Tuesday, 28 October 2014

Kontenti ho PM Xanana Nia Speech - Revizaun Lei Orsamental


Iha loron 15 Outubru 2014, Governu, lidera husi PM Xanana no akompania husi membru governu sira, aprezenta ba Parlamentu Nasional revizaun ba Lei Orsamental, liu-liu paragrafu 5 husi Artigu 8, Lei No.2/2014.
 
Hanesan ema nebe'e durante ne'e servisu iha Jestaun no Investimentu Fundu Petroliferu, iha liafuan ruma nebe'e fo sai husi PM durante debate ne'e nia laran nebe'e halo hau senti kontenti. Tamba ida ne'e maka mensajen nebe'e durante ne'e ami nia servisu hato'o.
 
PRIMEIRU - GASTA DIDIAK
PM hateten nune'e ba membrus deputadus sira, "Governu hasoru dilema ida entre gasta lalais ka gasta didiak". Hafoin nia rasik hatan hodi dehan "hau prefere ida ikus". Ida ne'e ligadu fali ho hau nia mensajen uluk nebe'e dehan "budget execution rate" laos indikator ka sasukat diak ida ba sukat ema nia dezenpenhu. "Budget execution is not an appropriate performance measurement". Ita "gasta lalais" hodi atinji "taxa exekusaun" ida nebe'e bo'ot, maibe prezudika fali "kualidade" ekzekusaun. Deputadu Bianco husi Fretilin reforsa liu tan hodi dehan "maske Governu ekzekuta to'ot 100 ka 200 pursentu, hau sei la satisfaz nafatin". Nia fo razaun katak "hau prefere liu ho taxa ekzekusaun ki'ik mas fo duni rezultadu". Fiar katak mensajen ida bele habelar liu tan, atu nune'e, ita hotu, konkorda katak dezenpenha governu nian labele sukat tuir "taxa ekszekusaun" maibe hare liu ba "kualidade ekszekusaun".
 
SIGUNDU - INVESTIMENTU FO RETORNU
PM, durante, debate ne'e mos hateten, "ami lakohi hasai osan hotu husi Fundu Petroliferu. Ami so foti sekuandu presiza. Diak liu tau osan iha Fundu Petroliferu hodi fo retornu investimentu diak, duke tau iha Konta Estadu nian nebe'e la fo returnu ida".

Durante ne'e iha ami nia preser no aprezentasaun, ami sempre fo hanoin ba nai-ulun sira katak foti osan husi FP kuandu presiza deit, laos foti hotu kedan pois rai hela deit iha Konta Estadu. Razaun ne'ebe ami hatoo maka se kuandu husik hela iha FP bele fo retornu, maske ki'ik, duke tau iha Konta Estadu ne'ebe fo zero retornu.

Hau fiar se karik pontus importantes rua ne'e, liu-liu ida primeiru ne'e, implementa duni, Timor-Leste sei la sai nasaun failadu ka hasoru "resource curse" hanesan ema barak dehan.

Government's official response to Charlie Scheiner's Article "Resource Curse in Timor-Leste"

Briefing Note To Respond to "The Resource Curse in Timor-Leste" Article Authored by Charles Scheiner (La’o Hamutuk)
 
Introduction  
An article was recently published on the resource course in Timor-Leste. The first part of this briefing note considers whether Timor-Leste is suffering from the resource curse. The second part critiques some of the specific arguments used in the resource curse article.

Part 1: Is Timor-Leste Suffering from the Resource Curse?

Defining the Resource Curse
The resource curse occurs when natural resource wealth causes conflict, macroeconomic instability and poor quality public spending. These in turn lead to stagnant or falling economic growth and living standards and result in countries that are wealthy in natural resources developing more slowly than other countries.
 
Conflict
Resource wealth in countries like Nigeria and South Sudan has contributed to political instability and conflict. It is, however, clearly not the case that resource wealth has contributed to political instability in Timor-Leste. Political instability in Timor-Leste from 2006 to 2008 was not over access to natural resource wealth. In addition, since 2008 Timor-Leste has enjoyed political stability and increased security even as oil production and oil revenues have increased. Indeed resource wealth has directly contributed to political stability in Timor-Leste, as the Government has used this oil revenue to finance war veterans’ pensions, old age pensions and the PDID program which provide a peace dividend to the population and reduce the chances of conflict.
 
Macroeconomic Instability
Many countries have spent natural resource revenues soon after they have been collected. This has meant that volatility in commodity prices has fed through to government revenues and expenditures. Volatile government expenditures have in turn led to macroeconomic economic instability as demand, exchange rates and inflation have fluctuated.
 
Timor-Leste has completely avoided this type of macroeconomic instability. Oil revenues are saved in the petroleum fund and do not flow directly into the state budget. Withdraws from the petroleum fund are based on what is considered sustainable in the long term and not short term changes to oil revenues (see graph 1).
 
Dutch disease is another kind of macroeconomic instability. This occurs when the expenditure from natural resources increases demand in the economy and causes inflation. Higher inflation increases costs and reduces the competiveness of businesses that export goods or compete with imports (e.g. manufactured goods). Higher prices raise profits and wages in the non-traded sector that does not have to compete with imports (e.g. construction, restaurants). Domestic labor and capital, therefore, move away from the traded sector to the non-traded sector. The end result is that the domestic economy is dominated by the non-traded sector (e.g. construction, restaurants) and most traded goods are imported. This can reduce long term economic growth if labor productivity growth and technological innovation occur more quickly in the traded sector (e.g. manufacturing) than the non-traded sector (e.g. construction).
 
There is limited evidence that Dutch Disease is currently occurring in Timor-Leste. Inflation in Timor-Leste is currently lower than most other countries (see graph 2). So there is no reason to think the traded sector is currently losing competiveness due to money from natural resources flowing into the economy. Inflation has been high in the past, but this was partly driven by increases in international food prices and depreciation of the USD and not just increased expenditure from natural resource wealth. Domestic production in the traded sector in Timor-Leste is small and there are significant imports. But there is little evidence that this has occurred due to capital and labor moving from the traded to the non-traded sectors. Most businesses argue that a lack of skilled labor, poor access to finance and the investment climate are the main factors constraining growth in the traded sector and not scarce labor and capital being concentrated in the non-traded sector.
 
Poor Quality Public Spending
In resource curse countries governments waste money on ambitious white elephant projects that do not benefit the people.
 
From 2008 to 2013 the largest amount of infrastructure spending was on electricity ($896.2 million). This project sharply increased electricity generation, distribution and transmission. A reliable electricity supply is essential for economic growth and industrial development. Better access to electricity has benefited many people. This project cannot be regarded as a white elephant project that hasn’t benefited the population.
 
