Timor-Leste aviation industry – everyone is better off with two truly independent providers

Timor-Leste aviation industry – everyone is better off with two truly independent providers

*Cosme da Costa Araújo

January 2017

In a small market economy such as Timor-Leste aviation industry, no competition allows a single provider to monopolize the market and do whatever it wants, charging higher price for low quality service. But too many competitors could fuel collusion, or a price war, which ultimately lead to deterring and driving out competitors, and retaking of monopoly position. For now, everyone would be better off with two truly independent providers.

Not everyone is as lucky as Marvi

Our journey into the New Year begins with a jubilant welcoming of Maria Vitoria, the third runner up of the 2^nd Asia Dangdut Academy. A record crowd turn-out for a previously unknown Timorese teenage girl nearly brought Dili to a standstill. Marvi, as she is now known, epitomizes the Chinese prophecy for 2017 – the year of the Rooster – the year of dawn and awakening, triumph and success for those who work hard.

But not everyone is as lucky as Marvi. Air Timor, for example, a company that is dear to many proud Timorese for flying with “Timor” name and run by many Timorese businessmen, decided to terminate its Denpasar flights and reduce the frequency of its Singapore flights. The inconsistent application of the regulations by the Government and overcapacity are the main reasons leading to the reduction of its route network, significant layoffs and the surrender of any Timor-Leste airline opportunities to Indonesian carriers. The Government dismissed Air Timor’s claims and responded that “Timor-Leste is a free market, whereby Government’s role is merely to do with regulations”. The Government went further to blame the company to bring the disaster into itself for lacking managerial capacity and inability to resolve its internal affairs.

A market too small for many competitors

Accessing to Timor-Leste from other countries is predominantly by air. Air connections are limited to three entry points: Singapore, Denpasar and Darwin. Dili-Denpasar route was first serviced by the Merpati Nusantara Airlines. The monopoly position it enjoyed allowed it to charge an exuberant one-way price above $300. The entry of Batavia Air in 2010 offered an alternate transportation for the Dili-Denpasar route and the price fell accordingly by 30%. Sadly bankruptcies took toll on both companies forcing them to cease their operations in 2014 and 2013 respectively. Sriwijaya Air, another Indonesian private airline, began flying to Dili in 2013. A year later with the entry of Air Timor, in partnership with Citilink, the price for a single trip fell considerably to around $100 or less. Sriwijaya apparently colluded with Nam Air, one of its subsidiaries, waged a price war and dumped the price to $70, far below the market price. Air Timor succumbed and left the route in early 2017. Consumers’ enjoyment of low airfares was short-lived with one company again dominating the market, and the price is skyrocketing, back to its previous record high.

With a small market of about 100,000 passengers flying in a year, there are so many seats available compared to market demand that the three airlines could only achieve 50% or less Load Factor. Too much competition actually results in everyone worse off situation. When a small market is shared among a larger number of firms, the unit cost rises as few economies of scales are realized. The higher unit cost necessitates higher price being charged. In a market where airlines usually need 70% to break-even, competition forces companies to run at margin loss which leads to a price war and the subsequent failure and return to monopoly ultimately does not benefit consumers.

Australian airline market with approximately 60 million passengers flies domestically, only two providers service the market – Qantas and Virgin. Its international airline industry remains quietly regulated and is subject to detailed capacity controls. More competition should be encouraged for the Dili-Darwin route, which is still dominated by Air North.

An indication of an apparent colluded “duopoly”

Timor-Leste has seven slots available to fly from Dili to Indonesia. The Government of Timor-Leste issues licenses to both Sriwijaya Air and Nam Air, each as a separate independent company. In fact, Nam Air is a subsidiary of Sriwijaya. With a different cost structure and economies of scales leveraged from its wider operation in the other Indonesian market, and the transfers of Nam Air passengers on low-capacity days, Sriwijaya enjoys the competitive advantage over Air Timor. The deep pocket it has enabled it and its subsidiary to wage a price war that Air Timor is not able to match. The actions of the both airlines indicate an apparent collusion to force rivals out and to maintain its monopoly position. All of us would have felt the impacts as price is skyrocketing immediately after Air Timor’s decision to terminate its Dili-Denpasar route.

Government failures exacerbate market failures

The Government is right that in a free market economy, the Government’s role is to set and enforce regulations. Therefore, Government has been intervened to correct market failures through regulations. However, in many instances, Government intervention can also fail to achieve an efficient allocation of resources.

To ensure aviation safety, the Government enacted legislation that stipulates aircraft must be no more than 20 years old. There is no ambiguity in the legislation. Air Timor was asked to replace its 18-year-old aircraft with a new A320 Airbus. But Sriwijaya and NAM are allowed to operate its 22 year old aircrafts.  The Government argues that both airlines are technically assessed to still be suitable for operation regardless of its 22 year old aircraft, which contradicts the clear stipulation of the law.

