Friday 19 September 2014

The Resource Curse

By | Published Sept. 12, 2014

Striking gold or discovering oil would seem to guarantee instant fortune. Instead, they often lead to conflict, corruption and poverty. History is full of examples of countries whose natural-resource wealth led to less economic success. Revenue from extracting raw materials might be mismanaged or embezzled by government officials, or siphoned off by foreign corporations. The bonanza might crowd out investment in other parts of the economy and make goods and services more expensive. And the country’s fiscal and economic fate might hang on volatile global commodity prices, especially for smaller and less diverse economies. All told, local populations can be left with little to show for their resources except a degraded environment. Economists and social scientists call this phenomenon “the resource curse.” Many countries are trying to determine how to prevent or reverse it.
Despite their abundance of oil, diamonds and other precious minerals, African countries including Angola, Nigeria and Sudan endure low average income and poor health indicators. While Middle East oil exports prop up extensive welfare spending, the region’s petrostates remain beholden to price swings and their people subject to undemocratic regimes. Though a superpower in resources as varied as iron ore, coffee and soybeans, Brazil continues to grapple with vast, dangerous slums. After centuries of plundering, Indonesia is trying to keep more wealth at home by restricting exports and investing in manufacturing. Critics such as the World Bank say the policies could deter investment and reduce tax revenue, yet international momentum is building behind efforts to improve resource management through more disclosures from governments and industries. Twenty-nine countries follow a voluntary international system of auditing company payments for commodities to make sure they match government revenues, and 17 more are applying to join the group. The U.S. and European Union are also implementing new rules for mining and energy companies to disclose payments.
The Background
The British economist Richard Auty coined the term “resource curse” in a 1993 book investigating why resource-rich countries underperformed other developing economies. A 1995 study found that economies with high commodities exports grew slower from 1971 to 1989, even after controlling for variables such as initial per-capita income and investment rates. Notwithstanding a few success stories (such as Botswana), the negative correlation between raw-material exports and economic growth suggests that resource wealth at least doesn’t help. The most commonly suspected causes include underinvestment in other industries (such as manufacturing), exposure to price swings, and concentration of wealth that discourages the development of rule of law and other conditions needed for a vibrant economy. The resource curse is sometimes lumped with the Dutch Disease, when a commodity boom makes a country’s currency more expensive and its other goods less competitive, named for the Netherlands’ 1960s crisis after discovering natural gas in the North Sea.
 
The Argument
Later researchers have questioned the existence of a resource curse, suggesting that resource wealth helps growth after all. Others have suggested that what matters isn’t resource abundance but dependence, or the strength of a country’s institutions. Initiatives to lift the curse have become a source of friction between developed and developing countries in intergovernmental bodies and in the international energy and mining industries. Experiments with controlling prices, blocking foreign direct investment and capping exports sparked controversy and backlash. The risk is always that the measures might kill the proverbial golden goose. Countries have had better luck with rules to moderate government spending, sovereign wealth funds, and lump-sum per-capita rebates. The newest discoveries, such as Ghana‘s 2007 oil find, are almost inevitably accompanied by discussion of what can be learned from the mistakes of the past.

INTRODUSAUN BA FUNDU PETROLÍFERU - Tamba Sá TL Estabelese Fundu Petrolíferu?

Tamba Sá TL Estabelese Fundu Petrolíferu?
*Cosme da Costa Araujo
 
Ita hotu nebeé moris no hela iha Timor-Leste (TL), rai-nain ka lao-rai, iha ligasaun direita no indireita ho Fundu Petrolíferu (FP). Ijemplu, osan selu saláriu trabailadores, pensaun vitalísia, veteranus, idozus, no kompañias. Osan sosa Hammer, pulsa tilun manas, Xinjang nia sasán nebeé dura loron ida deit. Osan halao atividade miss(ed) turizmu, osan harí ponte CPLP no osan hodi sosa no halo buat furak sira seluk. Osan hirak neé maioria, la seluk la leet, mai husi osan minarai - petro dollar - nebeé akumuladu iha FP.
 
Ijemplus hirak neé hakarak hatudu deit katak FP dezenpeña papél ida importante tebes iha ita nia moris loron-loron no liu-liu ba dezenvolvimentu nasaun TL. Antes hahú, uluk kna-nain hatoó agradese ba I Governu Konstitusional lidera husi Sr. Mari Alkatiri, nebeé maske iha tempu susar (laiha osan), nia no nia governu konsege, aprende husi esperiensia nasaun seluk, liu-liu nasaun Noruega, estabelese hela FP.