Roads and bridges and transport are the two largest sectors for infrastructure spending going forward ($516.3 and $537.5 million for 2014 to 2018 in the 2014 state budget). Roads are in a poor condition in Timor-Leste and need to be improved. Better roads are essential for bringing agricultural produce to market and economic growth. This spending is clearly not on unnecessary white elephant projects.
 
Government spending on education and health is also high and has been increasing since 2008 (see graph 3).Together these two sectors accounted for almost 18% of total Government spending in 2013. As discussed in the next section, health and education outcomes have significantly improved since oil production started in Timor-Leste. So overall Government spending has been in important areas and has had an impact.
 
Living Standards and Economic Growth
Resource curse countries suffer slower economic development and stagnant or falling living standards. This has not been the case in Timor-Leste. Indeed Timor-Leste has seen very substantial increases in economic growth and living standards. More specifically:
  1. Timor-Leste’s non-oil economy grew at an average rate of 11.8% per annum from 2008 to 2012. (see graph 4). This rate of growth is much faster than that of most other countries.
  2. Household consumption (which is more strongly related to living standards than non-oil GDP) sharply increased by 6.7% on average per annum from 2008 to 2012. This rate of growth is much higher than that of most other countries (see graph 5).
  3. Infant mortality declined by 50% in Timor-Leste from 2001 to 2009. This is one of the sharpest declines in infant mortality in the world.
  4. The primary school net enrollment rate significantly increased from 65.6% in 2007 to 91.9% in 2013 in Timor-Leste.
  5. The prevalence of underweight children under 5 years of age decreased from 48.6% to 37.7% from 2007 to 2013.
In short, since oil was discovered in Timor-Leste households have consumed more, there is less chance of their children dying and more chance they will attend school. It is hard to regard this as a curse.
 
Conclusion
The resource curse occurs when natural resource wealth leads to conflict, macroeconomic instability, poor quality public spending and stagnant living standards. Resource wealth in Timor-Leste has helped cement peace and has not caused political instability. The petroleum fund means the most severe forms of macroeconomic instability have been avoided. And most public spending has been in important areas like electricity, roads, education, health and social assistance and not on white elephant projects. Economic growth has been strong and living standards have increased. Thus there is little evidence Timor-Leste is suffering from the resource curse.
 
 
Part 2: Specific Comments on the Resource Curse Article
This part of the briefing note directly comments on the resource curse article. The relevant sentence from the article is quoted and then comments are made.
 
Non-Oil GDP Growth
‘non-oil GDP’ has grown at ‘double-digit rates’, this obscures the fact that productive sectors agriculture and manufacturing comprise only 4% of GDP and have not increased significantly since 2002."
 
Although agriculture and manufacturing together do only account for a small part of GDP, this is because of large oil GDP. Whenever a poor country exploits natural resources then this will add to total GDP in the short term and any particular sector of the non-oil economy will therefore be a small part of total GDP. The only way to avoid this would be to deliberately not exploit oil resources, which would be a very unusual policy and few economists would recommend it.
 
It is true that agriculture and manufacturing have grown slowly. However, agriculture and manufacturing are not the only sectors that improve living standards or household consumption. Many households would rather have a new house or access to healthcare than they would a new manufactured good. So growth in other sectors and not just agriculture and manufacturing also matters.
 
"All the growth in ‘non-oil GDP’ comes from the state spending oil money: public administration, infrastructure construction, and supplying goods and services to the government."
 
This is incorrect. Government administration does not account for all the growth in non-oil GDP. It is obvious to anyone living in Timor-Leste that the retail (e.g. Timor-Plaza) and private sector construction (e.g. people’s houses) sectors have also grown.
 
In addition, when oil production is offshore Government spending is the only mechanism for this wealth to flow into the domestic economy and benefit the Timorese people. Therefore, it will always be the case that in the initial years of natural resource wealth extraction a significant amount of demand and non-oil GDP growth will be due to Government spending. The only way to avoid this would be to deliberately not use oil wealth to benefit the Timorese people.
 
Timor-Leste’s oil wealth is leaking out rapidly. In 2013, Timor-Leste spent US$535 million on imported goods, while non-oil exports totaled only US$16 million, nearly all coffee.
 
This point is based on the simplistic argument that imports are bad and exports are good. In economic terms this is incorrect as imports increase consumption and welfare.
 
Timor-Leste is a small country and it is very unlikely that it will be able to manufacture its own motorbikes or anti-malaria drugs. So reducing imports would clearly reduce living standards. Even large rich countries import significant amounts of goods for consumption (e.g. Australia imports cars, the UK imports wine).
 
In addition, imports are needed to produce exports. Increased agriculture production in Timor-Leste will require fertilizer to be imported. Brewing beer would require importing bottling machinery. So increasing exports in the future will require imports.
 
There are few countries that make all the components of a manufactured good themselves. Rather in the modern world countries specialize in a particular part of production. Rolls Royce may export cars from the UK, but it imports motors from Germany to make those cars.
 
The key question is can Timor-Leste afford the current level of imports in the long term? With total exports (including oil) current exceeding imports and even the current yield on petroleum fund assets exceeding imports the evidence is that it can (see graph 6).
 
State Spending
During 2014, the Ministry of Finance projects that 61% of state revenues will come from oil and gas exports. Another 32% will be from investing past petroleum income, with only 7% from non-oil sources.
 
In any poor country that starts exploiting significant natural resources it is obviously the case that oil revenues will initially be large compared to domestic revenues. There is nothing wrong with this and the only way to avoid this would be to not tax the international oil companies extracting Timor-Leste’s oil.
 
The important point is whether domestic revenue is increasing and whether overall fiscal policy is sustainable. Domestic revenue has grown strongly in Timor-Leste and detailed fiscal modeling shows that a budget of $1.3 billion or less would be sustainable for 2015 and the Government is committed to not exceeding this amount.
 
Although health and education are gradually getting more, Timor-Leste still invests 40% less on them than well-managed developing countries.
 
This point is impossible to verify as there is no broadly accepted definition of what constitutes "a well managed developing country". The author of the article probably only regards developing countries that spend a lot on education and health as being well managed. So most likely the sample Timor-Leste is being compared to is biased.
 
Timor-Leste’s post-1999 ‘baby boom’ are not getting adequate nutrition or education, which will have long-lasting consequences.
 
Access to education has sharply increased since oil production started and child mortality and malnutrition have sharply declined. This isn’t evidence of the resource curse.
 
"Despite this, inflation continues because there are more dollars than goods"
The rate of inflation for December 2013 to December 2014 was 4%. This is a low rate of inflation and is lower than many other countries (see graph 2).
 