The Government’s inconsistent and discriminatory enforcement of the legislation violates the provision and the intention of the law itself. And by allowing both airlines which were ranked last year among the 10 least safe airlines in the world and banned from flying in Europe and by relying the assessment carried out by other countries on the safety of the aircrafts, the Government puts the safety of its own citizens at risk. The very people they vow to protect when they come to office. This type of legal uncertainties may set a bad precedent that could deter future potential investments.

Towards the end of 2016, the Government introduced a price support regulation which set a minimum price the airlines can charge. However, the regulation was repealed in the Council of Ministers. How the minimum price came about is still unknown. A price floor is fine, as long as it is set fairly close to the equilibrium price. The Government needs to do further study to determine what the equilibrium price is. It is clearly above the low price that forced Air Timor out of the market.

After the termination of Air Timor operation, the price is skyrocketing. A return ticket for Dili-Denpasar is now close to $300 or more. The Government has to swallow its pride to intervene by monitoring and controling the price charged by now a single provider. How the Government is going to do this remains unclear. If it is trying, the current price suggests it is not doing a good job. These are few examples of government failures which exacerbate market failures. The Government can be sued for breach duties and violation of the law.

Everyone is better off with some competition

Timor-Leste aviation industry is a market too small for too many competitors. We have seen and experienced that a monopoly provider is able to charge a higher price at will, reaping the benefits at the expense of the customers. The two truly independent providers offer us alternate and affordable options. But more than two providers will either fuel collusion, or a price war, driving out competitors which ultimately lead to the charging of high price. For now, everyone would be better off with two truly independent providers.

What the Government can do is to set a minimum price to stop future price wars and encourage Air Timor or other low carrier to enter the market. If the market is not big enough, the Government needs to put a price ceiling so that traveling is affordable for as many consumers as possible. An alternative option would be, in Timor-Leste case, flying could be considered as public goods. Therefore, a national commercial airline can be introduced, jointly financed and run by the Government in partnership with the private sectors – a typical Public Private Partnership  (PPP) arrangement.   

Support “Rai-Nain” – Timor owned, Timor led

Timor-Leste is in need for foreign direct investments (FDIs) to help create jobs, reduce unemployment, improve living standards and create revenues for the government. These byproducts are secondary to the main objective of FDIs, which is to maximize profits whenever and wherever opportunities exist. But FDIs will leave the country without notice when such opportunities no longer exist. Let’s see what these investors would do when Petroleum Fund runs out.

Only domestic Timorese investors, the “rai-nain”, will stay put to help out their country and their people. During the dark hours of our struggle, we vowed to unshackle ourselves from any form of dependence. And we will never “kaer kuda talin rasik”, if we halfheartedly support the likes of Jape Konsu, Jackson Lay, Clarissa Lay, shareholders of Air Timor, and many other Timorese who are not dependent on the government’s handouts. They help create jobs, pay taxes, and more importantly keep the money circulating in our economy, instead of repatriating it overseas. Surely such local businessmen warrant our support rather than the companies that squander public money on precarious projects. When other countries forbid foreign airlines to compete in their domestic market, bail out their ailing national carriers, and force their public servants to fly their national carriers, why can’t we support ours.

A free market economy sounds good in theory. But not many countries, who preach it, practice it. It reminds me of a wise Timorese man once told his confidant “every theory is good; but the only one that is useful, is the one that fits the reality of our country”.

* The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect the view of any entity or person that author works or associates with.

References

ABC News, (2017), Air Timor: Government policy, suspected corruption ‘destroying’ East Timor’s only airline.

ADB, (2015), Growing the non-oil economy: a private sector assessment for Timor-Leste.

Air Timor, (2017), Press Release

Ch-Aviation, (2017), Air Timor closes Bali route, blames government policy, dumping, www.ch-aviation.com

Investopedia, (2017), What is an ‘Imperfect Market’

Lusa, (2017), Companhia aérea timorense culpa política do Governo por perdas de 3 milhões de dólares

Lusa, (2017), Governo timorense espera que indonésia Citilink continue voos entre Díli e Bali

Ross, D., (2015), Aviation safety vs commercial profits, www.policyforum.net

The Economist, (2002), Fair play, free markets

The Economist, (2013), Spot the difference: legacy vs low-cost carriers

The Economist, (2015), The collusion delusion: Airline competition

ARGUING FOR REVIVING TIMOR-LESTE INVESTMENT CORPORATION

ARGUING FOR REVIVING TIMOR-LESTE INVESTMENT CORPORATION

*Cosme da Costa Araújo

 Source: businesskorea.co.kr

Timor-Leste Investment Corporation (TLIC) is the embodiment of the old adage – “having your own cake and eat it too”. It will earn not only financial returns from its investments in the local economy but also help to finance the country’s economic development by providing long-term finance at affordable rates to the private sector.