Artigu ida neé no sira seluk sei koalia konaba 1º objetivu estabelesimentu FP; 2º karakterístika FP; 3º governasaun FP; 4º investimentu FP; 5º tranferênsia FP; no 6º transparênsia no akuntabilidade FP. Artigu ida neé hahú ho pergunta importante ida neé - tamba sá TL estabelese FP?.
 
Objetivu prinsipál husi estabelesimentu FP maka atu asegura rikusoin rekursus naturais fo benefísiu ba ema hotu. Objetivu ida neé konsagra ona iha Konstituisaun RDTL (artigu 39) nebeé hateten Estadu tenkiser uza ho diak no justu rikusoin rekursus naturais hotu nasaun nian ba interese nasional. Lei Fundu Petrolíferu haforsa liu tan hodi dehan objetivu estabelese FP maka hodi kontribui ba jestaun diak rekursus petrolíferas TL atu nuneé fo benefísiu ba jerasaun agora no mos jerasaun futuru.
 
Iha kontekstu ida neé, FP nia funsaun atu asegura ekuidade entre jerasaun (inter generational equity). Osan minarai (reseitas petrolíferas) nebeé nakfilak-an husi petróleu iha rai-okos laos pertense deit ba ita (jerasaun agora), maibe ita nia oan no bei-oan (jerasaun futuru) sira mos iha direitu no sira sei ijiji sira nia direitu atu uza no goja mos rikusoin naun-renováveis sira neé. Atu asegura ida neé, FP, hanesan saving fund (fundu rezerva) ida, sei poupa (rai) hela osan balun, atu nuneé gerasaun futuru mos bele uza ba sira nia nesesidades (prioridades) rasik.
 
FP hamenus risku mal-jestaun ba rikusoin rekursus naturais. FP estabelese govenasaun, akuntabilidade, transparênsia no relatóriu ho nivel (padraun) ida aas tebes no rekoñesidu internasionalmente. Lei la fo dalan ba ema (instituisaun) ida foti (domina) dezisaun hotu nebeé relasiona ho jestaun FP. Entidade idak-idak (Parlamentu, Governu, Jestór Operasional) independemente halao nia knar tuir Lei haruka. Ho transparênsia nebeé aas (relatóriu trimestral, anuál, livru orsamentu, EITI) asegura akuntabilidade entidade relavantes sira no asegura povu nia konfiansa ba jestaun FP. Ho enkuadramentu FP nian, ita hotu bele hatene osan hirak maka tama, osan hirak maka investe, investe iha nebeé no osan hirak maka transfere ba orsamentu estadu. Ho exsepsaun ba kustus jestaun FP, Lei la fo dalan atu halo tranferênsia husi FP sein aprovasaun husi PN iha debate orsamental nebeé povu tomak bele akompaña. Nuneé ho FP ema (grupu) ida la bele halo mal-jestaun(dezvia) osan públiku ba nia (grupu) interese hanesan akontese iha nasaun sira seluk.
 
TL hetan ninia independénsia iha tempu ida oportunu. Ita iha oportunidade osan mean hodi aprende husi esperiensia nasaun seluk. Ita banati tuir esperiensia sira nebeé diak, hakribi no hasés-an husi sira nebeé aat. Esperiensia husi nasaun barak nebeé riku rekursus naturais hatudu katak rikusoin hirak neé la lori bensaun (blessing), maibe lori deit maka malisaun (curse) ba sira. Nasaun hirak neé hasoru konflitu (funu), povu barak moris kiak, korupsaun, rejime ditadura, governasaun sabraut, servisu públiku inefikás no inefisiente no sst. Esperiensia aat hirak neé toó halo eis ministru petróleu Venezuela nian, Sr Juan Pablo Perez Alfonso, hateten  oil is devil’s excrement (petróleo diabu nia teé).
 