The Resource Curse Has Many Faces
In addition, special interest groups veterans, contractors, people displaced by the 2006 unrest, former office holders, soldiers who deserted, political party leaders claim privileged entitlement to public funds.
 
It is not clear what the phrase "entitlement to public funds" means. There are certainly programs to assist veterans and the displaced. Contractors are certainly paid if they have fulfilled a contract with the Government and undertaken the specified construction. But these are all entirely legitimate (even desirable) areas of Government spending.
 
"Oil attracts the most persuasive, creative and ambitious people, leading to a brain drain from more productive or service-oriented professions"
The oil industry employs relatively few people. There has not been a significant movement of professionals (doctors, nurses etc) to the oil industry.
 
"The Future is Predictable Development of Greater Sunrise oil and gas is stalled due to disputes with Australia over maritime boundaries and with the oil companies, who want to liquefy the natural gas at sea, rather than pipe it to Timor-Leste. Even if this project proceeds with an LNG plant in Timor-Leste, total oil and gas revenues will average US$1 per person per day for four decades, about one-third of the 2014 budget" The article was originally arguing that oil has cursed Timor-Leste and made it worse off. Now the article is arguing that running out of money from natural resources will also make Timor-Leste worse off and that it is a problem that Timor-Leste’s oil resources are limited. These two arguments are inconsistent.
 
"Timor-Leste must fortify its strongest resource its people by investing in education, nutrition and health care"
There has been huge investment in these areas (see graph 3). Education, nutrition and health outcomes have all sharply increased since oil production started.

Conclusion
The article is a long list of criticisms. Some of which are valid but many of which are based on a simplistic understanding of economics. The article doesn’t show that Timor-Leste is suffering from the resource curse. There is very strong evidence that living standards have increased since oil production started.
 
 

Tuesday, 7 October 2014

Kuitansi Manual

Hau ho hau nia kolega ida husi servisu fatin ohin dia 7 Outubru 2014 ba sosa sasan kantor nia. Ami nain rua desidi hodi ba hola iha loja ida china timor oan nian ida iha parte audian nian neba. Hodi osan petty cash, ami nain rua sosa aqua danone no sasan ki'ik sira seluk.
 
Ami nain rua hakbesik ba rejistru hodi selu. Alin feto nebee hein rejistu, hafoin nia hatama hotu sasan folin no fo fila fali osan restu, nia fo mos resivu elektroniku nebee automatikamente print sai husi rejistu. Hafoin nia dehan mai ami nain rua - "maun sira bele lori kuitansi nee hodi ba troka kuitansi manual iha sorin neba".
 
Hau mos "bingung" tamba sa maka tenki troka fali ba kuitansi manual? Hau hanoin nunee - "keta halo ba bisanya ema sira husi governu mai sosa sasan nee sira presiza kuitansi manual para anexa hanesan provas ba kompras".
 
Hau nia kolega mos tama no husu "tamba sa tenki troka ba kuitansi manual?". Alin feto oan nee la hatan. Hafoin kolega nee rasik hatan ba nia dehan "ida nee diak hela".
 
Wainhira ami nain rua sai ba liur hodi hein ema lori sasan mai, no hau nia kolega nee dehan "shit....ema kala toman halo tiha ona buat hanesan".

Pois hau husu "buat saida"?.

Nia dehan "kuitansi manual nee".

Pois nia hatutan "alin ohin nee husu ita para ba troka ba kuitansi manual, tamba nia hanoin katak ita hakarak inventa sasan folin".

Too iha ne maka hau mos foin kompriende katak alin feto nee husu ami troka kuitansi elektroniku ba kuitansi manual tamba nia keta hanoin ami nain rua hanesan sira seluk nebee mai sosa sasan iha neba hakarak mos troka ka inventa sasan folin.
 
Insidente kiik oan ida nee hakarak hatudu mai ita katak durante nee ema barak, liu-liu sira husi governu nee, kala halao hela pratika hanesan nee - inventa sasan nia folin liu husi kuitansi manual. Tamba nee alin nebee hein rejistu hatene ami rua husi governu hateten atu ami rua ba troka ba kuitansi manual.

Se pratika hanesan nee maka halo ba kompras sira ho folin boot miliaun ba leten, la hatene estadu nee lakon osan hira husi hahalok hanesan nee.
 
Hahalok hanesan nee, inventa folin, maske kiik, tama ona iha pratika korupsaun no tenki hetan pena ka kastigu ida boot.

Update husi Audian, 7 Outubru 2014
 
 

Friday, 19 September 2014

The Resource Curse

By | Published Sept. 12, 2014

Striking gold or discovering oil would seem to guarantee instant fortune. Instead, they often lead to conflict, corruption and poverty. History is full of examples of countries whose natural-resource wealth led to less economic success. Revenue from extracting raw materials might be mismanaged or embezzled by government officials, or siphoned off by foreign corporations. The bonanza might crowd out investment in other parts of the economy and make goods and services more expensive. And the country’s fiscal and economic fate might hang on volatile global commodity prices, especially for smaller and less diverse economies. All told, local populations can be left with little to show for their resources except a degraded environment. Economists and social scientists call this phenomenon “the resource curse.” Many countries are trying to determine how to prevent or reverse it.
Despite their abundance of oil, diamonds and other precious minerals, African countries including Angola, Nigeria and Sudan endure low average income and poor health indicators. While Middle East oil exports prop up extensive welfare spending, the region’s petrostates remain beholden to price swings and their people subject to undemocratic regimes. Though a superpower in resources as varied as iron ore, coffee and soybeans, Brazil continues to grapple with vast, dangerous slums. After centuries of plundering, Indonesia is trying to keep more wealth at home by restricting exports and investing in manufacturing. Critics such as the World Bank say the policies could deter investment and reduce tax revenue, yet international momentum is building behind efforts to improve resource management through more disclosures from governments and industries. Twenty-nine countries follow a voluntary international system of auditing company payments for commodities to make sure they match government revenues, and 17 more are applying to join the group. The U.S. and European Union are also implementing new rules for mining and energy companies to disclose payments.
The Background
The British economist Richard Auty coined the term “resource curse” in a 1993 book investigating why resource-rich countries underperformed other developing economies. A 1995 study found that economies with high commodities exports grew slower from 1971 to 1989, even after controlling for variables such as initial per-capita income and investment rates. Notwithstanding a few success stories (such as Botswana), the negative correlation between raw-material exports and economic growth suggests that resource wealth at least doesn’t help. The most commonly suspected causes include underinvestment in other industries (such as manufacturing), exposure to price swings, and concentration of wealth that discourages the development of rule of law and other conditions needed for a vibrant economy. The resource curse is sometimes lumped with the Dutch Disease, when a commodity boom makes a country’s currency more expensive and its other goods less competitive, named for the Netherlands’ 1960s crisis after discovering natural gas in the North Sea.
 