Our private sector – where are we?

Our economic growth is being driven by public expenditures. With the blessings flowing in from oil and gas, we want to develop a vibrant private sector that will be the backbone for the transition to a sustainable non-oil economy. Government, at least in the earlier stage of development, is responsible for nurturing, supporting and creating favorable enabling environment for private sector to grow. 

Our private sector, however, is still miles away from the Strategic Development Plans (SDP)’s targets. It is under-resourced and so under-developed. The non-oil business sector comprises of small locally owned sole proprietorship companies. These businesses are based primarily in Dili and are mainly involved in retail, wholesale and construction activities. Construction companies are setup mainly to tender for government’s projects and investments. Lack of financial support and poor management often lead them to incur costs overruns which erode their already tight profit margin and in many occasions result in projects delays, quality impairments and abandonments. Lately a few of them find a new role of acting as “project brokers” for their international counterparts. Money earned from doing public projects is not reinvested back into the business or in new business ventures. Ill-equipped locals will be outnumbered and outcompeted in an uneven level of playing field. As we will continue to rely on foreign imports in years to come, about 70 percent of every dollar spent in Timor-Leste will go overseas. We are left nothing but “HELENA” – as locals normally call it. A small but promising number of start-ups begin to venture into non-construction-retail related businesses.

The question is what could have we possibly not done enough to cause such a gloomy picture of our private sector? The answer is simple and we all know it too well. Our private sector has no money. A multi-language Timorese would call it “Modal Laiha”; literally means “No Capital”. Our infant private sector is constrained by limited or no access to credit and long-term finance at affordable rates.

A limited access to finance at affordable rates

Corporate financing or ways of raising money or capital for a business can be either or a combination of debt, and contributions from owners and shareholders. Without a well functioning of financial market, raising capital will be not easy. However, it can still be done. For a small economy as ours, the amount of money sitting with our banks is not insignificant. The recent report by the Central Bank shows that total deposits, as of 2015, amounts to $US725 million but only US$191 million are loaned out. The average of private sector credit to GDP ratio is significantly below the average for lower middle-income countries. The IMF argues that our banks are falling short in their role of financial intermediation. The absence of collateral is cited as the main reason for banks’ reluctance to lend out more. As a result of that, banks charge high interest rates, which to a large extent further prevent businesses from taking out loans.

Banks lending out is only to a few high net-worth businesses mostly foreign-owned and in sectors that rely on government’s contracts. Excess deposits are placed offshore, instead of making them available for loans in the local economy. When loans are made, most have very short maturity. This prevents businesses from taking up meaningful long-term investments. Even our own BCNTL is yet to fulfill its mission to support “commercial activities” in the country. Only a handful of micro-credit institutions are taking the risk to offer small short-term loans with reasonable rates to households and small businesses.

We can now see the challenge the private sector is facing here. Without access to finance, they cannot invest, expand, purchase goods and equipments and upgrade facilities, let alone achieve the SDP’s targets.  

Limitations of the existing financing mechanisms

Many people have been calling for the Petroleum Fund to invest more in the local economy, instead of “helping other countries”. Well it does invest domestically indirectly. Transfers are made every year from the Petroleum Fund to finance the state budget. It is the government who is ultimately responsible for designing a good plan and having an efficient budget execution that ensures every dollar spent counts.

But facing with capacity constraints, government opts to take out concessional loans and engage in the Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). The former is to finance projects that generate social benefits, while the later is for projects that provide financial and economic returns. From the economic point of view, in both arrangements, mostly foreign private sector gain more benefits from the upsides and government has to bear more risk for the downsides and content with the little uptake from the upsides. It is understandable. For a country that Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) are hard to come by, government would do whatever it takes to secure investors’ confidence and lure future potential FDIs.

 

Government is contemplating on introducing a credit guarantee scheme. It will serve as collateral for banks to lend out more and or for businesses to borrow more.  It is an interesting idea, but doubtful that it will fulfill its intended objective. A similar scheme was introduced few years ago. But due to information asymmetry and adverse selection and coupled with moral hazards from the lenders side, businesses took excessive and reckless borrowings to such an extent it nearly bankrupted a commercial bank.

So what else do we have at our disposal? The answer is many. One of which I strongly support is to revive Timor-Leste Investment Corporation (TLIC).

TLIC and its many pros

TLIC was created in 2011 to follow the successful story of the Singaporean Temasek. However, it was prematurely killed in the 2011 budget when an initial capital injection of $200 million was proposed and discussed.