Maibe esperiensia diak husi nasaun seluk hatudu katak sira bele no konsege hasés-an husi malisaun rekursu. Aprende husi nasaun hirak neé, liu-liu nasaun Noruega, TL estabelese FP, hanesan dalan ida, maibe laos dalan úniku, atu bele hasés-an husi malisaun rekursu. Malisaun rekursu akontese wainhira rikusoin rekursus naturais hamosu konflitu (funu), instabilidade makroekonómika no kualidade despezas públikas nebeé ladiak. Ho nuneé nasaun sira riku rekursus naturais (i.e Nigeria no Guinea Equitorial) ninia dezenvolvimentu ekonómiku no kondisaun moris aat tebes, kompara ho nasaun sira seluk nebeé laiha rekursus naturais (i.e Corea do Sul, Singapura no Taiwan). Estabelesimentu FP la signifika TL livre ona husi malisaun rekursu. FP parte ida deit husi mekanizmus no polítikas sira seluk nebeé Estadu adopta no implementa atu tulun TL la bele monu ba maliasaun rekursu.
 
FP hamenus vulnerabilidade ba risku volatilidade presu (produsaun) no asegura estabilidade orsamentu estadu. Nasaun barak nebeé riku rekursus naturais, bainhira sira hetan osan (reseitas) husi esplorasaun rekursus naturais, sira gasta kedan osan hirak neé. Sira transfere osan (reseitas) hirak neé direitamente ba orsamentu estadu. Konsekuentemente, sira vulnerável liu ba risku volatilidade presu (produsaun) (commodity price (production) volatility). Iha tempu diak, folin (produsaun) minarai sae, governu nia despezas mos sae no hakbiit governu hodi implementa programas barak. Maibe iha tempu aat, folin (produsaun) minarai tun, governu nia despezas mos tun, no obriga governu hodi la implementa nia programas balun. Iha tempu aat hanesan neé, governu barak maka prefere liu deve hodi sustenta nia programas (orsamentu) duke koa sira nia programas (orsamentu).
 
Ho FP ita bele hamenus risku volatilidade presu (produsaun) no asegura estabilidade orsamentu estadu nian husi tinan ba tinan. Orsamentu estadu la depende ba folin (produsaun) rekursus naturais. Iha TL, osan minarai (reseitas petrolíferas) tama direitamente ba konta FP. Hafoin kada tinan Estadu foti osan husi FP ba orsamentu estadu bazeia ba rendimentu sustentavel estimativa (RSE). RSE neé montante ida nebeé ita fiar sei asegura sustentabilidade FP ba tempu naruk. Montante ida neé estavel husi tinan ba tinan no la hetan impaktu makás husi mudansa (fluktuasaun) folin (produsaun) minarai. Sé iha impaktu makás ruma (folin no produsaun mina tun makás), governu bele transfere liu RSE atu nuneé governu bele kontinua implementa nia programas (prioridades) sira. Pelo contratrio, wainhira folin (produsaun) minarai sae,osan (reseitas) nebeé resin (surplus) bele paupa (rai) iha FP. Iha kontektu neé, FP dezenpeña nia funsaun hanesan Fundu Estabelizasaun (stabilization fund).
 
Fenómena seluk husi malisaun rekursu maka Dutch Disease (DD). Ba nasaun sira nebeé iha nia osan (moeda) rasik, DD akontese wainhira aumentu iha reseitas husi rekursus naturais haforsa valor osan (moeda) nasaun refere ka nasaun refere nia osan (moeda) apresia kompara ho osan (moeda) nasaun sira seluk. Ho valor osan (moeda) sae (apresiasaun moeda), halo nasaun refere nia esportasaun sai karun no importasaun sai baratu.
 
Reseitas petrolíferas la hanesan ho reseitas naun-petrolíferas sira seluk. Wainhira reseitas naun-petrolíferas (i.e reseitas doméstikas) aumenta, sei fo impaktu ba redusaun konsumu iha seitor privadu. Ho selu taxa, seitor privadu sei iha osan uitoan hodi konsumu. Nuneé demanda ba beins no servisus mos tun (menus). Maibe aumentu iha reseitas petrolíferas, nebeé transfere direitamente ba orsamentu estadu no ekonomia rai-laran, sei aumenta tan demanda (aleim-de demanda seitor privadu), nebeé ikus mai halo inflasaun sae aas.
 