The Argument
Later researchers have questioned the existence of a resource curse, suggesting that resource wealth helps growth after all. Others have suggested that what matters isn’t resource abundance but dependence, or the strength of a country’s institutions. Initiatives to lift the curse have become a source of friction between developed and developing countries in intergovernmental bodies and in the international energy and mining industries. Experiments with controlling prices, blocking foreign direct investment and capping exports sparked controversy and backlash. The risk is always that the measures might kill the proverbial golden goose. Countries have had better luck with rules to moderate government spending, sovereign wealth funds, and lump-sum per-capita rebates. The newest discoveries, such as Ghana‘s 2007 oil find, are almost inevitably accompanied by discussion of what can be learned from the mistakes of the past.

INTRODUSAUN BA FUNDU PETROLÍFERU - Tamba Sá TL Estabelese Fundu Petrolíferu?

Tamba Sá TL Estabelese Fundu Petrolíferu?
*Cosme da Costa Araujo
 
Ita hotu nebeé moris no hela iha Timor-Leste (TL), rai-nain ka lao-rai, iha ligasaun direita no indireita ho Fundu Petrolíferu (FP). Ijemplu, osan selu saláriu trabailadores, pensaun vitalísia, veteranus, idozus, no kompañias. Osan sosa Hammer, pulsa tilun manas, Xinjang nia sasán nebeé dura loron ida deit. Osan halao atividade miss(ed) turizmu, osan harí ponte CPLP no osan hodi sosa no halo buat furak sira seluk. Osan hirak neé maioria, la seluk la leet, mai husi osan minarai - petro dollar - nebeé akumuladu iha FP.
 
Ijemplus hirak neé hakarak hatudu deit katak FP dezenpeña papél ida importante tebes iha ita nia moris loron-loron no liu-liu ba dezenvolvimentu nasaun TL. Antes hahú, uluk kna-nain hatoó agradese ba I Governu Konstitusional lidera husi Sr. Mari Alkatiri, nebeé maske iha tempu susar (laiha osan), nia no nia governu konsege, aprende husi esperiensia nasaun seluk, liu-liu nasaun Noruega, estabelese hela FP.

Artigu ida neé no sira seluk sei koalia konaba 1º objetivu estabelesimentu FP; 2º karakterístika FP; 3º governasaun FP; 4º investimentu FP; 5º tranferênsia FP; no 6º transparênsia no akuntabilidade FP. Artigu ida neé hahú ho pergunta importante ida neé - tamba sá TL estabelese FP?.
 
Objetivu prinsipál husi estabelesimentu FP maka atu asegura rikusoin rekursus naturais fo benefísiu ba ema hotu. Objetivu ida neé konsagra ona iha Konstituisaun RDTL (artigu 39) nebeé hateten Estadu tenkiser uza ho diak no justu rikusoin rekursus naturais hotu nasaun nian ba interese nasional. Lei Fundu Petrolíferu haforsa liu tan hodi dehan objetivu estabelese FP maka hodi kontribui ba jestaun diak rekursus petrolíferas TL atu nuneé fo benefísiu ba jerasaun agora no mos jerasaun futuru.
 
Iha kontekstu ida neé, FP nia funsaun atu asegura ekuidade entre jerasaun (inter generational equity). Osan minarai (reseitas petrolíferas) nebeé nakfilak-an husi petróleu iha rai-okos laos pertense deit ba ita (jerasaun agora), maibe ita nia oan no bei-oan (jerasaun futuru) sira mos iha direitu no sira sei ijiji sira nia direitu atu uza no goja mos rikusoin naun-renováveis sira neé. Atu asegura ida neé, FP, hanesan saving fund (fundu rezerva) ida, sei poupa (rai) hela osan balun, atu nuneé gerasaun futuru mos bele uza ba sira nia nesesidades (prioridades) rasik.
 
FP hamenus risku mal-jestaun ba rikusoin rekursus naturais. FP estabelese govenasaun, akuntabilidade, transparênsia no relatóriu ho nivel (padraun) ida aas tebes no rekoñesidu internasionalmente. Lei la fo dalan ba ema (instituisaun) ida foti (domina) dezisaun hotu nebeé relasiona ho jestaun FP. Entidade idak-idak (Parlamentu, Governu, Jestór Operasional) independemente halao nia knar tuir Lei haruka. Ho transparênsia nebeé aas (relatóriu trimestral, anuál, livru orsamentu, EITI) asegura akuntabilidade entidade relavantes sira no asegura povu nia konfiansa ba jestaun FP. Ho enkuadramentu FP nian, ita hotu bele hatene osan hirak maka tama, osan hirak maka investe, investe iha nebeé no osan hirak maka transfere ba orsamentu estadu. Ho exsepsaun ba kustus jestaun FP, Lei la fo dalan atu halo tranferênsia husi FP sein aprovasaun husi PN iha debate orsamental nebeé povu tomak bele akompaña. Nuneé ho FP ema (grupu) ida la bele halo mal-jestaun(dezvia) osan públiku ba nia (grupu) interese hanesan akontese iha nasaun sira seluk.
 
TL hetan ninia independénsia iha tempu ida oportunu. Ita iha oportunidade osan mean hodi aprende husi esperiensia nasaun seluk. Ita banati tuir esperiensia sira nebeé diak, hakribi no hasés-an husi sira nebeé aat. Esperiensia husi nasaun barak nebeé riku rekursus naturais hatudu katak rikusoin hirak neé la lori bensaun (blessing), maibe lori deit maka malisaun (curse) ba sira. Nasaun hirak neé hasoru konflitu (funu), povu barak moris kiak, korupsaun, rejime ditadura, governasaun sabraut, servisu públiku inefikás no inefisiente no sst. Esperiensia aat hirak neé toó halo eis ministru petróleu Venezuela nian, Sr Juan Pablo Perez Alfonso, hateten  oil is devil’s excrement (petróleo diabu nia teé).
 