TLIC is intended to support the country’s transition to a non-oil economy by promoting investments in sectors of the national economy that are vital to our economic growth and development. It will help nurture, protect and support private sector. It will assist in the development of new industries, build domestic skill base, broaden the base of our economy and decrease our reliance on imports.

To achieve those desired goals, it could do what most investment funds in Pacific do. They invest in domestic financial securities and real assets such as hotels, ports, airports, telecommunications and real estates. They maximize financial returns for their shareholders and at the same time contribute to the economic development of their countries. By saying that, I am not suggesting that we should follow ”the Pacific Way”. They have limitations. Their investments lack diversification, have strong home bias by definition, concentration risk and high correlation of asset classes as they are exposed to the same systematic risk. We should instead do ”the Singaporean Way”. They have two distinctively investments arms with different objectives and asset allocations. GIC invests in a globally diversified portfolio spread across various asset classes, while Temasek invests initially in local companies in the domestic market. They both play a distinct role and have a different investment portfolio as part of the larger strategy for diversification. Contrary to theoretical concern, Temasek investments in local economy have not resulted in a crowding out of private investments; instead, it helps attract private investment from within and outside of the country. If we are to follow the “the Singaporean Way”, we already have the Petroleum Fund, an equivalent of the GIC, that invests in a diversified assets abroad and TLIC, our version of Temasek, will invest domestically in our selected local companies. Essentially, by following “the Singaporean Way”, we can avoid the problems inherited in “the Pacific Way”.

An important characteristic of TLIC is that it will involve only in investments and projects that have a commercial focus. In that sense, it could be a party to the PPPs arrangements in, for example, Tibar Port, TL Cement and Heineken projects. Its fundamental focus should be on long-term financing directly or indirectly either alone or co-investing with others in projects that foster development, generate positive externalities and under-financed by private creditors. It can either be a debt-holder or an equity-holder or preferably both. With the former, it will provide long-term loans with subsidized interest rates – interest below market rates. With the later, it will provide not only finance, but also technical assistance and direct involvement in the management of the business. This helps to bring discipline and necessary skills that our private sector is lacking. It can become a business partner by providing money in return for a share of project’s profits. It will help to pick “winners” that will be competitive domestically and internationally. The benefits accrued from TLIC as an equity-holder is what is missing from a development bank as a debt-holder.

In addition, by acting as catalyst, TLIC can help attract foreign investors, guarantors, regional and multilateral financing institutions. It can also help to enhance climate for business and attract and pool together private sources of capital from within and outside of the country. This in turn allows TLIC to initiate and nurture the development of an inclusive financial market in Timor-Leste.

TLIC will also support small businesses in gaining access to credit. This means that it will provide support to microfinance institutions that are currently overstretched to meet the continued increase in demand for loans from households and small businesses. It will foster entrepreneurship and commercialization of agriculture in rural areas. It is easy to set up with minimal regulatory requirements and can be funded initially with public capital and owned by the government. It requires different skill sets and resources to achieve its intended objective.

TLIC is certainly not without risks. Government will ultimately still be responsible for all sorts of risks that TLIC may face. The risks governments in advanced countries defy the market principles when they bail out failed banks and companies with taxpayers’ money. The risks that central banks in those countries are willing to take when they lower interest rates close to and below zero and engage in unconventional measures just to support the revival of their economies. The 1997 South-East Asia’s Armageddon gives us an important lesson, that is, the government must keep its financial institutions aligned with its development strategies until they are achieved. The close alignment of finance with agricultural and industrial policy objectives facilitates the unprecedentedly rapid economic development of North-East Asia. The key is to have finance pointed at the right targets or right development strategies. This is better achieved through TLIC than a development bank as banks anywhere have a different DNA. 

TLIC – having your own cake and eat it too

It is worthwhile to look at the experience of others on how they can meet their return target and still contribute to the economic development of their countries. In reviving TLIC, “the Singaporean way” needs to be contextualized to our reality. As both debt and equity holders, TLIC will invest directly or indirectly either alone or with others in the local economy through local companies and in key strategic investments. In doing so, TLIC will earn not only financial returns from its investments in the local economy but also help to finance Timor-Leste’s economic development by providing long-term finance at affordable rates to the private sector. TLIC is all we ask for – an embodiment of the old adage – having your own cake and eat it too.

References

ADB, 2015, Growing the non-oil economy: a private sector assessment for Timor-Leste, Manila, the Philippines.

GIC, Frequently Asked Question, www.gic.com.sg.

Lao Hamutuk, 2011, The Unofficial Translation of Decree-Law No.41/2011, of 21 September, Timor-Leste Investment Company, www.laohamutuk.org.

