores e senhoras.

Estamos todos reunidos hoje aqui, para celebrar uma ceremónia de entrega de certificados de conclusão de curso da língua portuguesa, que foi frequentado pelo os funcionarios do Ministério e foi dado pelo o Governo Brasileiro atraves do Programa de Qualificação de Língua Portuguesa.

Senhores e senhoras

"O portugues em Timor é como o capim. Está em toda parte, enraizado e está no coração do povo Timorense". E por isso, com o apoio do doador, como o Brazil, "faz renascer a língua portuguesa em Timor".

Quando falamos sobre o apoio do Brasil, lembro-me um deputado federal, o saudoso João Hernmann Neto, quando era presidente da comissão parlamento de amizade Brazil-Timor.

Ele disse e eu cito “o brasil, o maior país de língua portuguesa do mundo, tem uma imensa responsabilidade para com o Timor”. E na minha opinião o Brasil está a cumpri-la muito bem.

O governo brasileiro, atraves da cooperação brasileira, desde inicio da nossa independencia, continua dar o apoio ao Timor, quer na forma financiamento e tanto na forma asisténcia técnica.

Alguns deste apoio, se não me enganho, começou com a formação dos professores na língua portuguesa no Ministério da Educação, e agora extende-se aos funcionarios públicos dos outros ministérios, começando com o Ministério das Finanças.

E por isso, em nome de todos os meus colegas, agradecemos o governo brasileiro por seu apoio.

Agradecemos tambem o Ministério das Finanças que nos deu esta rara oportunidade.

Agradecemos os professores, especialmente a professora Arizângela Figueiredo, por sua dedicação e paciência. 

Agradecemos o senhor Augusto e seu equipe e outras pessoas que não consigo mencionar todo aqui.

Esperamos que a nossa boa cooperação se mantena. E prometemos que em 2014 vamos fazer melhor do que o ano pasado.

Para concluir, quero fazer lembrar aos meus colegas, que nós, como a nova geração, temos "o dever patriótico, eu repito, o dever patriótico", de aprender o português.

A luta continua.

Obrigado.

 

BARRIERS TO LONG-TERM FINANCING AT AFFORDABLE RATES: INTRODUCING A NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANK TO SUPPORT TIMOR-LESTE PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT

BARRIERS TO LONG-TERM FINANCING AT AFFORDABLE RATES: INTRODUCING A NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANK TO SUPPORT TIMOR-LESTE PRIVATE SECTOR DEVEL...