Maibe esperiensia diak husi nasaun seluk hatudu katak sira bele no konsege hasés-an husi malisaun rekursu. Aprende husi nasaun hirak neé, liu-liu nasaun Noruega, TL estabelese FP, hanesan dalan ida, maibe laos dalan úniku, atu bele hasés-an husi malisaun rekursu. Malisaun rekursu akontese wainhira rikusoin rekursus naturais hamosu konflitu (funu), instabilidade makroekonómika no kualidade despezas públikas nebeé ladiak. Ho nuneé nasaun sira riku rekursus naturais (i.e Nigeria no Guinea Equitorial) ninia dezenvolvimentu ekonómiku no kondisaun moris aat tebes, kompara ho nasaun sira seluk nebeé laiha rekursus naturais (i.e Corea do Sul, Singapura no Taiwan). Estabelesimentu FP la signifika TL livre ona husi malisaun rekursu. FP parte ida deit husi mekanizmus no polítikas sira seluk nebeé Estadu adopta no implementa atu tulun TL la bele monu ba maliasaun rekursu.
 
FP hamenus vulnerabilidade ba risku volatilidade presu (produsaun) no asegura estabilidade orsamentu estadu. Nasaun barak nebeé riku rekursus naturais, bainhira sira hetan osan (reseitas) husi esplorasaun rekursus naturais, sira gasta kedan osan hirak neé. Sira transfere osan (reseitas) hirak neé direitamente ba orsamentu estadu. Konsekuentemente, sira vulnerável liu ba risku volatilidade presu (produsaun) (commodity price (production) volatility). Iha tempu diak, folin (produsaun) minarai sae, governu nia despezas mos sae no hakbiit governu hodi implementa programas barak. Maibe iha tempu aat, folin (produsaun) minarai tun, governu nia despezas mos tun, no obriga governu hodi la implementa nia programas balun. Iha tempu aat hanesan neé, governu barak maka prefere liu deve hodi sustenta nia programas (orsamentu) duke koa sira nia programas (orsamentu).
 
Ho FP ita bele hamenus risku volatilidade presu (produsaun) no asegura estabilidade orsamentu estadu nian husi tinan ba tinan. Orsamentu estadu la depende ba folin (produsaun) rekursus naturais. Iha TL, osan minarai (reseitas petrolíferas) tama direitamente ba konta FP. Hafoin kada tinan Estadu foti osan husi FP ba orsamentu estadu bazeia ba rendimentu sustentavel estimativa (RSE). RSE neé montante ida nebeé ita fiar sei asegura sustentabilidade FP ba tempu naruk. Montante ida neé estavel husi tinan ba tinan no la hetan impaktu makás husi mudansa (fluktuasaun) folin (produsaun) minarai. Sé iha impaktu makás ruma (folin no produsaun mina tun makás), governu bele transfere liu RSE atu nuneé governu bele kontinua implementa nia programas (prioridades) sira. Pelo contratrio, wainhira folin (produsaun) minarai sae,osan (reseitas) nebeé resin (surplus) bele paupa (rai) iha FP. Iha kontektu neé, FP dezenpeña nia funsaun hanesan Fundu Estabelizasaun (stabilization fund).
 
Fenómena seluk husi malisaun rekursu maka Dutch Disease (DD). Ba nasaun sira nebeé iha nia osan (moeda) rasik, DD akontese wainhira aumentu iha reseitas husi rekursus naturais haforsa valor osan (moeda) nasaun refere ka nasaun refere nia osan (moeda) apresia kompara ho osan (moeda) nasaun sira seluk. Ho valor osan (moeda) sae (apresiasaun moeda), halo nasaun refere nia esportasaun sai karun no importasaun sai baratu.
 
Reseitas petrolíferas la hanesan ho reseitas naun-petrolíferas sira seluk. Wainhira reseitas naun-petrolíferas (i.e reseitas doméstikas) aumenta, sei fo impaktu ba redusaun konsumu iha seitor privadu. Ho selu taxa, seitor privadu sei iha osan uitoan hodi konsumu. Nuneé demanda ba beins no servisus mos tun (menus). Maibe aumentu iha reseitas petrolíferas, nebeé transfere direitamente ba orsamentu estadu no ekonomia rai-laran, sei aumenta tan demanda (aleim-de demanda seitor privadu), nebeé ikus mai halo inflasaun sae aas.
 
Ho apresisaun moeda no inflasaun hakfraku kompetitivade seitores naun-petrolíferus. Nuneé produtus sira nebeé ita bele fan (esporta) sei la kompetitivu ho produtus importadus husi nasaun seluk. Ikus mai, nasaun refere ninia esportasaun menus no ninia ekonomia depende makás ba seitór petrolíferas no importasaun. Ekonomia TL ki’ik, tan neé nia kapasidade hodi absorve hotu osan petrolíferas limitadu teb-tebes. Liu husi FP maka governu transfere osan ba orsamentu estadu (tuir RSE) sukat tuir kapasidade ekzekusaun mas liu-liu kapasidade absorve ekonomia rai-laran. Ho nuneé FP ajuda limita risku Dutch Disease.
 
FP asegura despezas públikas nebeé diak. Nasaun riku rekursus naturais barak maka gasta osan ba projeitus sira (white elephant projects) nebeé la fo returnu  no benefisiu ba povu. FP hanesan dalan ida atu tulun Estadu atu asegura kualidade despezas públikas diak. Liu husi debate orsamental, PN, hanesan reprezentante povu, maka hatene liu no desidi prioridades (programas) Estadu nian nebeé maka serví interese nasional (povu nia diak). Nuneé PN bele kansela (koa) tiha programas sira nebeé la fo benefísiu ba povu nia moris diak. Enkuadramentu RSE mos obriga Estadu atu disiplina iha ninia polítika fiskal no fo atensaun no prioridades ba buat nebeé importante (priority of priorities). Maibe ikus mai despezas públikas ida diak depende fali ba vontade polítika (political will) Estadu nian rasik.
 
FP desenpeña papél ida importante tebes iha ita nia moris loron-loron. Objetivu estabelese FP maka 1º asegura rikusoin naturais fo benefisiu ba ema hotu, 2º ajuda TL hasés-an husi malisaun rekursu, 3º hamenus riksu volatilidade presu (produsaun), 4º limita risku Dutch Disease, 5º hamenus risku mal-jestaun, no 6º asegura despezas públikas nebeé diak.

Wednesday, 10 September 2014

Big Oil stands by as con man swindles East Timor

 
Tom AllardSeptember 10, 2014
Rip-off: Bobby Boye allegedly scammed $3.51 million from East Timor.
Rip-off: Bobby Boye allegedly scammed $3.51 million from East Timor. Photo: Supplied
 
EXCLUSIVE
As Bobby Boye surveyed his extensive property portfolio, the 2011 Rolls-Royce Ghost and other luxury vehicles in the garage, he may well have reflected with some satisfaction on a job well done.
The Nigerian national with a penchant for signing off his emails "Bobby W. Boye esq." and wearing suits with waistcoats in the hot tropical weather made his fortune in East Timor, where he was lauded as a hero in the local media. Boye had been working for the East Timorese government since 2010 in a role pivotal to the fledgling nation's prosperity.
 