RDTL, Timor-Leste Strategic Development Plan 2011-2030, Dili, Timor-Leste.

The United Nations, 2005, Rethinking the Role of National Development Banks, Financing for Development Office, Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

Investe agora ou nunca - haré fali desizaun defísil balun Timor-Leste tenki halo

 Investe agora ou nunca

Haré fali desizaun defísil balun Timor-Leste tenki halo

*Cosme da Costa Araújo

Fonte: www.joc.com

Konkorda hodi la-konkorda

Parlamentu Nasional foin lalais ne’e aprova orsamentu rektifikativu ba tinan 2016. Governu propoin orsamentu adisional milaun 391. Ho nune’e, total orsamentu ba tinan 2016 sa’e ba bilaun 1,9. Orsamentu refere barak liu sei utiliza ba finansiamentu projetu infra-estrutura sira. Governu argumenta katak investimentu hirak ne’e, ho retornu ne’ebé a’as, sei sai hanesan baze fundamental ba dezenvolvimentu sustentável longu-prazu lidera husi seitor privadu. Ema barak la-konkorda, inkluindu ONG Lao Hamutuk. Ema sira ne’e argumenta katak investimentu ba projetu fíziku hirak ne’e sei la-fo benefísiu ba timor-oan sira - jerasaun agora no mos jerasaun futura.

Parte rua ne’e – pro no kontra –, sem dúvida, iha intensaun diak ba nasaun ida ne’e. Sira-rua hakarak Timor-Leste sai nasaun ida próspera ho populasaun matenek no saudável no ekonomia naun-petrolífera forte lidera husi seitor privadu. Maibé, oinsá atu atinji mehi ida ne’e, sira-rua mai ho hanoin la-hanesan. Diskordu entre sira-rua ne’e laos buat ida foun mai ita. Akadémiku no practioner sira tinan barak ona seidauk hetan konkordánsia konaba oinsá nasaun sira riku rekursu natural tenki utiliza sira nia riku-soin hodi dezenvolve sira nia nasaun no ekonomia.

HRP no nia limitasaun

Estabelesimentu Fundu Petroliferu (FP) sai nu’udár alkanse importante no históriku ida ba Timor-Leste iha nia esforsu tomak ba jestaun diak rekursu mina-rai. Estabelesimentu FP sai nu’udár desizaun polítika importante ida nasaun barak iha mundu seidauk konsege halo. FP kontribui ba polítika fiskal ida diak, ne’ebé fo konsiderasaun ba interese longu-prazu timor-oan sira nian.

Rendimentu Sustentável Estimativa (RSE) nu’udár regra fiskal ida iha aranju FP. RSE montante sustentável ida ita bele foti husi FP hodi finansia orsamentu estadu nian, ao mesmo tempo, mantein  poder de compras Fundu ninian. Razaun hodi suporta regra RSE ne’e rasik, la-seluk la-leet, mai husi teoria klásika Hipóteze Rendimentu Permanente (HRP). Retoria refere dezenvolve husi ekonomista Milton Friedman iha tinan 1975. Teoria ne’e orijinalmente uza no aplika ba individual iha nivel uma-kain. Desde ne’ebá, nia dezenvolve no aplika ba nivel nasaun. Tuir regra ida ne’e, Timor-Leste so bele gasta deit 3 pursentu RSE, ida ne’ebé reprezenta retornu implísitu investimentu FP.

Embora ema no nasaun barak uza teoria HRP, maibé ninia aplikasaun hetan krítika maka’as, inkluindu Paul Collier, tamba konsidera nia la-apropriada ka ríjida liu ba nasaun sira ho rendimentu ki’ik hanesan Timor-Leste. Regra fiskal bazeia ba HRP la-kapta ho didiak karaterístika nasaun ida nian. Ho liafuan seluk, polítika fiskal ida ne’e tenki refleta objetivu nasional no sirkumtánsia nasaun ida nian.

Fundu Soberanu Noruega (FSN) sai nuda’ar modelu ba ita iha ita nia jestaun ba  reseita mina-rai. Noruega nasaun ida únika no certamente diferente husi Timor-Leste iha aspetu barak. Embora sira nia FSN no reseita mina-rai sai nafatin rekursu bo’ot no importante ba sira, maibé sira nia atividade ekonómika naun-petrolífera sai hanesan fonte prinsipal ba produsaun, empregu no rendimentu. Seitor servisu faz parte mais ou menos pursentu 59 husi PIB iha tinan 2012. Noruega ho infraestrutura moderna no forsa trabaillu kualifikada kontribui ba sira nia produtividade a’as no nivel PIB por habitante a’as kompara ho nasaun riku sira seluk iha Organização para a Cooperação e o Desenvolvimento Económico (OCDE).