Ho apresisaun moeda no inflasaun hakfraku kompetitivade seitores naun-petrolíferus. Nuneé produtus sira nebeé ita bele fan (esporta) sei la kompetitivu ho produtus importadus husi nasaun seluk. Ikus mai, nasaun refere ninia esportasaun menus no ninia ekonomia depende makás ba seitór petrolíferas no importasaun. Ekonomia TL ki’ik, tan neé nia kapasidade hodi absorve hotu osan petrolíferas limitadu teb-tebes. Liu husi FP maka governu transfere osan ba orsamentu estadu (tuir RSE) sukat tuir kapasidade ekzekusaun mas liu-liu kapasidade absorve ekonomia rai-laran. Ho nuneé FP ajuda limita risku Dutch Disease.
 
FP asegura despezas públikas nebeé diak. Nasaun riku rekursus naturais barak maka gasta osan ba projeitus sira (white elephant projects) nebeé la fo returnu  no benefisiu ba povu. FP hanesan dalan ida atu tulun Estadu atu asegura kualidade despezas públikas diak. Liu husi debate orsamental, PN, hanesan reprezentante povu, maka hatene liu no desidi prioridades (programas) Estadu nian nebeé maka serví interese nasional (povu nia diak). Nuneé PN bele kansela (koa) tiha programas sira nebeé la fo benefísiu ba povu nia moris diak. Enkuadramentu RSE mos obriga Estadu atu disiplina iha ninia polítika fiskal no fo atensaun no prioridades ba buat nebeé importante (priority of priorities). Maibe ikus mai despezas públikas ida diak depende fali ba vontade polítika (political will) Estadu nian rasik.
 
FP desenpeña papél ida importante tebes iha ita nia moris loron-loron. Objetivu estabelese FP maka 1º asegura rikusoin naturais fo benefisiu ba ema hotu, 2º ajuda TL hasés-an husi malisaun rekursu, 3º hamenus riksu volatilidade presu (produsaun), 4º limita risku Dutch Disease, 5º hamenus risku mal-jestaun, no 6º asegura despezas públikas nebeé diak.

Wednesday 10 September 2014

Big Oil stands by as con man swindles East Timor

 
Tom AllardSeptember 10, 2014
Rip-off: Bobby Boye allegedly scammed $3.51 million from East Timor.
Rip-off: Bobby Boye allegedly scammed $3.51 million from East Timor. Photo: Supplied
 
EXCLUSIVE
As Bobby Boye surveyed his extensive property portfolio, the 2011 Rolls-Royce Ghost and other luxury vehicles in the garage, he may well have reflected with some satisfaction on a job well done.
The Nigerian national with a penchant for signing off his emails "Bobby W. Boye esq." and wearing suits with waistcoats in the hot tropical weather made his fortune in East Timor, where he was lauded as a hero in the local media. Boye had been working for the East Timorese government since 2010 in a role pivotal to the fledgling nation's prosperity.
 
East Timor, still stumbling into nationhood, had just conducted the first tax audit of the oil companies that provide more than 90 per cent of its revenue. Until then, the oil companies essentially self-assessed, and East Timor was worried it was being ripped off. Boye's job was to issue the formal tax assessments to claw back unpaid revenue. He succeeded brilliantly, forcing the oil companies to cough up more than $350 million.But as he was raking in the revenue, Boye was robbing East Timor.
The shocking truth was he was a convicted felon, a charlatan and embezzler who has allegedly scammed $3.51 million from East Timor's threadbare treasury.
 
Boye was arrested in June this year after the East Timorese tipped off the FBI in April 2013.
Yet East Timor's government was not the first to know, not by a long shot.
Emails obtained by Fairfax Media, along with interviews with people involved in the saga, attest that at least a dozen people working for the oil and gas industry knew about Boye's chequered past.
In many cases, that knowledge stretched as far back as two years before East Timor's government says it independently realised Boye's malfeasance.
 
Senior staff at oil and gas giant ConocoPhillips, among others, kept secret their concerns about Boye's credentials even though he was a man they detested, an imposing and arrogant interloper who had cost them a significant amount of money.
For Pierre-Richard Prosper, a partner at international law firm Arent Fox, who is acting for East Timor, the refusal to share the information was "shocking and appalling".
"Clearly, they held this to be used as some kind of leverage; the question is against whom and for what intended gain?"
 