East Timor, still stumbling into nationhood, had just conducted the first tax audit of the oil companies that provide more than 90 per cent of its revenue. Until then, the oil companies essentially self-assessed, and East Timor was worried it was being ripped off. Boye's job was to issue the formal tax assessments to claw back unpaid revenue. He succeeded brilliantly, forcing the oil companies to cough up more than $350 million.But as he was raking in the revenue, Boye was robbing East Timor.
The shocking truth was he was a convicted felon, a charlatan and embezzler who has allegedly scammed $3.51 million from East Timor's threadbare treasury.
 
Boye was arrested in June this year after the East Timorese tipped off the FBI in April 2013.
Yet East Timor's government was not the first to know, not by a long shot.
Emails obtained by Fairfax Media, along with interviews with people involved in the saga, attest that at least a dozen people working for the oil and gas industry knew about Boye's chequered past.
In many cases, that knowledge stretched as far back as two years before East Timor's government says it independently realised Boye's malfeasance.
 
Senior staff at oil and gas giant ConocoPhillips, among others, kept secret their concerns about Boye's credentials even though he was a man they detested, an imposing and arrogant interloper who had cost them a significant amount of money.
For Pierre-Richard Prosper, a partner at international law firm Arent Fox, who is acting for East Timor, the refusal to share the information was "shocking and appalling".
"Clearly, they held this to be used as some kind of leverage; the question is against whom and for what intended gain?"
 
Oil industry sources and emails obtained by Fairfax Media reveal the oil companies became suspicious about Boye as early as December 2010, when an influential local website, La'o Hamutuk, ran a story about oil companies "robbing" East Timor of taxation. The figures about the adverse tax assessments were uncannily accurate – prompting concerns that Boye had leaked the information.
Several industry sources said they tried to formally protest to the head of East Timor's customs and revenue service, Cancio de Jesus Oliveira, but he allegedly fobbed them off.Emails show ConocoPhillips decided not to pursue the matter with East Timorese authorities any further.
But the oil industry made further inquiries, using investigators and lawyers to do due diligence on Boye. What they found out about him was far more disturbing than the unauthorised leaking of information.
Emails sent in June 2011, one bearing the subject heading "A Nigerian con artist in our midst?", outlined how Boye's claims to have studied at Cambridge University and worked at energy giant Chevron and the international law firm Clifford Chance were fake.
 
As the email noted: "I imagine the Timor government would be most embarrassed." The email was circulated to a number of ConocoPhillips Australia executives. Research was not that difficult; the irregularities could be easily detected by perusing documents on the public record.
 
The investigations uncovered further evidence of Boye's unsavoury past. Boye had served three years in prison in California for embezzlement in 2007 and had been banned for life by the New York Stock Exchange after defrauding clients of their stocks in 2004.
 
By mid-2012, oil company staff were also aware of serious problems with Opus & Best, a company that was awarded a lucrative contract to provide tax advice to the East Timorese government.
According to emails obtained by Fairfax Media, ConocoPhillips deduced that the company was registered four days after it was awarded the contract.
 
Moreover, the Opus & Best contracts were unusually buried on the transparency portal of the Ministry of Finance. The company's website looked like a cut and paste job.
Inquiries to Opus & Best's office in New York for a contact elicited Bobby Boye's personal email address.
 
Opus & Best was secretly owned by Boye, who used the sham company – it later emerged – to siphon off $3.5 million from East Timor's threadbare treasury into bank accounts established in New York.
 
Boye wrote Opus & Best's bid document and was on the committee that awarded the contract. The FBI states that Boye used his stature to dictate the winner.
According to the FBI, Boye used the proceeds of his fraud to purchase the Rolls-Royce, a Bentley Continental and a Range Rover, along with $US20,000 in watches and a portfolio of four homes in New Jersey.
 
If ConocoPhillips had informed the East Timorese government, it would have saved the impoverished nation at least $2 million. By mid-2012, only $1.5 million had been wired to Boye's fraudulent account.
 
One industry source said the companies went as far as to track the payments made to the company, and realised the accounts were linked to Boye.
"Everyone knew. Nobody did anything," said one oil industry source, who was among those aware of Boye's past.
 
"They kept it in their back pocket."
Apparently unaware the FBI was investigating the case or that East Timor had independently come across Boye's mischief, it was not until November last year that Conoco told East Timor about its concerns about Boye, and then only in a two-minute "heads up" at the end of a teleconference between lawyers.
 
It took until January 2014 for the company to disclose everything it had come across – including the fraud involving Opus & Best, says Mr Prosper, East Timor's lawyer in the tax dispute with Conoco, now before arbitration in Singapore.
 
"You would expect a partner in a major development with Timor Leste and an honest taxpayer to tell you, 'Look, we have a problem here,' " said Mr Prosper, referring to East Timor by its official name.
According to multiple sources, Conoco's planned appeals against the adverse tax assessments from Boye explains why it refused to pass on what it knew about Boye promptly.
It would make for a devastating case if Conoco could reveal that the author of the tax rulings was a convicted felon and con artist.
 
It is understood that Boye's character was the key to Conoco's case. The fact that it was able to present detailed allegations about Boye before the FBI investigation became public is proof that it had done its own detailed research.
 
Fairfax Media attempted to contact the ConocoPhillips executives directly but was referred to ConocoPhillip's media department.
Detailed questions were sent on Friday asking the company when its staff started having doubts about Bobby Boye's bona fides, if it was aware of investigations into Boye by oil companies and their proxies, if it had conducted an investigation itself, and if it contacted the East Timorese government about its concerns.
 
The oil giant declined to answer these specific questions and others, releasing a short statement instead. "ConocoPhillips is aware that Bobby Boye was a consultant to the Timor-Leste Revenue service and that he was arrested on 19 June 2014," it said.
 
"Because of his role within the government, we were obligated to engage with Mr Boye over revenue matters. ConocoPhillips is not involved in the case before the US court."
Conoco's joint venture partners in its Timor Gap oil field include Santos, ENI Australia and Japan's Tokyo Timor Sea Resources.
 
A Santos spokeswoman said the company and its staff did not know about Boye's convict past and alleged criminality in East Timor until his arrest. Other joint venture partners ENI Australia and Tokyo Gas either failed to return calls or said they could not find anyone to comment.
 
East Timor is the world's most oil dependent nation. Its oil revenue comes from just two fields in the Timor Sea. Bayu-Undan, where ConocoPhillips is its major shareholder and operator, is by far the larger and has been operational for longer. Few, if any, nation states have had to rely on one company so much to underwrite their prosperity.
 