Pelo contrario, ekonomia Timor-Leste nian ne’ebé ki’ik sei kontinua domina husi seitor mina-rai. Timor-Leste sei falta forsa traballu kualifikada. Limitasaun infra-estrutura halo seitor potensial sira hanesan agrikultura no turizmu seidauk bele dezenvolve ho didiak no kontribui ba movimentu inefisiente ba sasán no ema, ne’ebé dala barak hamosu sasán folin a’as ba povu ki’ik no mukit sira.

Ita hotu konkorda katak atu diversifika ninia ekonomia, Timor-Leste presiza investe maka’as iha seitor produtivu hodi kria fonte rendimentu foun no servisu ba nia emar sira. Timor-Leste presiza mos hasa’e nivel kualifikasaun forsa traballu no hadiak ninia infra-estrutura hodi hasa’e ninia produtividade. Ho razaun sira ne’e hotu, ita presiza hasa’e despeza públika ba investimentu kapital. Lei FP hatene konaba situasaun únika Timor-Leste nian ida ne’e desde início, nune’e nia fo-dalan atu governu bele halo levantamentu esesu RSE, naran katak polítika ida ne’e halo ba interese longu-prazu sidadaun timor-oan sira nian.

Aleim de ida ne’e, polítika fiskal bazeia ba HRP mai ho pre-supostu ida katak buat hotu-hotu sei la-muda (konstanta) inkluindu kresimentu populasaun, dezenvolvimentu ekonómiku no despeza públika. Infelizmente, pre-supostu hirak la-akontese iha realidade. Ho kresimentu anual populasaun Timor-Leste nian 3 pursentu, demanda ba servisu públiku mos sei aumenta, no ida sei fo impaktu ba despeza públika, ita la konta ho impaktu mai husi introdusaun pensaun ba funsiunáriu públiku. RSE agora daun-daun susar teb-tebes atu kobre deit despeza públika rekorente. Sé ita hakarak gasta tuir deit RSE, ita tenki halo rasionalizasaun ba despeza públika ka hasa’e baze kapital Fundu nian liu husi reseita mina-rai foun. Gasta deit RSE mos bele rezulta estagnasaun ekonomia naun-petrolífera, dependénsia eternal ba FP no risku despeza públika ba fluktuasaun kurtu-prazu retornu investimentu FP. Nune’e, sé ita la investe iha infra-estrutura no rekursu humanu mos riksu ida. Nune’e mos, atu asegura katak ita gasta deit rendimentu permanente eternalmente, ita presiza hasa’e baze kapital FP nian hodi konsidera inflasaun, ho nune’e deit maka ita bele mantein poder de compras Fundu nian. Sé lae, valór Fundu sei kontinua tu’un iha termu real.

Polítika “front-loading” no ninia benefísiu

Planu Estratéjiku Dezenvolvimentu (PED) hatudu dalan ba Timor-Leste iha nia dalan naruk hodi atinji ninia mehi hodi sai nasaun ho rendimentu médiu-altu iha tinan 2030 ho populasaun matenek, saudável no próspera. PED oferese solusaun ida ba dezenvolvimentu ekonomia naun-petrolífera ho tarjetu espesífiku ba iha dezenvolvimentu agrikultura, turizmu no industria petrolífera.

Timor-Leste hetan bensaun ho rekursu natural oin-oin, inkuindu mina no gas. Enkuantu mina no gas finansia tiha kresimentu nasaun ida ne’e nian desde independénsia, tempu to’o ona atu Timor-Leste realiza mos ninia potensia iha área sira seluk liu husi diversifika ninia ekonomia no hamenus dependénsia ba mina no gas. Ida ne’e signifika ita tenki kria ambiente suportável importante rua – infraestrutura diak ho rekursu humanu kualifikadu – hodi suporta no dudu kresimentu ekonomia naun-petrolífera no fasilita investimentu seitor privadu.

Nasaun sira seluk depende ba impréstimu, ajudu doadór, remitánsia no fonte finansiamentu seluk hodi finansia sira nia nasaun no ekonomia. Timor-Leste hetan bensaun iha FP. Polítika “front-loading” fo-bibán ba governu hodi halais dezenvolvimentu infra-estrutura no rekursu humanu. FMI mos konkorda katak polítika fiskal ida ríjida bazeia ba HRP la-apropridada ba nasaun sub-dezenvolvidu riku rekursu natural hanesan Timor-Leste.Tuir FMI, ba nasaun hirak ne’e, wainhira kapital inisial iha sira nia ekonomia sei ki’ik, inkluindu infra-estrutura no rekursu humanu, retornu no produtividade ne’ebé sei hetan husi despeza sosial no kapital governu halo sei boot liu retornu finanseiru husi investimentu de poupansa. FMI mos aumenta katak hodi halo investimentu barak liu ba jerasaun agora ne’ebé kiak sei fo benefísiu bo’ot liu. Ita la-bele julga benefísiu husi investimentu hirak ne’e tuir perspektiva fiskal ida klo’ot. Benefísiu husi investimentu hirak ne’e presiza tempu hodi realiza no kolekta liu husi kanal formal sira hanesan impostu no taxa.