Oil industry sources and emails obtained by Fairfax Media reveal the oil companies became suspicious about Boye as early as December 2010, when an influential local website, La'o Hamutuk, ran a story about oil companies "robbing" East Timor of taxation. The figures about the adverse tax assessments were uncannily accurate – prompting concerns that Boye had leaked the information.
Several industry sources said they tried to formally protest to the head of East Timor's customs and revenue service, Cancio de Jesus Oliveira, but he allegedly fobbed them off.Emails show ConocoPhillips decided not to pursue the matter with East Timorese authorities any further.
But the oil industry made further inquiries, using investigators and lawyers to do due diligence on Boye. What they found out about him was far more disturbing than the unauthorised leaking of information.
Emails sent in June 2011, one bearing the subject heading "A Nigerian con artist in our midst?", outlined how Boye's claims to have studied at Cambridge University and worked at energy giant Chevron and the international law firm Clifford Chance were fake.
 
As the email noted: "I imagine the Timor government would be most embarrassed." The email was circulated to a number of ConocoPhillips Australia executives. Research was not that difficult; the irregularities could be easily detected by perusing documents on the public record.
 
The investigations uncovered further evidence of Boye's unsavoury past. Boye had served three years in prison in California for embezzlement in 2007 and had been banned for life by the New York Stock Exchange after defrauding clients of their stocks in 2004.
 
By mid-2012, oil company staff were also aware of serious problems with Opus & Best, a company that was awarded a lucrative contract to provide tax advice to the East Timorese government.
According to emails obtained by Fairfax Media, ConocoPhillips deduced that the company was registered four days after it was awarded the contract.
 
Moreover, the Opus & Best contracts were unusually buried on the transparency portal of the Ministry of Finance. The company's website looked like a cut and paste job.
Inquiries to Opus & Best's office in New York for a contact elicited Bobby Boye's personal email address.
 
Opus & Best was secretly owned by Boye, who used the sham company – it later emerged – to siphon off $3.5 million from East Timor's threadbare treasury into bank accounts established in New York.
 
Boye wrote Opus & Best's bid document and was on the committee that awarded the contract. The FBI states that Boye used his stature to dictate the winner.
According to the FBI, Boye used the proceeds of his fraud to purchase the Rolls-Royce, a Bentley Continental and a Range Rover, along with $US20,000 in watches and a portfolio of four homes in New Jersey.
 
If ConocoPhillips had informed the East Timorese government, it would have saved the impoverished nation at least $2 million. By mid-2012, only $1.5 million had been wired to Boye's fraudulent account.
 
One industry source said the companies went as far as to track the payments made to the company, and realised the accounts were linked to Boye.
"Everyone knew. Nobody did anything," said one oil industry source, who was among those aware of Boye's past.
 
"They kept it in their back pocket."
Apparently unaware the FBI was investigating the case or that East Timor had independently come across Boye's mischief, it was not until November last year that Conoco told East Timor about its concerns about Boye, and then only in a two-minute "heads up" at the end of a teleconference between lawyers.
 
It took until January 2014 for the company to disclose everything it had come across – including the fraud involving Opus & Best, says Mr Prosper, East Timor's lawyer in the tax dispute with Conoco, now before arbitration in Singapore.
 
"You would expect a partner in a major development with Timor Leste and an honest taxpayer to tell you, 'Look, we have a problem here,' " said Mr Prosper, referring to East Timor by its official name.
According to multiple sources, Conoco's planned appeals against the adverse tax assessments from Boye explains why it refused to pass on what it knew about Boye promptly.
It would make for a devastating case if Conoco could reveal that the author of the tax rulings was a convicted felon and con artist.
 
It is understood that Boye's character was the key to Conoco's case. The fact that it was able to present detailed allegations about Boye before the FBI investigation became public is proof that it had done its own detailed research.
 
Fairfax Media attempted to contact the ConocoPhillips executives directly but was referred to ConocoPhillip's media department.
Detailed questions were sent on Friday asking the company when its staff started having doubts about Bobby Boye's bona fides, if it was aware of investigations into Boye by oil companies and their proxies, if it had conducted an investigation itself, and if it contacted the East Timorese government about its concerns.
 
The oil giant declined to answer these specific questions and others, releasing a short statement instead. "ConocoPhillips is aware that Bobby Boye was a consultant to the Timor-Leste Revenue service and that he was arrested on 19 June 2014," it said.
 