While East Timor has an annual budget of $US1.5 billion ($1.6 billion), ConocoPhillips had revenues of $US57 billion last year. Its market capitalisation is $US100 billion. It describes itself as the world's largest independent gas production and exploration company. It is among the top 25 oil producers in the world. The $3.5 million that Boye siphoned off East Timor is the equivalent to almost one month of the tiny nation's health budget.
 
But that amount is dwarfed in comparison with the $350 million-plus at stake in the tax litigation. ConocoPhillips alone is disputing more than $200 million in back taxes and penalties Boye forced it to pay. The ease of Bobby Boye's fraud reflects badly on East Timor, but it was the Norwegian government that hired Boye and sent him to East Timor under its aid program. Its ineptitude in checking his credentials was staggering.
 
According to Norwegian news reports, Boye listed 3D Systems as a previous employer. This was true. But it was while at 3D Systems that Boye was found guilty of embezzling $250,000, money laundering and theft, and sentenced to two years in prison. All of this, again, was on the public record. One of the world's most fragile states was badly let down by Norway, the country that ranks number one on the UN's human development index.
 
Conoco's conduct was even more reprehensible, Mr Prosper says. He called for Conoco's head office in Houston to undertake a "full and complete investigation as to why it withheld vital information regarding fraud from both Timor and law enforcement". Others in East Timor's government are talking about possible prosecutions of Conoco staff. East Timor's struggle for independence after 24 years of Indonesian occupation was epic. Its efforts to transform into a middle income state are just as challenging.
 
Frauds like Bobby Boye sadly prey on post-conflict states. Interlopers of his ilk are not uncommon throughout the developing world. Emerging states building the infrastructure of government need all the support they can get to protect them. Its concerns about Boye were triggered by unexplained absences and dubious claims to have a life-threatening illness. It was fortunate it acted. Boye, according to the FBI, was hatching another scheme to defraud East TImor when he was arrested.
 
BOBBY BOYE
Investment banker, tax lawyer, fraudster
1963 Born in Nigeria. Later becomes US citizen. Other aliases Bobby Ajiboye, Bobby Aji-Boye.
1998 Employed by Morgan Stanley. Fleeces clients of shares, which he sells for cash. Permanently suspended by New York Stock Exchange.
2002-2005 Works at 3D Systems, a 3D printing pioneer, as head of tax department.
2006 Arrested in California.
2007 Found guilty of defrauding 3D Systems of more than $250,000. Serves prison term for grand theft, money laundering and perjury.
2010 Gets limited licence to practise international law in New York, citing a Nigerian legal training.
July 2010 Starts as a petroleum tax legal adviser to East Timor's government, hired and funded by Norway. Salary and benefits worth $350,000 a year. Falsified CV to claim he studied at Cambridge University, worked at Chevron and law firm Clifford Chance.
Mar-Dec 2012 Boye on committee to award contract for external tax advice for East Timor. Contract awarded to a company that he secretly owns, Opus & Best. $3.51 million is wired from East Timor to an account he set up.
April 2013 Flees East Timor.
May 2013 East Timor refers Boye to FBI for investigation.
June 19, 2014 Arrested at Newark International Airport by the FBI. Released on $1.5 million bail.