Investimentu iha portu, estrada, eletrisidade, drainajen no rekursu humanu sei fo benefísiu ba timor oan sira. Portu Tibar sei hamenus atrazu no tráfiku, hadiak komérsiu entre Timor-Leste ho ninia parseiru komersial sira no potensialmente bele sai hanesan sentru lojístiku ba rejiaun ida ne’e. Timor-Leste ida iha koneksaun diak liu husi estrada, portu no aero-portu sei fasilita movimentu efisiente sasán no ema iha rai-laran no mos ba no husi rai-liur.

Aleim de suporta empregu iha prosesu konstrusaun no produsaun material, projetu sira ne’e sei dezenvolve mos kapasidade produtiva ekonomia rai-laran liu husi positivamente influensia produtividade seitor privadu no hasa’e retornu kapital privadu hodi rezulta iha impaktu benefisial longu-prazu. Liu husi aumentu iha despeza husi traibalador sira ne’ebé servisu iha seitor hirak ne’e, sei fo impaktu positivu ba ekonomia nasaun ida nian. Benefísiu husi investimentu iha infra-estrutura sei bo’ot, wainhira rekursu sira iha ekonomia ida nia laran seidauk uza ho másimu. Projetu hirak ne’e la’os deit fo benefísiu ba jerasaun agora, maibé mos jerasaun futura liu husi kapital sira dezenvolvidu ona, em forma servisu públiku no kondisaun moris diak no rekursu humanu kualifikadu. Wainhira projetu báziku hirak ne’e remata ona, sira sei kontribui ba estimulasaun kresimentu ekonómiku, ne’ebé ikus mai tradús ba iha reseita doméstika ne’ebé bo’ot. Desde ne’ebá, despeza governu nian sei fila fali ba nivel ida konsistente ho RSE.

Tempu investe – agora ou nunca

Eim jeral, ita hotu konkorda katak Timor-Leste presiza diversifika ninia ekonomia. Atu halo ida ne’e, ita presiza atrai seitor privadu hodi investe barak liu iha seitor produtivu sira. Esperiensia durante tinan hirak liu ba hatudu mai ita katak maske Timor-Leste oferese taxa de imposto ki’ik ho insentivu oin-oin, maibé investimentu seitor privadu, tantu lokal no internasional, sei limitadu. Impendimentu ba ida ne’e la-seluk la le’et tamba deit falta de infra-etrutura no rekursu humanu. Enkuantu seitor privadu sei dúvida hela hodi investimentu, governu tenki foti responsabilidade hodi hahú investe no dezenvolve nasaun ida ne’e. Laiha tempu diak hodi investe sé laos agora. Gasta deit RSE mos risku ida. La investe agora simplemeste signifika ita adia fali problema agora ba tempu seluk ne’ebé sei kria tutan fali problema foun seluk iha tempu tuir mai no ida ne’e sei hasusar ita hodi halo desizaun sira iha futuru ho kustu boot liu tan. Timor-Leste la-bele lakon tan oportunidade sira ne’ebé nia lakon tiha ona iha tinan sanulu liu ba. Enkuantu nasaun seluk iha mundu preokupa hela ho esesu de kapasidade, investe agora sei baratu liu duké tinan hirak oin mai. Ho ekonomia Timor-Leste nian ne’ebé seidauk atinji nia kapasidade másima, investe agora sei lori benefísiu barak duké kustu. Buat sira maka ijemplu husi desizaun defisil sira Timor-Leste tenki halo. No desizaun hirak ne’e ita tenki halo agora ou nunca.