"Because of his role within the government, we were obligated to engage with Mr Boye over revenue matters. ConocoPhillips is not involved in the case before the US court."
Conoco's joint venture partners in its Timor Gap oil field include Santos, ENI Australia and Japan's Tokyo Timor Sea Resources.
 
A Santos spokeswoman said the company and its staff did not know about Boye's convict past and alleged criminality in East Timor until his arrest. Other joint venture partners ENI Australia and Tokyo Gas either failed to return calls or said they could not find anyone to comment.
 
East Timor is the world's most oil dependent nation. Its oil revenue comes from just two fields in the Timor Sea. Bayu-Undan, where ConocoPhillips is its major shareholder and operator, is by far the larger and has been operational for longer. Few, if any, nation states have had to rely on one company so much to underwrite their prosperity.
 
While East Timor has an annual budget of $US1.5 billion ($1.6 billion), ConocoPhillips had revenues of $US57 billion last year. Its market capitalisation is $US100 billion. It describes itself as the world's largest independent gas production and exploration company. It is among the top 25 oil producers in the world. The $3.5 million that Boye siphoned off East Timor is the equivalent to almost one month of the tiny nation's health budget.
 
But that amount is dwarfed in comparison with the $350 million-plus at stake in the tax litigation. ConocoPhillips alone is disputing more than $200 million in back taxes and penalties Boye forced it to pay. The ease of Bobby Boye's fraud reflects badly on East Timor, but it was the Norwegian government that hired Boye and sent him to East Timor under its aid program. Its ineptitude in checking his credentials was staggering.
 
According to Norwegian news reports, Boye listed 3D Systems as a previous employer. This was true. But it was while at 3D Systems that Boye was found guilty of embezzling $250,000, money laundering and theft, and sentenced to two years in prison. All of this, again, was on the public record. One of the world's most fragile states was badly let down by Norway, the country that ranks number one on the UN's human development index.
 
Conoco's conduct was even more reprehensible, Mr Prosper says. He called for Conoco's head office in Houston to undertake a "full and complete investigation as to why it withheld vital information regarding fraud from both Timor and law enforcement". Others in East Timor's government are talking about possible prosecutions of Conoco staff. East Timor's struggle for independence after 24 years of Indonesian occupation was epic. Its efforts to transform into a middle income state are just as challenging.
 
Frauds like Bobby Boye sadly prey on post-conflict states. Interlopers of his ilk are not uncommon throughout the developing world. Emerging states building the infrastructure of government need all the support they can get to protect them. Its concerns about Boye were triggered by unexplained absences and dubious claims to have a life-threatening illness. It was fortunate it acted. Boye, according to the FBI, was hatching another scheme to defraud East TImor when he was arrested.
 
BOBBY BOYE
Investment banker, tax lawyer, fraudster
1963 Born in Nigeria. Later becomes US citizen. Other aliases Bobby Ajiboye, Bobby Aji-Boye.
1998 Employed by Morgan Stanley. Fleeces clients of shares, which he sells for cash. Permanently suspended by New York Stock Exchange.
2002-2005 Works at 3D Systems, a 3D printing pioneer, as head of tax department.
2006 Arrested in California.
2007 Found guilty of defrauding 3D Systems of more than $250,000. Serves prison term for grand theft, money laundering and perjury.
2010 Gets limited licence to practise international law in New York, citing a Nigerian legal training.
July 2010 Starts as a petroleum tax legal adviser to East Timor's government, hired and funded by Norway. Salary and benefits worth $350,000 a year. Falsified CV to claim he studied at Cambridge University, worked at Chevron and law firm Clifford Chance.
Mar-Dec 2012 Boye on committee to award contract for external tax advice for East Timor. Contract awarded to a company that he secretly owns, Opus & Best. $3.51 million is wired from East Timor to an account he set up.
April 2013 Flees East Timor.
May 2013 East Timor refers Boye to FBI for investigation.
June 19, 2014 Arrested at Newark International Airport by the FBI. Released on $1.5 million bail.

BARRIERS TO LONG-TERM FINANCING AT AFFORDABLE RATES: INTRODUCING A NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANK TO SUPPORT TIMOR-LESTE PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT

BARRIERS TO LONG-TERM FINANCING AT AFFORDABLE RATES: INTRODUCING A NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANK TO SUPPORT TIMOR-LESTE PRIVATE SECTOR DEVEL...