Thursday, 10 July 2014

Invazaun ekonómika - entre realidade no xenofóbia


Husi Cosme da Costa Araujo*

           Ema barak, ikus-ikus neé, komesa preokupa ho prezensa ema estranjeirus barak nebeé mai halao negósiu iha ita nia rain. Sé ita akompania notísias sira iha televizaun ka jornais, asuntu ida neé sai tiha hanesan sira nia makanan pokok. Ijemplu hanesan Jornál STL nebeé pernah publika artigu ida ho títulu - invazaun foun ameasa ekonomia Timor-Leste. Iha artigu refere, membrus deputadus balun preokupa ho ema estranjeirus, liu-liu Xineza sira, nebeé mai halao negósiu iha Timor-Leste. Tuir deputadus hirak neé, ema rai seluk domina tiha atividade ekonómika rai-laran no nuneé sira konsidera hanesan invazaun foun nebeé fo ameasa ba ekonomia Timor-Leste. Laos deputadu sira deit, vendedores Timór oan sira nebeé fila-liman (i.e fán kios) mos preokupa. Nuneé sé ita nonton STL News karik, ita sempre haré vendedores hirak neé lamenta konaba dominasaun ema estranjeiru iha atividade ekonómika rai-laran nian no sira husu atu governu bele foti medidas ruma ba sira nia preokupasaun hirak neé.
           Prezensa ema estranjeirus iha ita nia rain laos buat foun ida mai ita. Iha tempu rai-diak, negosiantes barak hanesan husi Xina, Arabe no rai sira seluk maka mai Timór hodi halo negósiu ho ita nia beiala sira i.e sosa ai-kameli. Nuneé mos iha tempu Portugês no okupasaun Indonésia. Hafoin Timor-Leste nak-kore a’an husi Indonesia iha 1999, pela primeira vez iha ita nia istoria, ita haré ema estranjeirus barak husi fatin oi-oin maka tama mai iha ita nia rain. Ema hirak neé maioria mai servisu iha ajensias internasionais sira hodi ajuda harí Timor-Leste foun.
           Maibe iha tempu nebá ita ladún preokupa ho sira, tamba ema hirak neé mai halo servisu hirak nebeé ita rasik seidauk bele halo no sira servisu iha seitór ida nebeé la kompete direitamente ho servisus Timór oan sira nian. Hafoin ONU remata nia mandatu iha 2012, iha tinan hirak ikus neé, ema estranjeirus barak mos komesa tama fila fali mai Timór no ema hirak neé mai atu investe liu husi loke loja sira iha Dili no distritus sira. Wainhira ita haré loja harí iha kintu-kantu, ita mos komesa preokupa ho sira prezensa, tamba ita senti sira mai kompete direitamente ho ita no ita tauk sira hadau fali servisu hirak nebeé durante neé ita mos bele halo.  
          Pergunta maka neé - tamba sá ema estranjeiru barak mai halo negósiu iha ita nia rain?. Primeiru - hanesan nasaun foun, Timor-Leste oferese oportunidade osan-mean ba investimentu esternu. Nuneé ema hotu hakarak mai adu-nasip ou buka-moris iha ita nia rain. Sira fiar katak maske ho risku bo’ot, sira sei hetan rendimentu diak ba sira nia investimentu iha Timór foun. Sigundu – hanesan ita nai-ulun sira konfesa iha fatin-fatin, Timor-Leste adopta sistema merkadu livre. Tan neé, nai-ulun sira argumenta, ema hotu iha direitu (livre) hodi mai investe inklui mai halo negósiu. Prinsipiu ida neé refleta iha ita nia lei do investimento nebeé fo dalan ba investimentu esternu hodi investe iha kualker seitór atividade ekonómika.
          Terseiru - ho limitasaun rekursus nebeé nasaun foun Timor-Leste infrenta, Timor-Leste hakarak ka lakohi presiza tebes investimentu esternu inklui sira nebeé mai halo negósiu, hodi direita ou indireita, ajuda prosesu dezenvolvimentu. Ita presiza sira nia kapitál, sasán, teknolojía, matenek, no esperiênsia.
           Prezensa ema estranjeirus nebeé mai halo negósiu iha Timór justru fo benefisiu barak ba ema hotu. Ho sira nia prezensa hamanas liu-tan kompetisaun direita ou indireita, halakon monopóliu merkadu, hafanun ita hotu, liu-liu vendedores Timór oan sira, atu hadiak ita nia kualidade servisu ho folin nebeé razoável. Ho kompetisaun, konsumidores ou povu kbit-laek maka sei hetan benefisiu liu. Tamba sira sei hili vendedores nebeé presta ou oferese servisu diak ho presu razoável. Ho kapitál bo’ot no asesu ba fornesimentu nebeé baratu fasilita sira hodi loka joja bo’ot no fan sasán ho folin baratu. Ho matenek no esperiênsia ajuda sira fornese servisus ho kualidade diak, lalais no baratu. Iha parte seluk, ho sira nia prezensa bele hakman todan governu nian tamba sira kria kampu ba Timór oan sira, ao mesmo tempo fo mos rendimentu ba governu liu husi selu taxa.
           Nuneé ita nota katak prezensa ema estranjeiru barak iha ita nia rain laos mai invade ita nia ekonomia, maibe sebaliknnya sira mai kontribui ba dezenvolvimentu nasionál no bem-estar povu ein jerál. Tan neé preokupasaun hirak hotu mesak la-masuk akal. Ou pelo contrario, tamba buat ida neé fenómena foun ida ba ita, nuneé ita hakfodak no tauk dezenesesariamente. Ita komesa curiga no komesa tauk ba buat foun ou xenofóbia - tamba ita senti sira fo ameasa ba priviléjiu ou status quo nebeé durante ita goja ou taken for granted.
            Entaun Governu la-likan preokupa ona ka ho preokupasaun hirak neé?. Lae. Merkadu livre la signifika livre totál. Ukun-nain sira tenki defini didiak saida maka sistema merkadu livre neé tuir kontekstu Timor-Leste nian. Laiha nasaun ida iha mundu neé, liu-liu sira nebeé hamosu no adopta sistema merkadu totalmente livre. Merkadu livre la signifika katak tukang bakso, suku sapatu, buruh kasar, kasir, no sst bele tama ho livre mai iha Timor-Leste. Sé ita livre nuneé bele hamate fali oportunidade ba Timór oan sira, nuneé governu bele faila tamba la kumpri ninia papél - tau matan ba ninia sidadaun sira nia moris diak. 
         Entaun saida mak ita tenki halo?. Husu ba governu liu-liu ministériu kompentente tenki implementa ho didiak leis hirak nebeé aprovadu no em vigor ona, liu-liu hadiak no hametin sistema avaliasaun no rejistu ba investidór esternu sira. Lei rasik hatúr katak investidór esternu presiza mínimu milaun 1.5 dólar. Laos investidór kelas teri sira i.e tukang bakso, hanesan amo Martinho dehan, mos husik tama livre mai investe iha Timór.
         Ita nia lei rasik mos dehan governu tenki identifika ativade ekonómika nebeé maka presiza investimentu esternu, no hirak nebeé maka proibidu ou rezervadu ba governu ou investidór nasional deit. Ijemplu hanesan bé. Ita la bele fo arbiru deit ba ema mai ke rai, bomba bé sai pois fán. Ita tenki halo planu no estudu didiak molok fo lisensa ba kompania ida prodús no fan bé. Ita mos presiza defini seitór ekonomia nebeé deit maka tenki taka ba investidór esternu. Sé la halo nuneé, ita bele tama iha risku dependensia ba investidores esternu nebeé iha futuru bele fo ameasa ba soberania nasaun nian hanesan nasaun Cyprus nebeé foin lalais neé hasoru problema bank run.
          Husu mos husu ba parte departamentu imigrasaun atu hadiak tan sira nia servisu, liu-liu kontrole ba ema estranjeirus nebeé hodi viza turista hodi mai buka servisu ou loke investimentu. Sé lae, estadu rasik maka lakon tamba ema ilegal hirak neé la selu taxa ker rendimentu pesóal no rendimentu institusionál. Imigrasaun mos tenki fo sansaun forte ba sira nebeé viola lei nebeé vigora.
          Husu ba Timór oan sira tenki prepara a’an no hadiak a’an iha aspeitu hotu-hotu. Komesa husi buat ki’ik sira hanesan étika servisu i.e pelayanan, badaen ou skill no matenek. Prepara a’an ba kompete ho ema seluk. Labele toba demais. Sé ita toba dukur, ita hakfodak mai kareta liu tiha ona no ikus mai ita sai bainaka iha ita nia rain rasik.
         Ikus liu, husu ba governu atu kria kondisaun nebeé diak hanesan fo prioridade no ajuda material ou finanseiru ba Timór oan sira. Hakman sira nia todan liu husi fo asesu ba kréditu. Atu nuneé bele fasilita sira hadiak no haluan sira nia negósiu hodi kompete ho fair ho ema estranjeiru sira.
         Prezensa ema estranjeiru, liu-liu sira nebeé mai halo negósiu iha ita nia rain, laos ameasas ida mai ita, maibe bensaun ida mai ita tamba sira lori benefisiu barak mai ita nia rain no ita nia emar sira. Durante neé ita tauk demais, nuneé ita haré sira hanesan inimigu laos parseiru. Husu ba nai-ulun sira labele husik liman, tau matan nafatin hodi kria kondisaun diak atu nuneé rai-nain ka lao-rai hetan hotu benefisiu husi dezenvolivmentu Timór foun.
           

BARRIERS TO LONG-TERM FINANCING AT AFFORDABLE RATES: INTRODUCING A NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANK TO SUPPORT TIMOR-LESTE PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT

BARRIERS TO LONG-TERM FINANCING AT AFFORDABLE RATES: INTRODUCING A NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANK TO SUPPORT TIMOR-LESTE PRIVATE SECTOR DEVEL...