Sé hakarak buat hotu, sei lakon buat hotu

Buat hotu iha ita nia moris ne’e la-se’es husi foti desizaun ka halo escoilha. Ita husik buat ida hodi hetan buat seluk. Ida ne’e maka ita hanaran trade-off. Prinsípiu hanesan mos ita uza hodi halo desizaun polítika ba no iha nasaun ida. Ita la-bele iha parte ida ejiji diversifikasaun ekonómika hodi redús dependénsia ba mina-rai, maibé iha tempu hanesan mos ita rezisti nesesidade hodi halo levantamentu esesu RSE hodi investe iha infra-estrutura no rekursu humanu – kondisaun bázika rua ba diversifikasaun ekonómika. Ita so bele halo ida deit, maibé la’os rua ne’e hotu. Sé lae, sé maka hakarak buat hotu, sei lakon buat hotu (quem todo quer todo perde). Ida ne’e maka desizaun (escolha) defísil sira Timor-Leste tenki halo. No hanesan ho kualker investimentu, kualker desizaun nasaun ne’e foti involve mos risku. Maibé, riksu ida ne’ebé fo benefísiu, ne’e risku ida ne’e merese atu ita foti. Benefísiu sira ita hetan husi halo investimentu agora bo’ot liu kompara ho kustu de oportunidade sira ita lakon hodi la-halo investimentu.

Maibé ita tenki kuidadu ho buat balun

Reseita mina-rai nuda’ar transformasaun husi rekursu mina-rai iha tasi okos ba rekursu finanseiru. Rekursu sira ne’e sei la-permanente. Idealmente, ita hakarak reseita naun-petrolífera finansia orsamentu estadu nian. FP sai nudaar bensaun ida mai ita hodi atinji situasaun óptima ida ne’e.

Atu halo ida ne’e, ita tenki kuidadu no fo konsiderasaun konaba investimentu públiku hirak maka ita tenki halo no ita investe lalais oinsá. Ho liafuan seluk, wainhira ita halo avaliasaun ba polítika fiskal ida apropridada, ita tenkiser fo konsiderasaun ba ekuidade entre jerasaun, kapasidade absortiva ekonomia nian no objetivu estabilizasaun makro-ekonómika,  Wainhira ita failla hodi halo ida ne’e, bele hamosu fali konsekuensia a’at seluk hanesan kustu boot, atrazu, inflasun, korupsaun no inefisiensia sira seluk.

Komentáriu ikus

Atu diversifika ninia ekonomia, Timor-Leste uluk kna-nain presiza estabelese baze fundamental rua – infra-estrutura xave ho kualidade no rekursu humanu matenek no kualifikadu. Flexibilidade iha Lei FP fo-bibán ba governu hodi halo polítika “front-loading”, levantamentu esesu RSE, hodi halais dezenvolvimentu nasaun nian. La-halo investimentu ka gasta deit RSE mos risku ida. Benefísiu sira ne’ebe ita sei hetan husi investimentu ba projetu hirak ne’e sei bo’ot liu fali kustu de oportunidade sira husi la-halo investimentu. No la-iha tempu ida diak liu hodi investe duke agora. Agora ou nunca.

Maibé iha buat balun ita presiza konsidera no kuidadu. Primeiru - investimentu públiku presiza konsidera ekuidade entre jerasaun, kapasidade absortiva ekonomia no objetivu estabelizasaun makro-ekonómika. Sigundu - hametin no hadiak liu tan jestaun finansa públika, ekzekusaun orsamental no kapasidade implemetnasaun projetu, nune’e mos dezenvolve prosesu ida rigorozu, independente no transparante ba avaliasaun proposta investimentu.Terseiru - presiza halo revizaun ba PED hodi avalia ninia progresu no aktualiza ninia pre-supostu balun. Kuartu - impréstimu bele sai hanesan opsaun ida hodi rezolve limitasaun kapasidade absortiva ekonomia nasaun nian, maibé tenkiser halo dentro de limitasaun esplísita ida. Kintu - nesesidade ba dezenvolvimentu ekonómiku tenki hetan balansu entre nesesidade ba fornesimentu produtu kualidade husi kompañia internasional versus involvimentu kompañia lokal. Sestu - presiza konsidera aprosimasaun rua ba jestaun FP. Asegura montante nato’on ida ba finansiamentu nesesidade urjente no aktual ba dezenvolvimentu nasaun nian, ao mesmo tempo, poupa no investe kuantidade nato’on seluk ba jerasaun futura no tempu defísil.

Estabelesimentu FP buat ida timor-oan sira hotu tenkiser orgulhu ho. Ida ne’e sai nuda’ar alkanse importante no históriku ida ba nasaun ida ne’e. Maibé, ida ne’e deit sei la-nato’on. Buat importante seluk ita tenki halo maka iha planu no ekzekusaun orsamentu ida diak hodi evita maldisaun rekursu ne’ebé nasaun riku mina-rai sira barak hasoru. FP ne’e bensaun ida. Ita tenki asegura katak kada investimentu ne’ebe ita halo sei nakfilak bensaun ida ne’e ba bensaun seluk barak liu tan.

*Opinaun sira espresa iha artigu ida ne’e autór nian rasik no la-refleta opiniaun/hanoin husi kualker entidade ka ema ne’ebé autór servisu ba ka asosiadu ho. 

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